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Abstract
Sovereignty is regularly characterised in juridico-philosophical discourse as an 
illimitable power ‘beyond law’. It is territorialized, equated with the nation-state, 
delimited in space and time, and thus regarded as having a finite presence as the 
symbol of a particular ‘political community’. Sovereignty is also treated as an 
infinite power which transcends juridical limits. The central thesis developed here is 
that sovereignty is at once finite and infinite (in-finite). The objective of this thesis is 
to elaborate this ambivalent ‘position’ of sovereignty in relation to law. The thesis 
seeks to ‘de-position’ monistic conceptions of sovereignty through a critical 
examination of the delimited and illimitable presence, the in-flnitude, of sovereignty.
The opening concern of the thesis, then, is to identify the in-finitude of 
sovereignty in the telling instance of Australian ‘postcoloniaF law. In Australia, an 
imperial sovereign assertion which treated the continent’s indigenous people as 
barbarous and without a ‘settled law’ needed to be rendered ‘finite’ -  that is, 
delimited -  so that this sovereign excess could be disavowed in the process of 
inaugurating a ‘postcolonial’ law and society. A ‘finite’ sovereign event that took 
place ‘back then’ was central to re-presenting the juridical order as ‘post-racist’ and 
‘postcolonial’. However, the imperial sovereign ‘event’ also needed to be preserved 
as the ‘infinite’ ground of present and future law and society. Sovereignty is thus 
imbued with a ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ quality in the ‘postcolonial’ context. The 
question which then arises is how the contradictory lineaments of in-finite (finite and 
infinite) sovereignty are sustained.
The second concern of this thesis, then, is to demonstrate how in-finite 
sovereignty is impelled and sustained through the juridical limits of ‘political 
community’. For instance, Australian ‘postcolonial’ law positions the imperial 
sovereign event beyond law as this ‘event’ purportedly grounds, symbolises or 
sustains a stable political community. By demonstrating how law inscribes the 
monistic character of sovereignty with reference to the ‘political’, the ‘pure facticity’ 
or unitary presence of sovereignty is undermined. In Australia the primacy of the 
‘political’ is instantiated through the insistence of one Taw of the land’. A central
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claim made in this thesis is that ‘jurisdiction’ is the phenomenon through which the 
co-presence of sovereignty, law and the political is sustained.
The argument that in-finite sovereignty is sustained through law’s unceasing 
‘positioning’ of sovereignty/law with reference to the stability of political community 
is also elaborated through an examination of the notion of ‘jurisdiction’ in a neo­
imperial context. The ‘war on terror’, a context seemingly different from 
‘postcolonial’ Australia, reveals the pervasiveness of in-finite sovereignty, and thus 
the wider purchase of the account developed here. U.S. Courts, in deciding whether 
to grant the writ of habeas corpus to those detained in Guantanamo Bay, inscribe the 
in-finite position of the sovereign by determining the limits of jurisdiction. The 
analysis of these habeas cases demonstrates the wider significance of the argument 
developed in this thesis -  that the contradictory lineaments of in-finite sovereignty are 
sustained through law’s re-positioning of sovereignty with reference to the political.
The thesis closes by considering imperial sovereignty at its outer limits -  the 
im-possibility of sovereignty as ‘worldwide’ authority or ‘Empire’. This serves three 
functions: it emphasises the significance of ‘postcolonial’ sovereignty for developing 
an account of neo-imperial sovereignty, considers what it would mean for imperial 
sovereignty to be overcome, for it to be moved to a ‘non-place’, and suggests why the 
account of the relation between sovereignty and law as a problem of finitude should 
inform juridico-philosophical approaches to sovereignty. The conclusion stresses that 
while it is not possible to simply do away with sovereignty, the im-possibility of 
absolute sovereign authority offers a basis for imagining how sovereignty can be 
moved to a ‘non-place’. Sovereignty de-positioned by law, sovereignty as contained 
and unconditioned, that is, in-finite sovereignty, exposes the limit of what is usually 
regarded as illimitable.
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Introduction
Why ‘sovereignty’?...the trait of sovereignty ... 
The first and last question, if  not the only one, 
could then become: What happens when this trait 
divides? When it must, when it cannot not divide? 
When its division follows from the necessity o f a 
law that is undecidably that of a duty or a fate?
Jacques Derrida, “Provocation: Forwards” in 
Derrida, Without Alibi (2002), xix.
In 1993 the Wiradjuri Aboriginal people of New South Wales, Australia, 
sought a declaration from the High Court of Australia that they were a “sovereign 
nation of people”, a claim that was adverse to the sovereignty held by the Crown {Coe 
v Commonwealth (No 2) (1993), 112).1 The Wiradjuri also claimed, in the alternative, 
that they were a “domestic dependent nation” or “a free and independent people” 
(ibid). Their claim asserted the existence of some form of Aboriginal sovereignty, 
including the limited kind expressed through the notion of a ‘domestic dependent 
nation’. At the heart of their claim was the question of whether the Crown’s 
sovereignty could be challenged, and indeed, whether it could be ‘divided’ or shared. 
No such divisibility of sovereignty was permitted by the High Court. The Aboriginal 
claim to sovereignty was struck out. Chief Justice Mason stated that the various ways 
in which the plaintiff put the sovereignty claim can have no basis in domestic law and 
can have “no independent legal significance” (ibid, 115). This formulation implies 
that sovereignty can have a basis in domestic law, but also that it can occupy a 
position apart. Chief Justice Mason’s precarious formulation denies the possibility of 
Aboriginal sovereignty independent of the Australian legal system. It affirms the
1 The High Court is the highest court in Australia.
2 The latter kind of sovereignty was derived from the expression by Marshall CJ in Cherokee Nation v 
State o f  Georgia (1831), 17.
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over Australia and recognises that it is the only 
sovereignty of ‘legal significance’. Australian law refuses to recognise Aboriginal 
sovereignty. There can be no position apart for these natives, nor could they assert 
self-determination within the Australian juridical order. This decision neatly 
encapsulates the problem taken up for investigation in this thesis: what account can be 
given of the ‘position’ of (imperial) sovereignty in relation to law?3
The decision to refuse the Wiradjuri claim reiterates, with palpable fragility, 
the long standing view that the British Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over 
Australia is not justiciable in a municipal court.4 The conclusion that the plaintiffs’ 
claim lacked ‘independent legal significance’ expresses a pragmatic stance which 
‘positions’ the (re)treatment of colonial sovereignty ‘outside’ the competence of 
municipal law. A more candid expression of this stance can be found in the decision 
of Justice Jacobs who, in 1979, stated that a claim of sovereignty adverse to the 
Crown “is not cognisable in a court exercising jurisdiction under that sovereignty 
which is sought to be challenged” (Coe v The Commonwealth (No 1) (1979), 410). 
These statements by the Australian High Court manifest the essence of the ' 
problematic that I take up for investigation in this thesis. If courts both eschew and 
preserve the imperial sovereign assertion, how are these contradictory lineaments
3 Though I have drawn on the claim to Aboriginal sovereignty in Coe (No 2) (1993), this thesis is not 
about ‘Aboriginal sovereignty’ as such. At the beginning of Chapter One I will locate the decision in 
Coe (No 2) in the history of courts’ treatment of (imperial) sovereignty and its implications for the 
indigenous people of Australia. I will also return, at the conclusion of Chapter Four, to reflect on the 
implications of my enquiry for indigenous claims for self-determination.
4 A litany of cases including New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1975); Coe v The 
Commonwealth (No 1) (1979); and more recently, Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 31-2, had 
declared that the assertion of sovereignty was not justiciable in a municipal court. The last two cases 
are discussed in Chapter One. NSW v Commonwealth (1975) is cited as authority for non-justiciability 
of sovereignty in subsequent decisions, but is beyond the scope of this enquiry as it pertains to the 
extension of national maritime boundaries.
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sustained ‘within’ juridical orders that are apparently ‘postcolonial’5 and post-racist? 
In this thesis I argue that this contradiction is sustained through a conception of 
sovereignty as at once finite and infinite (in-finite). The thesis elaborates how this 
ambivalent ‘position’ of sovereignty in relation to law is sustained through the 
juridical limits of ‘political community’. Another crucial example should amply set 
the scene of this enquiry.
In 1992 the High Court of Australia in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (hereafter,
‘Mabo’) recognised for the first time since the imperial occupation and usurpation of 
Aboriginal lands by the British Crown in 1788, that Aboriginal and Torres Straight 
Islander peoples’ antecedent property rights, or ‘native title’, survived the colonial 
acquisition of sovereignty. This decision gave an account of the basis for the British 
Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over Australia, the reception of the common law 
of England in Australia, and its consequences for the proprietary rights of its 
indigenous people.6 The colonial acquisition of sovereignty was based on the 
“barbarian theory” -  the notion that the territory was acquired by the British Crown, 
and the common law of England became the Taw of the land’, because the natives 
were ‘barbarous and without a settled law’ {Mabo, 36-9). In 1992 the common law 
was ‘adjusted’ in order to recognise the antecedent property rights of the indigenous
5 ‘Postcolonial’ connotes social movements and literary, political, and juridical theories which inform 
and seek to challenge the terms, discourses and practices through which de-colonisation has taken 
place. ‘Postcolonial’ also implies an attempt to confront and (purportedly) correct a colonial ‘past’. 
However, ‘postcolonial’ is not simply a reference to a temporal, teleological progression from the 
‘colonial’ era. My argument suggests that ‘postcolonial’ always involves a movement from the ‘past’ 
to a future that is always yet to arrive. The complicity of colonised elites, rebellion o f colonised 
peoples, hybrid identities, diasporic reflections on the experience of leaving colonised societies, and 
ongoing engagements with the insidious formations of neo-colonialism are just some of the range of 
political positions invoked by the term ‘postcolonial’. For a useful discussion of the term ‘post- 
colonial’, see Ashcroft, 2001, 7-13; and Lazarus, 2001 and 2004. I have consistently used the term 
‘postcolonial’ in this thesis without wishing to distinguish it from ‘post-colonial’. I will continue to use 
the former. Unless otherwise indicated, in this enquiry ‘postcolonial’ usually refers to the attempt to 
disavow the imperial past. I will shortly point out that this is not a linear process.
6 The principal judgement is that of Brennan J, and is discussed at length in Chapter One.
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people. The Mabo decision is regarded as the ‘event’ of ‘postcolonial’ sovereignty in 
Australia, and the moment in which liberal legal institutions were renewed: “Writing 
that the common law was shamed by its racist history and the gaze of the international 
community, the justices took the occasion to alter fundamentally the conditions of 
Australian sovereignty” (Povinelli, 2002, 158). How could the conditions of 
sovereignty have been altered when judges have steadfastly refused to admit that the 
validity of sovereignty is a cognisable question? How is a colonial ‘past’ re­
conditioned to produce a ‘postcolonial’ future? How is imperial sovereignty 
positioned and de-positioned by a juridical order? In this thesis I argue that these 
questions should be addressed as the problem of the ‘limit’ that separates sovereignty 
and law.
Sovereignty is a problem of the ‘limit’ to the extent that courts must articulate 
how a past ‘event’, such as the assertion of colonial sovereignty, can be delimited so 
that it can be grasped and disavowed. This requires that the sovereign assertion be 
rendered ‘finite’. At the same time, colonial sovereignty must also be preserved as 
the ‘infinite’ ground which traverses the past, present and future of law and society.7 
Drawing from the rich vein of Australian ‘postcolonial’ law as an exemplary instance 
of the problem that is taken up for investigation, in Chapter One I elaborate how 
sovereignty is treated as at once ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ (‘in-finite’) in the ‘postcolonial’ 
context of Australia. The overall objective in the thesis is to articulate the relationship 
between (imperial) sovereignty and law. The notion of ‘in-finite’ sovereignty neatly
7 The positivist approach to this problem asks whether sovereignty is ‘limited’ or ‘unlimited’ (Malbon, 
2003, 323-31). Malbon investigates whether the sovereign has a limited or unlimited power to 
extinguish native title in Australia. Deploying Karl Popper, he considers whether to adopt an 
‘essentialist’ or ‘nominalist’ approach to whether sovereignty is limited or unlimited. But neither of 
these approaches thinks through the question of the ‘limit’, which after all is what is at stake when it is 
asked whether sovereignty is ‘limited’ or ‘unlimited’.
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captures the spatial aspect of imperial sovereignty (the usurpation of territory and the 
creation of a delimited nation state), and the temporal aspect of inaugurating 
‘postcolonial’ law by preserving and disavowing this sovereign ‘event’. As we will 
see in the course of the discussion, sovereignty as finite and/or infinite is a common 
conceptual feature of numerous approaches to the character of imperial sovereignty.8
Methodology
As I have just demonstrated, the ambivalent ‘position’ of sovereignty (its finite 
and infinite character) is identified in the texts of Australian ‘postcolonial’ law, and 
from them I extract a more general problem for examination (the ‘limit’ that sustains 
the separation between sovereignty and law). These cases are examples of what 
Fitzpatrick called the “telling instance” of a situation in which is embedded a 
“reiterative concern of the modem period” (Fitzpatrick, 2001a, 4). The identification 
of the contradictory lineaments (both finite and infinite) of sovereignty in Australian 
‘postcolonial’ law signals and amplifies a problem that is of wider concern in 
accounts of modem law.9 An imperial sovereign assertion is the factual instance that 
grounds the juridical order, yet at the same time, it is always an inadequate normative
8 Hardt and Negri’s account o f ‘Empire’ illustrates what I mean. Though I do not accept the conclusion 
they reach, the account they give attributes ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ qualities to sovereignty. For instance, 
they chart a movement from ‘old’ imperialism, where the imperial sovereign was based in the nation­
state, to a new form of sovereignty they call ‘Empire’, where imperial sovereignty has a totalising, 
worldwide (that is, spatially and temporally infinite) reach (Hardt and Negri, 2000 and 2004).
9 This wider concern is illustrated in the theoretical engagements with sovereignty that I draw upon in 
the course of the discussion. For instance, there is a renewed interest in the theoretical jurisprudence of 
Carl Schmitt, the ‘theorist of the exception’, or in my terms, the theorist of the ‘limit’ between 
sovereignty and law (Schmitt, 1922/1985, and 1932/1996; for contemporary treatments of this 
questioning see Derrida, 1997, Ch 5-6; Agamben 1998 and 2005; Mouffe (ed.) (1999); Nancy, 2000c; 
and Rasch, 2004, Ch. 1-2). I discuss Schmitt’s thought in Chapter Three. The renewed interest in 
Schmitt demonstrates that the ‘finitude’ of sovereignty is a persistent concern o f political philosophers 
and jurists. A novel and contemporary ‘telling situation’ sharpens the significance of treating much 
older and persistent juridical concerns. I have thus posed the question of the ‘finitude’ or ‘limit’ of 
sovereignty in the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context, but extended the concern to other persistent and 
related questions such as the limits of ‘political community’ and ‘jurisdiction’.
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base for future law and society. As Fitzpatrick put it, these telling situations combine 
the “evidentiary with authoritative assertion” (ibid). The authority that is supposed to 
be revealed by the High Court recounting the imperial assertion of sovereignty in the 
Australian ‘postcolonial’ setting is found, in my account, to be lacking any of the 
certainty that such a (sovereign) foundation would want to disclose. But this lack of 
certainty, revealed here through the tension identified between finite and infinite 
sovereignty in the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context, proves to be very useful for 
examining the wider question of the relationship between sovereignty and law. Let 
me elaborate how this approach is brought to bear on the empirical material I 
examine, and how the wider theoretical concerns are brought forth. The strategy can 
conveniently be set out along with the contents of each Chapter.
Outline o f Chapters
I describe how the Australian courts have dealt with the colonial acquisition of 
sovereignty in Chapter One. This principally involves identifying how sovereignty is 
at once positioned ‘outside’ law, but also preserved as the infinite ground of present 
and future law and society. A more general question about the ‘limit’ between 
sovereignty and law is then extracted from the court decisions that have dealt with 
imperial sovereignty. The persistent or ‘reiterative’ concern of modem sovereignty is 
identified by deploying the concept of ‘finitude’.10 ‘Finitude’ aptly captures the 
problem of delimiting (imperial) sovereignty. The relationship between sovereignty 
and law, I assert, discloses a problem of ‘finitude’, one that is of wider significance to 
theoretical discourses on sovereignty. I draw principally on the thought of Jean-Luc
101 will shortly explain why Jean-Luc Nancy’s post-Heideggerian treatment of ‘finitude’ is the central 
prism through which I examine the relationship between sovereignty and law.
13
Nancy in order to explain how the question of the limit between sovereignty and law 
can be dealt with as a problem of ‘finitude’. By identifying the contradictory 
lineaments (at once finite and infinite) of sovereignty - a phenomenon which is 
supposed to be stable, grounding, and beyond question - I have extracted a 
problematic that can stimulate a wider discussion about sovereignty. Empirical 
material in the form of judicial decisions pertaining to the question of (imperial) 
sovereignty is examined in order to identify the tensions and contradictions which 
reveal that the ‘presence’ of sovereignty is unstable. Sovereignty as at once ‘finite’ 
and ‘infinite’, for instance, expresses the spatial and temporal instability afrd 
indeterminacy of sovereignty.
In Chapter Two I consider how, despite the im-possibility of allocating a 
secure ‘presence’ to sovereignty, it is an ‘event’ regularly deployed in judicial 
accounts as a ‘monistic’ phenomenon that is the ‘Subject’ and the ‘Symbol’ of a 
unified ‘political community’. I argue that such ‘monistic’ sovereignty is sustained 
by some other ‘essence’ -  a point I make by considering how Australian cases give an 
account of the ‘political community’ of the ‘nation’ united by one Sovereignty and 
one ‘law of the land’. Australian courts after Mabo have determined whether 
indigenous communities are ‘native-enough’ to be granted the belated recognition of 
their property rights by the ‘postcolonial’ juridical order (Yorta Yorta v Victoria 
(1998) and (2002)). These cases disclose that when courts delimit the position apart 
(from law) of sovereignty, they do so by claiming that sovereign power re-presents a 
unitary idea of the ‘political’, or that the ‘nation state’ re-presents a juridical construct 
whose stability cannot be disrupted by admitting other (customary) normative orders 
that sustain community. The re-presentation of (‘stable’) sovereignty through the
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‘political’, the space of ‘being-in-common’11, sustains the otherwise nebulous 
phenomenon of sovereignty. Sovereignty, I will argue, is content-less, but 
nonetheless reiterated by law through the idea that sovereignty symbolises a ‘political 
community’.12 I introduce this argument in Chapter Two by examining how 
Australian courts express monistic sovereignty through a unified ‘political 
community’ with one ‘law of the land’. One ‘law of the land’ is sustained through the 
phenomenon of ‘jurisdiction’. ‘Jurisdiction’, I argue, manifests, and indeed is the 
carrier of, the co-presence of sovereignty, law and the political.
The co-presence of sovereignty, law and the political proposed in Chapter 
Two cannot be fully explored or developed with reference only to the material drawn 
from the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context. For this reason Chapter Three engages 
with the U.S Courts’ decisions on whether to grant the writ of habeas corpus to those 
indefinitely detained at the whim of the U.S Government in Guantanamo Bay. 
Although the ‘war on terror’ is a context seemingly different from ‘postcolonial’ 
Australia, it reveals the pervasiveness of in-finite sovereignty. U.S. Courts, in 
deciding whether to grant the writ of habeas corpus, inscribe the in-finite position of 
the sovereign by determining the limits of jurisdiction. In-finite sovereignty is 
sustained by law ‘positioning’ sovereignty/law with regard to the stability of political 
community. The analysis of these habeas cases demonstrates the wider significance 
of the argument developed in this thesis -  that the contradictory lineaments of in­
finite sovereignty are sustained through law’s re-positioning of sovereignty with 
reference to the political.
11 A phrase which I elaborate through Nancy in Chapter One and Chapter Two.
121 will shortly provide a further account of why the ‘political’ is central to understanding the 
relationship between sovereignty and law. As my justification for dealing with the ‘political’ is largely 
influenced by Jean-Luc Nancy, I shall elaborate the significance of the ‘political’ when I explain why 
this enquiry is principally informed by his thought.
15
Chapter Three thus serves two principal functions. It continues the 
elaboration of how the position of sovereignty in relation to law is determined in and 
through the limits of ‘political community’. But it also demonstrates the wider 
significance of my account of sovereignty developed with reference to ‘postcolonial’ 
Australia, but now with reference to what Derek Gregory has called the “colonial 
present” (Gregory, 2004). The habeas corpus cases in relation to those detained in 
the U.S Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay are an apt choice for considering the link 
between sovereignty, law and ‘political community’ for several reasons. The 
detainees were captured during the ‘war on terror’. Like previous imperial adventures 
this war is undertaken in the name of ‘civilisation’ and against ‘barbarians’ (Ignatieff, 
2003b, .3, 21; for a critique see Gregory, 2004, 251). The ‘barbarian’ foe is once 
again racialised -  the ‘Arab’ or more widely, the ‘rigid’, ‘frozen’ Muslim 
fundamentalist, who seeks to destroy that other chimera of colonialism, the ‘West’. 
The treatment of the habeas corpus cases that pertain to the detainees in Guantanamo 
Bay, despite their seeming disparity to the ‘postcolonial’ context, dramatically 
indicates how the in-finitude of sovereignty is not confined to ‘postcolonial’ law and 
society. The problem of the in-finitude of sovereignty is of more general significance, 
and the treatment of these habeas corpus cases is the ‘hinge’ by which this enquiry 
opens towards a wider treatment of the problem of sovereignty in neo-imperial 
settings. In both the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context and the U.S courts’ decisions 
on their jurisdiction in relation to Guantanamo Bay, a Taw of the land’, a law o f  
community and ‘nation’, is invoked in order to set the ‘limit’ between sovereignty and 
law. It is the stability of ‘nation’ (in Mabo (No 2)) or the concerns of ‘national 
security’ (in relation to the ‘war on terror’) that are regularly deployed to sustain a
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‘limit’ between sovereignty and law. To repeat, the tension between finite and 
infinite sovereignty is sustained by courts articulating the ‘limits’ of political 
community, usually in the form of the nation-state. However, contemporary 
discourses on sovereignty claim that sovereignty and political community have now 
surpassed being delimited by the nation-state. Rather than delimited sovereignty and 
political community in the form of the nation-state, it is suggested that a new juridical 
category of ‘Empire’ and community as the ‘multitude’ is emerging (Hardt and Negri, 
2000 and 2004). Sovereign authority, it is claimed, is becoming ‘worldwide’. Is 
sovereignty no longer in-finite? Has sovereignty become infinite?
In Chapter Four, then, the analytic of in-finite sovereignty developed in the
three preceding Chapters will be brought to bear on contemporary accounts of
sovereignty purportedly becoming ‘worldwide’ in an era of ‘globalised’ sovereign
authority (e.g Nancy, 1997; Hardt and Negri, 2000, and 2004). 13 The treatment of
sovereignty in the first three Chapters is confined to ‘national’ sovereignty and law.
But there is a proliferation of claims that sovereignty is surpassing its erstwhile
delimitation within a particular nation-state and is taking form as ‘worldwide
authority’ in an era of ‘globalisation’. Hardt and Negri’s account of the sovereignty
of ‘Empire’ is selected for close scrutiny precisely because their claims about imperial
and ‘postcolonial’ sovereignty are the opposite of what I argue throughout the thesis.
My argument is that the finitude of sovereignty, like the finitude of being, can only
‘be’ through the ‘sharing’ and crossing of ‘limits’ that sustain but also always exceed
sovereignty.14 The ‘event’ of sovereignty is an endless process of being-delimited in
relation to law and with respect to a particular ‘political community’ -  an infinite
13 There is a substantial difference between Nancy’s and Hardt and Negri’s treatment of this issue. I 
elaborate this difference at length in Chapter Four.
141 will shortly elaborate how this argument is derived from Jean-Luc Nancy’s thought.
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experience of finite sovereignty. Reducing Hardt and Negri’s argument to the terms 
of my enquiry for the time being, their assertion is that sovereignty is no longer 
‘finite’ -  that is, associated with territory, ‘people’, ‘nation’, coloniser, the Occident 
or the state. On their account, the sovereignty of the nation-state is coming to an end. 
Instead of discrete sovereign entities which re-present a particular political 
community and its law, Hardt and Negri herald an infinite form of sovereignty called 
‘Empire’.
The second reason for considering sovereignty as ‘Empire’ in Chapter Four is 
in order to treat it as a point of departure for stressing the im-possibility of 
‘globalised’ imperial sovereignty. For Nancy, ‘community’ should not be delimited 
by the being-in-common re-presented through sovereignty. Sovereignty should 
instead be ‘Nothing’, a ‘non-place’ (Nancy, 2000c, 139; and generally 2000b).15 Is 
‘worldwide’ authority an instance of the ‘end of sovereignty’ or sovereignty as 
‘Nothing’? Hardt and Negri announce the end of the sovereignty of the nation-state, 
only to herald the emergence of a new ‘global’ mode of sovereignty they call 
‘Empire’. Empire encompasses all modes of social, economic and political being -  
sovereign power expands its boundaries to “envelop the entire globe” (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000, 189). What is proclaimed as a ‘new’ imperial logic of global rule has 
implications for enterprises which seek a ‘postcolonial’ or anti-imperial juridical 
order. As Hardt and Negri claim that the “end of history” has ushered in “the reign of 
peace”, and that imperial, inter-imperial and anti-imperialist wars are over (ibid), it is 
apt to question what bearing these claims may have on ‘postcolonial’ and anti­
imperial enterprises that are concerned with resisting ongoing and ever-present forms
151 discuss what it means for sovereignty to be ‘Nothing’ in Chapter One and in Chapter Four.
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of imperial domination. This questioning will return us to the problem posed at the 
beginning of the enquiry -  how might the ‘position’ of sovereignty in relation to law 
be conceived in order that it facilitates a ‘postcolonial’ and anti-imperial enterprise. 
At the conclusion of Chapter Four, then, I return to address how an account of in­
finite sovereignty can inform ‘postcolonial’ and anti-imperial political and juridical 
enterprises.
Jean-Luc Nancy and the ‘Finitude’ of Sovereignty
As indicated earlier, the problem of the ‘limit’ between sovereignty and law 
will be addressed in this enquiry through Jean-Luc Nancy’s critique of ‘finitude’.16 
Indeed, this enquiry is primarily informed by Nancy’s politico-philosophical thought. 
I should thus explain, by way of introduction, why the notion of the ‘limit’ or 
‘finitude’ is a productive means of addressing the relationship between sovereignty 
and law and why Nancy’s thinking has informed the enquiry. The problem of the 
limit which separates sovereignty from law has purchase in many contexts including 
the ‘postcolonial’. The general question is often posed in terms which ask whether 
sovereignty is limited or beyond limit -  as if the limited and illimitable have a secure 
‘presence’ which can be conceptually or empirically grasped.17 Rather than ask 
whether sovereignty is limited or beyond limit, the question I attempt to address is the 
nature of the ‘limit’. Does a ‘limit’ absolutely separate what is enclosed? What 
account can be given of what is adjacent to the conceptual (and cultural, national, 
communal, legal etc.) border of sovereignty? These are all different ways of asking
16 An extensive account of Nancy’s critique of finitude and other salient aspects of his thought is given 
in Chapter One.
17 This is often the approach of international relations theory and is discussed through the work of 
Bartelson (1995) in Chapter One.
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the same question -  what account can be given of a delimited ‘position’ and the 
‘relation’ with whatever inevitably lies beyond this position? For my purposes this 
line of questioning enables me to address the purported position of sovereignty 
beyond law. Examining these questions is the task which, as the title of the thesis 
indicates, I have termed ‘de-positioning' sovereignty.
Throughout this thesis I deploy Nancy’s critique of the finitude of being. 
Being is finite. The existence of an individual being begins at birth and ends at death, 
and yet, knowledge of finitude is not derived from a being experiencing her own birth
1 Ror death. The problem of finitude is a problem of metaphysics. The metaphysical
question taken up by Nancy, after and beyond Heidegger, is the extent to which the
‘subject’, the ‘I’ or ‘singular being’, is exceeded by its metaphysical re-presentation as
a ‘subject’. The individual being, Nancy argues, experiences its finitude by being in
community: “Death is indissociable from community, for it is through death that the
community reveals itself -  and reciprocally” (Nancy, 1991, 14). The ‘reciprocal’
revelation of the death of the finite being through community, and community
through this death, places the singular being indissociably in relation. It is only by
observing the finitude of another -  the death of another being -  that a singular being
can have knowledge of her own finitude. This account of finitude stresses the
-impossibility of a position absolutely apart, or a ‘limit’ which absolutely separates
‘inside’ from ‘outside’. Position (always) implies relation. In this thesis I bring this
thinking to bear on the being of sovereignty, and on the relation between sovereignty
and law. For instance, where courts assert that sovereignty is ‘finite’ or ‘infinite’ -
e.g. sovereignty as absolutely beyond law, capable of being grasped as a discrete
18 It is beyond the scope of my enquiry to chart the development of this problem in the history of 
metaphysical thought. However, I will shortly explain why the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy, in 
particular his critique of finitude, informs all aspects of my argument.
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entity in order that it can be disavowed, or as all encompassing, transcending space 
and time - Nancy’s critique of finitude enables one to question the possibility of such 
in-finitude. When courts position sovereignty outside law, I question how such 
separation, such being-apart, is sustained.
There is another significant aspect of Nancy’s thinking which I draw on in this 
thesis. That is his thought of ‘community’ which is central to his critique of finitude. 
Nancy develops his critical engagement with community along with his account of the 
im-possibility of a singular being. A singular being exceeds the metaphysical 
characterisation of being as a ‘subject’ precisely because of the ‘excess’ (death) that 
marks the finitude of being -  that is, the subject cannot say that it is dead, she cannot 
announce her death, even though this death most properly belongs to her (Nancy, 
1991, 14). Thus characterising being as a ‘subject’ (the metaphysical treatment of 
being) does not say nearly enough about this being’s existence. Departing from 
Heidegger’s emphasis on dasein (the German noun for existence), Nancy emphasises 
the importance of examining mitsein (or being-with) (Nancy, ibid).19 The finitude of 
being cannot be grasped other than in community. It is only by being-with others that 
‘we’ can have knowledge of our own death (Nancy, ibid, 14-15). This emphasis on 
‘relation’, being-in-common, as a condition of ascertaining ‘position’, is central to the 
argument I develop in order to give an account of the ‘limit’ that separates 
sovereignty and law. Moreover, I draw on Nancy’s critique of any essential basis for 
community in interrogating ‘nation’, ‘tradition’, ‘native’, or a notion of the ‘civilised’, 
all of which arise in the ‘postcolonial’ or neo-imperial contexts examined.
19 It is beyond the scope of my enquiry to provide an account of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics.
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I should stress that my treatment of sovereignty through Nancy’s critique of 
the finitude of being or account of community is not a novel extension of his thought. 
Nancy has extended his critique of finitude to the problem of the relation between 
sovereignty and law (see Nancy, 1991 and 2000c discussed at length below). 
Moreover he brings the critique of finitude to bear on postcolonial studies (see Nancy, 
2003d) and on the question of sovereignty in an era of ‘globalisation’ (see Nancy, 
1997, 2003e and 2003f -  discussed in Chapter Four). All these aspects of Nancy’s 
thought are considered and developed in the course of the discussion.20
Nancy’s thinking on community also provoked attention to a matter that I 
signalled earlier -  the importance of ‘political community’ for understanding the 
relationship between sovereignty and law. Permit me, then, to say a little more about 
why I argue that the notion of the ‘political’ is so central to understanding the 
relationship between sovereignty and law. The question of the ‘political’, as with 
sovereignty, is a problem of the ‘limit’. My argument is influenced by Lacoue- 
Labarthe and Nancy’s account of how the ‘political’ is a problematic constituted by
the concepts of ‘people’ and ‘sovereignty’ (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1996, 115-
21116). ‘People’ and ‘sovereignty’ are staged as a closure (ibid). ‘People’ and 
‘sovereignty’ are thus questions of the ‘limit’. The closure is determined by a 
‘measure’ for membership of ‘people’, for instance, as ‘race’, ‘traditional native’, 
‘ethnos’, ‘civilised’ and so on. All these closures that sustain the ‘political’ as 
‘people’ or community feature in the postcolonial and neo-imperial contexts in which
201 should stress at the outset that as my account of sovereignty develops in the course of the 
discussion, there is a degree of repetition of Nancy’s critique of finitude. While the exposition of the 
central tenets of Nancy’s critique of finitude is set out in Chapter One, related aspects of his thought 
(e.g on community, jurisdiction, ‘sense’ o f the ‘world’) are developed in subsequent Chapters.
211 provide a more detailed account o f their thought on this question in Chapter Two and develop it 
further in Chapter Three.
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I examine the problem of in-finite sovereignty. Indeed it could be said that the 
political occupies a place in-between sovereignty and law. Sovereignty is 
(sometimes) a symbol of this essential basis for community as ‘people’ or ‘nation’. 
The closure on community, for instance, in a ‘traditional’ indigenous community, is 
resolved by some ‘essence’. While the ‘in-fmitude’ of sovereignty renders 
sovereignty unstable and indeterminate, the ‘essence’ by which ‘political community’ 
is delimited offers an(other) basis by which sovereignty can be given some substantial 
content or be delimited in space/time. This account of the significance of ‘political 
community’ for articulating the ‘position’ of sovereignty is consistent with influential
'yy  # ,
accounts of the relationship between sovereignty and the political. My intervention 
is to explain how a sovereign exclusion, by an essence as ‘measure’ for membership 
in community, or the decision on the enemy, does not render the excluded entirely 
apart, but rather, sustains a ‘relation’ that constitutes the position of sovereignty in 
relation to law.23
Some crucial caveats before proceeding. This thesis should not be read as 
providing an exhaustive history of the relation between imperial sovereignty and law. 
The contexts examined are necessarily limited -  and in the opening section of 
Chapter One I will explain why the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context is the ‘telling 
instance’ which so aptly poses the problematic investigated here. Where comparisons 
are made, for instance with ‘postcolonial’ Canada in Chapter Two, the extent of the 
comparison is limited to what is necessary to support the argument being developed.
22 Carl Schmitt, for instance, explained how the central sovereign decision of juridical and political 
importance -  indeed the decision that identified the sovereign qua sovereign - was the decision on 
friend/enemy, the decision on the ‘political’ (see Schmitt, 1996, discussed in Chapter Three).
231 make this argument about the political in Chapter Three through Nancy’s and Agamben’s treatment 
of the ambivalent position of ‘abandoned being’ both inside/outside the juridical and political order, see 
Nancy, 1993b, and Agamben, 1998.
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The thesis does not seek to rehearse the extensive literature in political philosophy or 
international relations that have dealt with the nature of sovereignty of its relation to 
law. That is not to say that this study does not have implications for understanding 
sovereignty in those fields of enquiry -  but I have not sought to foreground or develop 
the connections here.24 The problem of sovereignty dealt with here is principally of 
an imperial variety. Characterising sovereignty as in-finite, both finite and infinite, 
does suggest that sovereignty is both contained and illimitable. It is this im­
possibility of sovereignty that the enquiry seeks to chart. By examining the im­
possibility of ‘postcolonial’ sovereignty, it is hoped that this study will contribute to a 
growing literature in ‘postcolonial’ theory and law. The intention is to offer an 
account of sovereignty that resists the pragmatic, utilitarian, and state-centred 
compromise that courts reach when they account for the relation of law to imperial 
sovereignty. The compromise manifests the failure of ‘postcoloniality’. However, 
what is revealed from within the texts of law is that the terms of the failure -  the im­
possibility of a simultaneous disavowal and preservation of an excessive sovereign 
power, is indeed the ‘event’ of ‘postcolonial’ sovereignty. This im-possible ‘event’ 
unravels in and through law.25
24 The critical engagement with Bartelson, 1995, in Chapter One, and Hardt and Negri, 2000 and 2004, 
and Simpson, 2004, in Chapter Four, serves to highlight the significance of my analysis for debates 
about sovereignty in political philosophy, and international relations theory.
25 Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying what is signified by the ‘im-possibility ’ of sovereignty. The 
‘im-possibility’ of sovereignty refers to the character of sovereignty as both delimited and illimitable, 
finite and infinite. Sovereignty is thus an ‘event’ that does not have a ‘presence’ as such. This im­
possibility of sovereignty is disclosed, I will argue, through a variety of instances of its in-finitude 
which will be elaborated below.
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CHAPTER 1 
De-Positioning Sovereignty
Boundaries are central to the discourse of sovereignty. It is not merely 
a case of physical boundaries ... but of cultural boundaries which 
separate the ‘same’ from the ‘other’, and of conceptual boundaries 
which distinguish the domestic from the international, community from 
anarchy, and the universal from the particular. ... Outside these 
boundaries there exists no order, no community, no framework for 
conducting normative discourse.
Camilleri and Falk (1992), The End of Sovereignty?, 237-8.
... [Sovereignty stands as the representation of the autonomy of the 
political. By drawing on an intrinsically collective notion of political 
power -  what Arendt referred to as ‘the worldly in-between space by 
which men are mutually related’ -  sovereignty can be recognised to be 
a relational phenomenon.
Loughlin (2003), “Ten Tenets of Sovereignty” in Walker (ed.),
Sovereignty in Transition, 80.
... [Sovereignty and community can be the mere outline of an area of 
shared jurisdiction, or else they can identify themselves as the subject 
of a fundamental legitimacy. In the first case, sovereignty and 
community tend to be nothing -  to repeat once again the formula that 
George Bataille exhausted himself in thinking through, “Sovereignty is 
NOTHING”. ... In the second case, they are not merely something but 
the res cogitans of a subject effecting in person the autoteleology of its 
substance (whether this person be the people, the leader, the fatherland, 
the class, or the individual, as long as it is “consciousness” or “spirit”).
Nancy (1997), The Sense of the World, 107.
A range of legal and politico-philosophical discourses characterise sovereignty 
as a phenomenon with a spatial and temporal ‘limit’. Physical, cultural and 
conceptual ‘boundaries’ and ‘limits’ seem central to characterisations of sovereignty 
(see epigraph from Camilleri and Falk). Sovereignty is at once discrete or delimited 
and also a ‘relational phenomenon’ (see epigraph from Loughlin). On the other hand, 
sovereignty, in its classic instantiation, is also ‘without limit’ -  the supreme power 
with nothing above or beyond it. Sovereignty represents the ‘autonomy’ of the 
political (see epigraph from Loughlin). These various discourses elaborate the 
‘position’ of sovereignty in time and space. The metaphor of inside/outside space and 
time asserts a territorially and historically graspable ‘presence’ that can be attributed
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to sovereignty.26 Sovereignty is thus many things, but always imbued with a 
delimited ‘presence’ and ‘position’. In this Chapter I call into the question a discrete 
‘presence’ and ‘position’ attributable to sovereignty. I argue that sovereignty is not 
discrete or ‘finite’. Nor is it possible to claim, I argue, that sovereignty is an ‘infinite’ 
totality with nothing beyond it. Interrogating the problem of limits, finitude, 
‘presence’ and relation must itself be contained in order to avoid the illimitability of 
such abstractions. Therefore, this Chapter interrogates the ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ 
quality attributed to sovereignty by examining the attempt to inaugurate a 
‘postcolonial’ law and society in Australia.
In the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context, the colonial sovereign ‘event’ that 
founded the colony and established its juridical order is both preserved and 
disavowed. In order to preserve the sovereign ‘event’ it is given an ‘infinite’ quality 
whereby sovereignty is ungraspable, beyond limit (non-justiciable). However, in 
order to distinguish the ‘postcolonial’ legal order from its foundation in a sovereign 
assertion that regarded indigenous people as ‘barbarous’ and ‘without a settled law’, 
the present common law needs to assert that the foundation can be adjusted or 
‘shifted’. Australian ‘postcolonial’ law, in its belated recognition of indigenous rights 
and interests in land, thus provides the opportunity to examine the contradictory 
lineaments of finitude and infinity attributed to sovereignty.
26 For a thorough critique of this metaphor of inside/outside in relation to sovereignty, see R.B J  
Walker, 1993, Ch.8.
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Over the past several decades indigenous people in settler-colonies such as
77Australia have obtained legal recognition of their proprietary rights in land. In the 
case of Australia the recognition of indigenous rights in land took place after two 
centuries of courts refusing to acknowledge the proprietary and other interests that 
indigenous people hold in relation to land. The Mabo decision is commonly regarded 
as a retreat from the racist assumption that Australia was a vacant land or terra 
nullius}% The Australian High Court’s recognition that indigenous peoples held 
proprietary interests in land (‘native title’) was touted as the full recognition of their 
humanity, and was heralded as a retreat from legally endorsed practices of 
marginalisation which were central to the establishment of British colonies in 
Australia.29 However, the recognition of indigenous property rights has been 
subordinated to the sovereign act which founded a colony. The foundation of a 
colony and its juridical order have been characterised as sovereign ‘acts of state’ 
{Mabo, 31).30 These sovereign acts are declared to be non-justiciable in municipal 
courts. Recognition of ‘native title’ is also subordinated to subsequent ‘acts of state’, 
the sovereign acts of the respective Parliaments of the Colonies (later states of the 
Commonwealth of Australia) which issued tenures and thus alienated the land 
appropriated from indigenous people.
At stake in Mabo was a ‘de-positioning’ of sovereignty in order to inaugurate 
a ‘postcolonial’ law and society. It thus offers an exemplary opportunity to examine
27 In this study I focus on indigenous land rights claims in Australia, with some limited comparisons 
with Canada. The landmark decision of the Australian High Court in Mabo v Queensland (No 2)
(1992) 175 CLR 1 (hereafter Mabo) is discussed at length in this thesis. In this decision the reasons for 
judgement of Brennan J is commonly regarded as the leading judgment.
28 For a sample of commentaries which treat Mabo as a recognition of ‘difference’, see: Detmold, 1995; 
Patton, 1995 and 1997; Webber, 1995.
29 For a critique of the limits of this form of recognition, see Motha, 1998.
30 For a historical account o f the foundation of the colony, see Castles, 1982; and Neal, 1991.
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the relationship between sovereignty and law. The recognition of native title rights is 
legitimated on the basis that it is consistent with the emergence of pluralist, 
multicultural, cosmopolitan societies that embrace ‘universal human rights’ as their 
core values. But the renewal of legal institutions, the production of a ‘post-racist’ and 
‘postcolonial’ future, is the instance of a certain remembering of the ‘past’. Law’s 
response to the legacy of the colonial conquest of territory, dispossession of land and 
destruction of indigenous forms of social organisation, recalls colonial sovereignty 
and requires the re-positioning of this sovereign ‘event’ as the condition for 
inaugurating a ‘postcolonial’, ‘post racist’ law and society. Recalling the ‘event’ of 
sovereignty as something that took place “back then” raises the question of the 
‘graspability’ of such an ‘event’. What is the nature of this sovereign ‘event’ and 
what is law’s relationship to it? Does this sovereign ‘event’ have a ‘presence’ that 
can be preserved or disavowed? These are questions I wish to pose as the very 
possibility of a finite sovereignty (delimited and graspable). Such a delimited 
phenomenon is asserted when sovereignty is retained as foundation, ‘positioned’ in 
the ‘past’, and disavowed as inconsistent with a ‘post-racist’ and ‘post-colonial’ law 
and society.
My argument will proceed as follows. I will extract the problematic of a 
monistic or finite sovereignty through the exemplary instance of the attempt by the 
Australian High Court to inaugurate postcolonial law and society in Australia. I will 
demonstrate how Mabo invoked a contradictory conception of sovereignty as both 
‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ as the condition for inaugurating a ‘postcolonial’ law and 
society. I will then argue, through the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy, that such 
finitude/infinity is impossible. But this impossibility is productive. The impossibility
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of finite/infinite sovereignty exposes a relation. This exposure is the occasion of 
community.
Through a discussion of the impossibility of finite/infinite sovereignty in the 
exemplary instance of Mabo, I wish to derive a more generalisable account of the 
relation between sovereignty and law that can be brought to bear on other contexts 
where the relationship between sovereignty and law is being considered -  where 
sovereignty is being consigned, distributed or re-positioned. For instance, the 
spatialised ‘position’ of sovereignty in ‘relation’ to law and territory is precisely what 
is at stake when U.S Federal Courts debate the availability of the writ of habeas 
corpus to those being detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. A discussion of 
sovereignty and law in the ‘postcolonial’ context of Australia will elicit a more 
general problematic of the ‘position’ of sovereignty in ‘relation’ to law.
1.1 Finite Sovereignty and the ‘Postcolonial’ Nation
A brief account of the legal history that conditioned the ‘postcolonial’ setting 
in which Mabo was decided is an apt place to begin. I will focus on how British 
sovereignty was asserted over indigenous lands, and on how Australian courts dealt 
with this colonial legacy prior to Mabo. The bulk of the treatment of sovereignty that 
follows thereafter will be centred on the decision in Mabo. We will see that the basic 
problem has been one of preserving Australian law’s foundation in the British 
colonial assertion of sovereignty, distinguishing the sovereign ‘nation’ and its law
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which emerged after Federation in 1900, and cleansing what is now asserted to be a 
‘postcolonial’ law and society from its colonial juridical antecedents.
1.1,1 Colonial Sovereignty o f  a ‘Postcolonial’ Nation
British sovereignty over Australia was first asserted during the voyage of 
Captain Cook along its east coast in 1770. As we will see, many attempts were made 
to inaugurate British colonial sovereignty. As the indigenous peoples of Australia 
were regarded as not being in possession of the land they occupied, Cook asserted 
control (imperium) and possession {dominium) of the territory on behalf of the British 
Crown. Ceremonies of affirmation and reaffirmation were performed to ‘seal’ 
discovery and settlement (see generally, Seed, 1995). While in Botany Bay, on the 
east coast, Cook’s expedition had “cut an inscription into a tree recording the details 
of the arrival of the ship” (Castles, 1982, 22). Presumably because solemnity and 
permanence were lacking in this original inscription, on 22 August 1770, Cook 
performed the appropriate forms for taking possession of an ‘uninhabited land’ on an 
island he perspicaciously named Possession Island (ibid). As Cook’s Official Log 
records: “At six possession was taken of this country in his Majesty’s name and under 
his colours, fired several volleys of small arms on the occasion, and cheer’d three 
times, which was answered from the ship” (ibid). Cook’s ceremonies, it seems, were 
lacking. On the arrival of the First Fleet of convicts and gaolers in Port Jackson on
31 The amalgamation of the Australian colonies to constitute a Federated nation was enabled by the The 
Commonwealth o f Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp.) passed by the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom. The Constitution o f Australia was a creature of this imperial statute. The emergence of an 
Australian nation was, even after colonisation, well and truly tied to British juridical institutions. It 
was not until the Australia Act 1986 (UK), another British Act of Parliament, and Australia Act 1986 
(Cth), that the Privy Council of the UK House of Lords ceased to be the final appellate court in the 
Australian juridical structure. Needless to say, the ‘independence’ of the Australian nation is attended 
by much ambivalence and ambiguity. For an incisive discussion of the origin of Australian law 
interrogated through the ambivalent origin of the High Court of Australia, see Dominello, 2003.
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26th January 1788 more ceremony of flag unfurling and firing of arms were performed 
to take possession (ibid, 24). This too was not enough as a second ceremony, with 
more ‘pomp and circumstance’ took place on 7th February, 1788:
[Governor] Phillip’s first Commission was read out. The Act of Parliament 
and the First Charter of Justice which created the first courts were broadcast to 
the convicts and their gaolers. This second ceremony [of 1788], like the first, 
was an assertion of independent British authority over New South Wales. It 
proclaimed, in effect, that Britain was now beginning to perfect its claim to 
New South Wales by occupying part of this new possession and setting up its 
first governmental administration, (ibid)
The multiple ceremonies evidence the precariousness of colonial sovereignty. 
Moreover, the initial assertion of sovereignty is not a finite ‘event’ that takes place 
‘once-and-for-all’. Colonial sovereignty remained to be perfected by occupation. 
This inchoate character of sovereignty is an original ‘lack’ that courts would later, and 
recurrently, seek to address.
In 1841 there was eloquent treatment of whether the law of England applied to 
Aboriginal people where a crime is committed by one Aboriginal upon another 
(Bonjon ’s Case, (1841)). The question was whether the law of the coloniser, English 
law, had jurisdiction with respect to intra-Aboriginal disputes. This question turned 
on whether the Colony of New South Wales was acquired by conquest, cession or 
occupancy of an uninhabited territory discovered by British subjects. The status of 
the colony in the eyes of the coloniser’s law, as we will see, was central to 
determining the rights enjoyed by the indigenous population. In the eighteenth 
century Emer de Vattel advanced the idea that new territories could be obtained by
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settlement rather than conquest if the land was not subject to cultivation, even though 
the territories were inhabited by people (Vattel, 1916; for discussion see Castles, 
1982, 16-7). This justification for usurping inhabited territories (that the territory was 
uncultivated) was canvassed in Bonjon’s Case, but it was observed that “the frequent 
conflicts that have occurred between the colonists and aborigines within the limits of 
the colony of New South Wales, make it, I think, sufficiently manifest that the 
aboriginal tribes are neither a conquered people, nor have tacitly acquiesced in the 
supremacy of the settlers” {Bonjon’s Case, 153). This is an important case that marks 
an early ambivalence about whether the colony was acquired by settlement or 
conquest, and thus whether the coloniser’s law was applicable to the indigenous 
population. It is a question that presents itself alongside the basis on which 
sovereignty is asserted, and the consequences of such an assertion for the indigenous 
peoples. Willis J stressed that there was no treaty or express enactment subjecting the 
indigenous people in the colony to English colonial law (ibid, 155). Nor should they 
be treated as “foreigners in a kingdom which is their own” (ibid). It could be said that 
this remains the high point of judicial sensitivity to the usurpation of aboriginal land 
and sovereignty to this day. This early equivocation did not last.
The Supreme Court of New South Wales in The Attorney-General v Brown 
(1847) considered whether land granted by the Crown was regulated by the feudal 
principles by which land was held in England. Land had been leased to the 
defendants (non-Aboriginal persons) with a reservation that no minerals such as coal, 
silver and gold could be mined as they were reserved to the Crown. The defendants 
had asserted that the Crown held no ‘beneficial ownership’ {dominium, distinct from 
title to territory, imperium) in the land. The Court held that “The territory of New
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South Wales, and eventually the whole of the vast island [sic] of which it forms a part, 
have been taken possession of British subjects in the name of the Sovereign. They 
belong, therefore, to the British Crown” (A-G v Brown (1847) 317). As New South 
Wales was regarded as a “newly-discovered country, settled by British subjects” the 
occupancy or ‘possession’ by the Crown was said to be “no fiction” (ibid). But 
because the “colonists brought the common law of England with them”, it was 
regarded as a convenience to adopt the feudal doctrine of tenures, where all land is 
held of the Crown (ibid). The significance of this decision for the indigenous 
population was that it confirmed that they had been deprived of any rights in the land 
as the Crown had taken ‘possession’, it had become the ‘universal occupant’.
William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws o f England set out three 
modes of acquiring territory. They were through ‘conquest, secession or 
occupation’32 (Australian courts have tended to refer to the last category as 
‘settlement’). For occupation/settlement to take place, the territory would have to be 
terra nullius or vacant land.34 In Cooper v Stuart (1889), the Privy Council 
confronted the fact that although Blackstone’s formula required that the Australian 
colonies would have to be terra nullius or ‘vacant land’ to be acquired by settlement, 
they were in fact inhabited. The Privy Council dealt with this obstacle by modifying 
Blackstone’s requirement. It ‘expanded’ the notion of terra nullius to include lands 
which were described as “practically unoccupied” (Simpson, 1993, 200; Cooper v
32 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws o f  England (17th Ed. 1830), Book I, Ch. 4, pp. 106-108 as 
cited in Mabo, 34-5.
33 It is beyond the scope of my thesis to pursue these doctrines in any detail. See the discussion of 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws o f  England in Simpson, 1993, 199.
34 For an excellent discussion of the doctrine of terra nullius in international law in the context of 
Australian colonialism, see Simpson, 1993.
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Stuart, 291). This later became know as the ‘enlarged notion of terra nullius’ which, 
we will see below, was discussed over a century later in Mabo. As Simpson puts it:
In this way, the people who did inhabit the land were redefined as physically 
present but legally irrelevant and their history was obliterated. Thus began the 
series of elisions and slippages that came to characterise Australian judicial 
pronouncements on acquisition, and to provide the tools for a series of 
artificial and purely formal reconciliations of law, politics and history. 
(Simpson, ibid, 200).
Cooper v Stuart stated categorically that the Australian colonies were acquired by 
‘settlement’ and no other means. ‘Settlement’ as the ground of acquisition meant that 
Aboriginal law and the antecedent rights determined by that law were not recognised 
by the coloniser.
The question of colonial acquisition and its consequences for the property 
rights of indigenous people was not directly addressed again until Milirrpum v
' I C
Nabalco (1971) (the Gove Land Rights case). This case had all the trappings of the 
large contests between indigenous communities, Governments, mining companies and 
other stakeholders in land which were to follow in the decade after Mabo (1992). 
There was lengthy evidence from the plaintiffs and anthropologists, evidence from 
Professor Berdnt and Professor Stanner, to establish the Aboriginals’ ‘social 
organisation’ {Milirrpum, (1971), 165-76). The task was to prove that contrary to
35 The application was brought by the plaintiffs at a time when indigenous people throughout the world 
were asserting their rights, and decolonisation and self-determination had gained considerable 
momentum. In Australia, a referendum in 1967 had affirmed that indigenous peoples could be counted 
in the Census, and removed legislative authority over indigenous people from the States and granted it 
to the Federal Government. The Referendum is colloquially identified as the date when indigenous 
people were granted full rights of citizenship, though racial discrimination was not outlawed until 1975 
{Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)), and countless social, economic and political disparities 
between indigenous and non-indigenous people continue to this day.
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Cooper v Stuart, the territory of Australia had a ‘settled people with a settled law’ on 
colonisation. Blackburn J held that:
The evidence shows a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the 
country in which the people led their lives, which provided a stable order of 
society and was remarkably free from the vagaries of personal whim or 
influence. If ever a system could be called “a government of laws, and not of 
men”, it is that shown in the evidence before me. (Milirrpum, 267).
One would have expected that this vital finding of fact would have consigned Cooper 
v Stuart to the abhorrent days of colonial racism. That was not to be. Rather than 
taking the opportunity to distinguish Cooper v Stuart on the facts, Blackburn 
concluded that the territory was a ‘settled’ colony (Milirrpum, 244). As a settled 
colony English law applied in the “whole of the colony” (ibid). As English law does 
not have a rule recognising “communal native title”, it was held that “no doctrine of 
communal native title” exists in Australia unless it is expressly created by statute 
(ibid). In other words, although the indigenous people were found to have a system of 
law which could sustain communal native title, they were found not to have any
O / :
proprietary interests in the land. In Mabo, as we will see, the majority came to the 
opposite conclusion.
The colonial acquisition of sovereignty was directly challenged in the 
Australian High Court in Coe v The Commonwealth (No 1) (1979). The plaintiffs 
claimed that “there is an aboriginal nation which, before European settlement, 
enjoyed exclusive sovereignty” over the Australia, and which still has sovereignty 
(Coe, 407). They asserted that “Captain Cook wrongly proclaimed sovereignty and
36 For a discussion and critique of Milirrpum see Simpson, 1993, 200-01; and Hocking, 1993, 188-9.
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dominion over the east coast of Australia” (ibid). According to the plaintiffs, 
“Australia was acquired by the British Crown by conquest, after which the aboriginal 
people and nation retained their rights in respect of their lands” (ibid). Thus it was 
claimed that the plaintiff and the Aboriginal people are “entitled at common law to the 
proprietary and possessory rights which they had prior to 1770, unless those rights 
were taken away by ‘bilateral treaty, lawful compensation and/or lawful international 
intervention”’ (ibid).37 In the face of these claims Gibbs J (who wrote the main 
judgment) confidently asserted that if the plaintiff is suggesting that the “legal 
foundation of Australia is insecure .. .it cannot be supported” (ibid, 408). Here we see 
explicit signs that the colonial assertion of sovereignty, despite its basis in factual 
errors about the character of Aboriginal society and law, is imbued with a plenitude 
that places it beyond reproach. This is one sign of what I will later characterise as the 
‘infinite’ quality attributed to colonial sovereignty.
The plaintiff in Coe claimed that the Aboriginal people of Australia should be 
treated as a ‘domestic dependent nation’, to use the formulation by Marschall CJ in 
Cherokee Nation v State o f Georgia (1831). Gibbs J refused to accept this because he 
claimed that the relationship between the white settlers and Aboriginal peoples in 
Australia was not the same as in the United States. Moreover Gibbs J claimed that it 
is not possible to say that the Aboriginal people of Australia are organised as “a 
distinct political society separated from others” (Coe (No 1), 408). On the question of 
whether Australia had been acquired by conquest Gibbs J dismissed this proposition: 
“It is fundamental to our legal system that the Australian colonies became British
37 There were various other claims which I have excluded given the purpose of this introductory 
historical account.
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possessions by settlement and not by conquest” (ibid). Here then is the ‘secure 
foundation’ of the legal system. Gibbs J continues:
It is hardly necessary to say that the question is not how the manner in which 
Australia became a British possession might appropriately be described. For 
the purpose of deciding whether the common law was introduced into a newly 
acquired territory, a distinction was drawn between a colony acquired by 
conquest or cession, in which there was an established system of law of 
European type, and a colony acquired by settlement in a territory which by 
European standards, had no civilized inhabitants or settled law. Australia has 
always been regarded as belonging to the latter class.(ibid, emphasis added) 
Note here that the formulation in Cooper v Stuart (1889), that the Australian colonies 
were ‘practically unoccupied’, is being augmented (Simpson, 1993, 201). The fact 
that the territory was inhabited, that it was not ‘practically unoccupied’, could no 
longer be denied. But trusty ‘European standards’ of civilisation and ‘settled law’, 
nearly a century after Cooper v Stuart, were deployed in order to expand the range of 
‘inhabited territories’ that would be regarded as terra nullius (ibid). Coe v The 
Commonwealth is the high point of the refusal to recognise indigenous people and the 
rights enjoyed under their laws.
Just over a decade later, in Mabo, the High Court reversed these long standing 
authorities in order to recognise indigenous proprietary rights in land held under their 
traditional laws and customs. The result in Mabo, as we will see, left the colonial 
assertion of sovereignty undisturbed. The High Court asserted that it was moving 
away from an ‘age of racial discrimination’. Previously unrecognised indigenous 
proprietary rights would henceforth be recognised by the Australian common law.
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This is what makes Mabo a founding instant of ‘postcolonial’ law and society. I will 
go onto argue that this was only possible because sovereignty was imbued with both a 
‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ quality.
In Mabo the High Court of Australia was asked to determine whether the 
annexation of the Murray Islands to the Colony of Queensland in 1879 or 1895 (the 
insistent sovereign event was ironically uncertain) vested absolute ownership of the 
land in the Crown {Mabo, per Brennan J, 20-1, 24-5, 30-1).38 The plaintiffs, 
representatives of the Meriam people, claimed that the Crown acquired ‘radical title’ 
(title to the territory or imperium) but not ‘beneficial title’ to the land (possession or 
dominium) (ibid, 30).39 The respondent, the State of Queensland, argued that the 
Crown acquired absolute beneficial ownership of the land on the assertion of 
sovereignty (ibid, 26). By accepting the distinction between radical title and 
beneficial ownership of the land, the Court confirmed the acquisition of sovereignty 
over the Murray Islands but recognised that a sui generis form of title called ‘native 
title’ was capable of recognition by the common law and was thus a burden on the 
radical title of the Crown. The incidence of native title would be determined by the 
traditional laws and customs of the indigenous community making the land claim 
(ibid, 58-9). Importantly, if an indigenous community lost its physical connection 
with the land or ceased to practice their traditional laws and customs, both questions 
of fact determined by the courts, native title could not be recognised: “when the tide 
of history has washed away any real acknowledgement of traditional law and any real 
observance of traditional customs, the foundation of native title has disappeared”
38 Recall that A-G v Brown (1847) had decided that the Crown became the ‘universal occupant’.
39 Radical title is the term given to the sovereign’s right to control a territory, distinct from its 
beneficial ownership of the land.
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(ibid, 60). Such a determination would effectively declare the ‘non-existence’ of a 
particular indigenous community, or traditional law sufficient to sustain a land claim. 
‘Native title’ is a mode for including the previously marginal or excluded in the 
‘postcolonial’ polity of Australia. This polity now seeks to march in step with 
international law which, as Brennan J stressed, has “declared the existence of 
universal human rights” (ibid, 42). The common law needed to be adjusted because: 
“A common law doctrine founded on unjust discrimination in the enjoyment of civil 
and political rights demands reconsideration” (ibid). But the inclusion of the ‘native’ 
as a ‘native’ can be refused by a Court’s declaration that indigenous law, and thus 
community, is no longer in existence.40 The High Court also stated that native title 
was capable of being extinguished by the grant of inconsistent tenures or the Crown’s 
appropriation of land for its own purposes. Brennan J attributed acts of alienation and 
appropriation solely to the Crown exercising its “sovereign authority over land”, thus 
attempting to absolve the common law from any responsibility for extinguishment of 
native title (ibid, 68-9). The power that dispossessed indigenous people is thus an 
‘exceptional’ power whose actions cannot be reviewed by a ‘postcolonial’ legal 
system. The dispossession of indigenous people is regarded by the Court as 
‘exceptional’ to the extent that the decision to appropriate/alienate land is non- 
justiciable. Later I will describe how the High Court sought to free itself from being a 
“prisoner” of this imperial legal history (ibid, 29). But first I will describe how the 
attempt to relegate sovereign acts to the ‘past’, a conception of sovereignty as finite, is 
the ground of ‘postcolonial’ law and society.
40 See Yorta Yorta v Victoria (1998), and (2002). These cases will be outlined and analysed below.
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1.1.2 The Finitude o f  Sovereignty in Mabo (No 2)
There are several instances in Mabo41 where the inauguration of a ‘postcolonial’ 
law and society is based on a finite conception of sovereignty:
i. Dispossessing the indigenous people of their land is attributed to an imperial 
sovereign. A finite conception of sovereignty enables these acts of 
dispossession to be relegated to a now surpassed ‘colonial’ era (31);
ii. The grounds for the reception of the common law of England to Australia is a 
consequence of an imperial assertion of sovereignty over a territory deemed to 
be ‘vacant land’ {terra nullius) because its inhabitants were “barbarous” and 
Tow in the scale of social organisation’ (38). A finite conception of 
sovereignty permits Australian law to retain and depart from this racist 
ground of law’s reception in the territory. By regarding sovereignty as 
monistic, singular or finite, a legal system previously concerned with the 
exigencies of Empire is now able to ripen into an “Australian law” no longer 
under the constraints of the courts in the hierarchy of Empire (29, 34-8);
iii. Violence accompanied the arrival of settlers and the occupation of the 
continent of Australia. Indigenous people were excluded and marginalised 
from the settler social and economic framework and in some cases eliminated 
through genocidal acts of violence. A finite conception of sovereignty that 
relegates these events to a time long ‘past’ enables the court to inaugurate and 
affirm a society which reflects ‘contemporary values based on universal 
human rights’. Relegating violence and dispossession to a time now ‘past’,
41 In-text references that follow in this Chapter are to Mabo (1992).
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the High Court affirmed the equality of all Australians by announcing that
Australia is no longer “frozen in an age of racial discrimination” (41-2).
It is in these ways that a ‘postcoloniaV law and society relies heavily on the 
possibility of a ‘finite’, containable, colonial sovereignty. That is, a limit would have 
to separate imperial sovereignty and a nation’s law now capable of recognising the 
citizenship rights (as proprietors) of indigenous people. The implications of the 
impossibility of a ‘finite’ sovereignty that can be separated from ‘postcolonial’ law 
will be explored below. For now I wish to consolidate the nature of the problematic I 
am eliciting from Mabo - the impossibility of a finite conception of sovereignty. The 
point of this elaboration is to demonstrate, in an actual politico-juridical context, the 
extent to which ‘postcolonial’ law is premised on a finite conception of sovereignty. I 
will then take up the implications of the impossibility of such a delimited, finite 
sovereignty.
Mabo was an attempt to reconcile the contradictory lineaments of an imperial 
assertion of sovereignty over a territory regarded as inhabited by “backward” people 
devoid of sovereignty and law, the consequent reception of the common law as the 
Taw of the land’, the appropriation of land, the destruction of indigenous forms of 
social organisation, and a ‘postcolonial’ society that (now) respects universal human 
rights. Let me elaborate the impossibility of such a reconciliation. A sovereign 
decision to annex a territory on the basis of the “enlarged notion of terra nullius,A2 is
42 The ‘enlarged notion of terra nullius ’ refers to the acquisition of territory of “backward peoples”, 
indigenous inhabitants “not organised in a society that was united permanently for political action”, 
Mabo, 31. Such territory was treated as a “desert uninhabited”, that is, as i f  it were terra nullius. In 
Australia this was only retrospectively explained through the racist notion that indigenous people were 
‘too low in the scale of social organisation’, see discussion of cases in Mabo, 38.
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recognised in Mabo “simply on the footing that such a prerogative act is an act of 
state the validity of which is not justiciable in the municipal courts” (30). Such a 
sovereign assertion was the basis for the reception of the common law of England in 
the territory of Australia:
it was necessary for the common law to prescribe a doctrine relating to the law 
to be applied in such colonies, for sovereignty imports supreme internal legal 
authority. ... The hypothesis being that there was no local law already in 
existence in the territory. (36)
The indigenous people were treated as if they were not sovereign over the territory, a 
people regarded as “barbarous” and “without a settled law” (38). On the basis of the 
““barbarian” theory” the common law of the coloniser becomes “the law of the land” 
and determines the rights and entitlements of the subjects of that juridical order (37, 
39). In Mabo the High Court thus recounted the sovereign ‘event’ which inaugurated 
the common law in Australia based on racist assumptions. The acts of ‘past’ 
sovereign governments could not be touched for this would destabilise the foundation 
of ‘present’ law and the ‘peace and order’ of the ‘postcolonial’ society. The 
‘progressive’ recognition of previously disregarded rights thus involved the 
preservation and reiteration of past sovereign acts. The absolute disavowal of a 
repugnant past proved to be impossible. ‘Past’ sovereign ‘events’ are at some point in 
the future determined to be the repugnant though insistent basis of ‘present’ law.
1.1.3 Sovereignty as 'Finite and ‘Infinite ’ in Mabo
In Mabo the High Court asserted that a sovereign ‘event’ took place at some 
point in the past and was the ‘cause’ of a variety of now-abhorrent consequences such
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as the dispossession of indigenous people. Nonetheless, this sovereign event is 
retained as the foundation of Australian law. However, preserving the foundation is 
an anxious and contradictory affair, particularly when judges also wish to 
retrospectively adjust what is ‘now’ perceived to be the case ‘back then’. That is, 
finite sovereignty proves to be uncontainable. Let me explain this. A newly self- 
sufficient common law can ‘now’ recognise this abhorrence and ‘shift’ the 
implications and consequences of the sovereign ‘event’ by recognising ‘native title’. 
In a subsequent decision of the High Court in Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996), 
Gummow J confidently asserted the ‘presence’ of a sovereign ‘event’ and the 
possibility of its alteration:
Thus, it was appropriate to declare in 1992 ... [Mabo]... the common law upon 
a particular view of past historical events. That view differed from 
assumptions, as to extent of the reception of English land law, upon which 
basic propositions of Australian land law had been formulated in the colonies 
before federation. To the extent that the common law is to be understood as 
the ultimate constitutional foundation in Australia, there was a perceptible 
shift in that foundation, away from what had been understood at federation. 
{Wik, 182, emphasis added)
Was there such a shift in the foundation of Australian law? The aporia in this passage 
is its acknowledgement of the impossibility of a finite, fixed concept of sovereignty, 
while retaining the notion of the common law as the ‘ultimate’ foundation. But the 
explanation for the ‘reception’ of the common law to a ‘vacant land’ without a settled 
law was not disturbed. The common law was adjusted, but not its foundation. There 
is thus an imperative for both a finite and infinite foundation -  a common law that is
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the ‘ultimate’ foundation and one that can be ‘left behind’, adjusted to fit with current 
imperatives. How are these contradictory requirements addressed?
The ‘barbarian theory’ is retained as the theory explaining the foundation of 
Australian common law. Though this was said to be inconsistent with “facts as we 
know them today” {Mabo, 39), it remained the basis for the reception of the common 
law to a putatively ‘settled colony’. What did ‘shift’ in Mabo were the concomitants 
of sovereignty -  whether sovereignty resulted in the Crown becoming the absolute 
owner of land or whether the antecedent proprietary rights of indigenous people 
survived annexation of their territory. Gummow J concludes that the common law 
does not have the methodological resources to address shifts in the interpretation of 
the past: “There remains lacking, at least in Australia, any established taxonomy to 
regulate such uses of history in the formulation of legal norms” {Wik, 182). Instead 
he reasserted the methodology of the common law -  one that would not enquire into 
its grounds (sovereignty is non-justiciable). According to Gummow J in Wit. “[T]he 
task of the court is to do, and be seen to be doing, justice between the parties ... There 
is no higher or additional duty to ascertain some independent truth” (ibid, 184; Citing 
Lord Wilberforce in Air Canada v Secretary o f State for Trade [1983], emphasis 
added). Thus retaining a now abhorrent foundation and altering its implications 
involves both a sovereignty that is positioned beyond law (infinite sovereignty) and 
one that can be subjected to the insights of revisionist history and now adjusted.
Fitzpatrick matches these refusals in Australian native title cases to seek an 
‘independent truth’ with Kant’s injunction against enquiries into law’s foundation 
(Fitzpatrick, 2002, 233-4). For Kant:
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The origin of the supreme power, for all practical purposes, is not discoverable 
by the people who are subjected to it. ... [Wjhether in fact an actual contract 
originally preceded their submission to the state’s authority {pactum 
subiectionis civilis), whether the power came first and the law only appeared 
after it, or whether they ought to have followed this order -  these are 
completely futile arguments for a people which is already subject to civil law, 
and they constitute a menace to the state, (ibid, 233, original emphasis)
The enlightenment demand that we pursue any enquiry to its end, Fitzpatrick argues, 
would reveal “the partial and contingent nature of ...[supreme] authority, reveal the 
poverty of its constituent claim to sovereign completeness -  a completeness which a 
modernist Kant would see as necessary for effective rule” (ibid, 234). The colonial 
assertion of sovereignty was indeed ‘partial and contingent’. It was from the outset 
inchoate, needing to be confirmed by occupation and settlement (per Dean and 
Guadron JJ, Mabo, 78). And the assertion of sovereignty did not immediately 
dispossess the indigenous inhabitants for this happened by the sovereign granting of 
tenures “parcel by parcel” {Mabo, per Brennan J, 69). Nor is it clear when Australia 
became a “nation”.43 The usurpation of sovereignty and territory did not result in the 
Crown acquiring absolute ownership of the land. Nor did it eradicate, despite 
genocidal efforts to do so, the traditional laws and customs of the indigenous peoples 
that are a condition, according to Mabo, of their recognition as proprietors of a 
subordinate interest in the land. Despite these multiple reasons to refuse a unitary, 
finite conception of colonial sovereignty, for the High Court sovereignty is a 
constitutive event that inhabits a singular time and space ‘back then’. Sovereignty is a 
monistic phenomenon that cannot be called into question in a municipal court.
43 In New South Wales v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Case) (1975), Stephens J pointed 
to the uncertainty of when Australia became a ‘nation’.
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The insight Fitzpatrick offers to explain the absolute and contingent senses of 
sovereignty raised here is this: “Supreme authority is inevitably delimited in its 
finitude, yet its sovereign capacity must be elevated beyond limit” (Fitzpatrick, 2002, 
234). Sovereignty is at once finite and infinite. Sovereignty is rendered finite as a 
colonial violence that took place ‘back then’ and elevated beyond limit. This 
disjunction cannot be the occasion of a ‘postcolonial’ nation. The inauguration of the 
‘postcolonial’ fails precisely because sovereignty cannot be both things at the same 
time, a rupture from and continuity of colonial sovereignty. For instance, Brennan J 
in Mabo treats sovereignty as ungraspable by municipal law - the assertion of 
sovereignty “is not justiciable in a municipal court” (31). However, there is the 
possibility of a renewed law, cleansed of imperial exceptionality:
Australian law is not only the historical successor of, but is an organic 
development from, the law of England. Although our law is the prisoner of its 
history, it is not now bound by decisions of courts in the hierarchy of an 
Empire then concerned with the development of its colonies. (29)
The exercise of colonial sovereignty is rendered finite and infinite, an event that took 
place “back then” but also one that is capable of reaching into the present and future 
as the force that ‘imprisons’ Australian law. Despite its subjection to an illimitable 
sovereign, the Australian High Court now has the “ultimate responsibility for 
declaring the law of the nation” (ibid).
In sum, the High Court in Mabo deployed the contradictory lineaments of 
sovereignty identified by Fitzpatrick -  a delimited, finite sovereignty that established 
the common law “back then” on the basis that the indigenous inhabitants were
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“barbarous”, “without a settled law” and thus too low on the scale of social 
organisation (Mabo, 37-8). But this sovereign assertion is not justiciable in courts 
established by the sovereign, and thus the assertion of sovereignty is ‘elevated beyond 
limit’. The identity of sovereignty as a finite phenomenon capable of being 
distinguished from the present ‘postcolonial’ law is thus paradoxically undermined by 
the assertion of non-justiciability that elevates sovereignty ‘beyond limit’ (sovereignty 
as infinite). The ‘postcoloniality’ of the common law itself is called into question by 
the elevation beyond limit of the imperial sovereign, for then, what limit marks the 
difference between the colonial assertion of sovereignty over a “desert uninhabited” 
(33) and a law founded on that assertion? Brennan J attempts to disavow the theory 
that explained the assertion of sovereignty, the ‘enlarged notion of terra nullius’, by 
separating sovereignty from law. But this is an assertion of a difference that is 
impossible if sovereignty is ungraspable. This is precisely why the (im)possible limit 
that marks the difference between sovereignty and law requires elaboration -  a task I 
undertake in this thesis. In Mabo sovereignty is imbued with a plenitude that renders 
it substantial enough to be identified as the event that inaugurates a legal system, but 
this event is quarantined from any scrutiny. The ‘singular’ sovereign event is central 
to law as its foundation but also exceeds law as an event that is not justiciable. 
Calling into question a sovereign event that exceeds law is precisely what is at stake 
in attempts to inaugurate the ‘postcolonial’ -  an attempt to resurrect buried identities, 
laws and communities that have survived on the periphery of the imperial settler 
society.44 An ‘unknowable’ sovereign whose authorisation and legitimacy the courts
44 The resurrection of identities, laws or communities on the basis of variously asserted essences of 
‘race’, ‘tradition’, custom, the ‘authentic’ native and so on carry their own deeply problematic 
consequences that I take up in subsequent chapters. Such essences are the currency of postcolonial law 
and society in Australia.
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dare not enquire into renders the distinction between colonial sovereignty and 
‘postcolonial’ law impossible to sustain.
As we observed, there was a re-positioning of a colonial assertion of 
sovereignty as an ‘event’ that took place ‘back then’, one that can be separated from 
the ‘postcolonial’ law declared in Mabo which now recognises the antecedent 
proprietary rights of indigenous people. My assertion is that a delimitated 
sovereignty, one that is ‘singular’, and ‘monistic’ -  a finite sovereignty -  is deployed 
in Mabo in order to ‘separate’ colonial sovereignty/law from the ‘postcolonial’ law 
that can depart from the sovereign ‘event’ that founded ‘Australian law’. The court’s 
deployment of a finite sovereignty (as the disavowal of acts of state which took place 
‘back then’) failed as soon as it was proclaimed -  that is, ‘postcolonial’ law also had 
to preserve its foundation in a colonial assertion of sovereignty. This colonial 
assertion of sovereignty thus has an infinite reach to the extent that it is the ground of 
‘past, present, and future’ law and society. Such an infinite sovereignty is without 
‘limit’, it is uncontainable and ungraspable. A conception of sovereignty without 
‘limit’ raises the problem of its ‘relation’, for instance, with law and community. In 
my discussion of Mabo I have identified both a finite and infinite quality attributed to 
sovereignty. In what follows I wish to develop an account of the impossibility of 
finite/infinite sovereignty. I want to argue that sovereignty cannot be contained as an 
‘event’ ‘back then’ (finite sovereignty), nor can it be the ‘absolute’ will without 
‘limit’ which grounds law and community (infinite sovereignty). What account can 
be given of the ‘spacing’ between sovereignty and law? The impossibility of a finite 
or infinite conception of sovereignty is an account of sovereignty which I will develop 
through Jean-Luc Nancy’s critique of the ‘finitude of being’. I will argue, through
Nancy, that the impossibility of finite and infinite sovereignty implies a ‘relation’ -  a 
relation that is the occasion of ‘community’ (Nancy, 1991, 4).
1.2 The Impossibility of Finite/Infinite Sovereignty
Nancy’s critique of the finitude of being is developed in The Inoperative 
Community (1991) and several other texts from which I will draw. Nancy’s concern 
with the relationship between sovereignty and law is posed explicitly in his essay 
“War, Right, Sovereignty - Techne” (2000c). This essay, written at the time of the 
Gulf War of 1991, explores the relationship between sovereignty and law as a 
question of thinking and rethinking the possibility of a ‘limit’. The (im)possibility of 
a ‘limit’ is elaborated as a question of ‘spacing’ and ‘separation’ (ibid, 136-40). The 
question of the ‘limit’, the ‘spacing’ between sovereignty and law, the very possibility 
of their separation, is central, as we observed, to the attempt to distinguish Australian 
‘postcolonial’ law and society from its foundation in a ‘colonial’ sovereign ‘event’. 
By discussing “War, Right, Sovereignty - Techne”, I intend to dispel any objection 
that Nancy’s critique of the ‘finitude of being’, a concern of ‘first philosophy’45, 
cannot be brought to bear on ‘real events’ of the world, and in particular on the 
‘event’ of sovereignty in the ‘postcolonial’ context. To the contrary, Nancy calls for a 
thought that exposes “Every detail of the uses, claims, manipulations, aporias of 
sovereignty in the postcolonial world ...” (Nancy, 2000c, 103). Though this is only a 
passing reference, it is an opening, an invitation, which I wish to take up in the
45 For an account of the ‘first, philosophy’ with which Nancy engages, a rethinking of ontology, the 
relation between logos and the city, philosophy and community, a western philosophical concern from 
Aristotle to Heidegger, see Nancy, “O f Being Singular Plural”, (2000b), 21-28. It is beyond the scope 
of my thesis to trace these philosophical trajectories. For an incisive account of the proximity of 
Nancy’s thought to Heidegger’s critique of the Cartesian Cogito, see Ian James, “The Persistence of the 
Subject: Jean-Luc Nancy” (2002) 125-141.
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discussion that follows. Additionally, Nancy’s thought on the impossible ‘finitude of 
being’ is explicitly brought to bear on the sovereign ‘event’ in his consideration of the 
notion of ‘jurisdiction’.46
1.2.1 Finitude  -  Limit or Relation?
I will begin with a discussion of “The Inoperative Community”, a text which 
draws together Nancy’s problematisation o f ‘finitude’, ‘limit’, and ‘relation’ as central 
to thinking and rethinking ‘community’. Here Nancy argues that the impossibility of 
a ‘limit’ that absolutely encloses one being from another is the condition of 
community. It is apt to deploy the question of community alongside a questioning of 
the ‘limit’ between beings or phenomena, as it is a central tenet of Nancy’s thought 
that a finite being, a singular being (being-one) delimited from another, is an ‘event’ 
of being in community. I wish to bring this thought to bear more explicitly on 
sovereignty. The impossibility of finite sovereignty, or the impossibility of an 
absolute totality (the State) that eradicates the question of ‘limits’ by the assertion of 
‘unity’ or ‘communion’ can only be grasped by understanding how ‘singularity’, 
being-one, is an essential ‘exposure’ to an outside, being-more-than-one. At the end 
of this Chapter I will instantiate this critique of finitude in terms of the (im)possibility 
o f ‘sovereignty’ in various accounts of the ‘international’, and in relation to the ‘limit’ 
of law.47
46 Here I wish to provide a sample of Nancy’ s engagements with the notion of sovereignty in order to 
establish the significance of considering Nancy’s thought On the ‘finitude of being’ and ‘being-in- 
common’ in an enquiry into the nature of sovereignty.
471 relate Nancy’s thought to sovereignty and law in several ways. The problematic of the finitude of 
being has already been explained as central to deconstructing the position beyond law attributed to 
sovereignty in the Mabo decision. I will also discuss Nancy’s more explicit treatment of sovereignty 
and law in “War, Right, Sovereignty - Techne”. Later, I will relate Nancy’s thought to an explicit 
treatment of sovereignty in the context of international relations discourse through Jens Bartelson, A
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In “The Inoperative Community” Nancy calls into question the possibility of 
an “absolute”, atomistic subject, as individual or state, which exists entirely “for- 
itself’ (Nancy, 1991, 4).48 According to Nancy, the individual subject or “total State” 
cannot be “perfectly detached, distinct or closed” (ibid). There cannot be a “being 
without relation” (ibid). Nancy sets out to establish that every finite, atomistic being, 
whether that is the individual subject or a State, implies a relation in its separation:
A simple and redoubtable logic will always imply that within its very 
separation the absolutely separate encloses, if we can say this, more than what 
is simply separated. Which is to say that the separation itself must be 
enclosed, that the closure must not only close around a territory (while still 
remaining exposed, at its outer edge, to another territory, with which it thereby 
communicates), but also in order to complete the absoluteness of its 
separation, around the enclosure itself, (ibid)49 
The ‘limit’ that marks the separation of a being (let’s say of an individual or state), in 
order to be absolutely separate, would have to be so thoroughly and ‘purely’ enclosed 
that it would not communicate on its outer edge with the subject, territory, space 
beside it. Such an absolute separation, Nancy argues, is impossible: “to be absolutely 
alone, it is not enough that I be so; I must also be alone being alone -  and this of 
course is contradictory” (ibid). The idea of a finite being violates itself to the extent
Genealogy o f Sovereignty, 1995. I will relate Nancy’s thought to an account of law by discussing Peter 
Fitzpatrick’s Modernism and the Ground o f  Law, 2001a. Here Fitzpatrick gives an account of law as 
an ambivalent combination of determination and responsiveness. Central to this account is a 
conception of law as an incessant movement across limits, what Fitzpatrick characterises as the 
‘apposition’ of law. I will return, at the end of this Chapter, to make Nancy’s thought more generally 
applicable to the relationship between sovereignty and law through Bartelson and Fitzpatrick.
4 On the critique of an absolute being ‘for-itself see the rich discussion in Nancy, “The Inoperative 
Community”, 1991, at 4.
49 The finitude of the “Idea, History, the Individual, the State, Science, the Work of Art, and so on” are 
called into question in Nancy’s critique of the metaphysics of the “absolute” (ibid). For my purposes, I 
will confine my discussion to the critique of finitude, and not elaborate the deeper, post-Heideggerian 
critique of metaphysics that is set out in Nancy’s thought.
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that this finitude implies a separation that is at once a ‘communication’ ‘with... ’ . One 
cannot say what is ‘beside’ {‘with ... *) finitude precisely because of the impossibility 
of ‘being alone’. In asserting its separateness, the absolute is undone by the “relation” 
(communication, community) to which ‘it’ is exposed (ibid).50 The “relation” that 
this ‘communication’ implies violates the “essence” (as ‘absolute’) that an ‘absolute’ 
finite being asserts for itself. Finitude is impossible because being finite implies 
communication and relation. It is therefore in the “logic of the absolute” that 
“community comes perforce to cut into” the subject/being/state (ibid). It is this 
critique of finitude that I wish to bring to bear on the ‘presence’ of sovereignty as a 
discrete ‘event’.
A non-justiciable ‘act of state’ as the absolute decision that inaugurated a 
colony and its juridical order was deployed in Mabo. This sovereign ‘event’ was 
presented as the origin of ‘colonial’ law and society -  an ‘event’ from which the 
future-oriented ‘postcolonial’ law and society could be disassociated. At the same 
time, this sovereign ‘event’ was preserved as the origin of Australian law -  it was 
granted an infinite quality. Nancy’s thought interrupts the possibility of an ‘event’ 
which is finite, or an absolute totality with nothing beyond it. Thus the ‘spacing’ of 
sovereignty in relation to law in Mabo, the separation asserted as the condition of 
differentiating colonial/‘postcolonial’ sovereignty, law and society, is called into 
question by Nancy’s critique. An absolute sovereignty cannot be a discrete entity or 
an. infinite totality which has no relation with what is adjacent to it. Crucially, this 
failure of finite sovereignty is the occasion of relation, community. Through Nancy I 
will explain how the being singular at once involves a division and a relation. Being
50 The ‘presence’ of the absolute as absolute is thus called into question, undone by the logic of 
absoluteness.
is not infinite because it always already implies this division and relation. I will 
argue, then, that sovereignty, at the instant of attempts to place it beyond law, is 
exposed to a relation with law. I will return later to explain this co-presence of 
sovereignty/law through the notion of ‘jurisdiction’. First I will elaborate how the 
failure of finitude is the occasion of relation or ‘community’.
1.2.2 ‘Being in Common’
The impossibility of an individual being-alone does not result in the 
impossibility of a ‘singular being’. Nancy’s characterisation of the impossibility of 
finitude demonstrates that the logic of ‘being-one’ is the occasion of ‘community’. 
His point is that ‘singularity’ implies a plurality of singular beings (ibid, 6). 
Singularity does not take place at the “level of atoms” but in the “inclination” 
(“clinamen”) between one being and another (ibid, 3-4, 6-7). It is this inclining that 
opens the possibility of “being-in-common” (ibid, 4). What, then, is ‘being-in- 
common’? Nancy explains ‘being-in-common’ in multiple ways in several texts.51 
One approach is through a discussion of death. The death of an individual, he argues, 
cannot be disassociated from the individual’s being-in-community. An individual 
cannot know or experience her/his own death. The death of the individual, the 
ultimate testimony to the finitude of existence, cannot reveal itself to this finite being. 
Though an individual’s death, the death of an “7” is “most proper to it and most 
inalienably its own”, the “/  cannot say that it is dead” (Nancy, 1991, 14). There is 
thus a “reciprocal revelation” of death and community (ibid). The death of a being is 
revealed by ‘being with’ others, and this is the community that experiences the death
51 See the section on “Co-appearing” in Nancy, “Of Being Singular Plural”, 2000b, 56-65; and Nancy, 
“Sharing Freedom: Equality, Fraternity, Justice” in Nancy, 1993a, Ch. 7.
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of its members (ibid). Death is not experienced in an “authentic sense” by the 
community -  “we are always just “there-alongside”” (ibid, 33). The “sharing” of 
knowledge in (the other’s) death is only a recognition that there is “nothing 
recognizable” (ibid). Nancy distinguishes this experience of being-finite-through- 
community from a “limited community as opposed to an infinite or absolute 
community” (ibid, 27). Being-in-common is neither an assertion of a limit between 
communities or an absolute community:
Sharing comes down to this: what community reveals to me, in presenting to 
me my birth and my death, is my existence outside myself. Which does not 
mean my existence reinvested in or by community, as if community were 
another subject that would sublate me, in a dialectical or communal mode. 
Community does not sublate the finitude it exposes. Community itself in sum, 
is nothing but this exposition. It is the community of finite beings, and as such 
it is itself a finite community. In other words, not a limited community as 
opposed to an infinite or absolute community, but a community of finitude, 
because finitude “is” communitarian, and because finitude alone is 
communitarian, (ibid, 26-7)
Finitude can only be experienced in community. What it means to be in community is 
to be ‘exposed’ to the fact that being finite is always already ‘being-in-common’. As 
Nancy argues, community does not absorb or ‘sublate’ finitude. Instead, community 
is the exposition of finitude. ‘One’ cannot be ‘One’ without this exposition in 
community. What is significant in this discussion for my purposes is that the ‘sharing’ 
that takes place in ‘death’ is the sharing of the knowledge of a ‘limit’ -  an 
‘experience’ of finitude that can only ‘happen’ in community. The experience of a 
‘limit’ is the occasion of community.
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What are the implications of this thought for a critique of a finite conception 
of sovereignty? As we saw in the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context, a finite 
conception of sovereignty is deployed as the ‘ground’ or foundation of Australian law 
and society. I have already pointed out how Nancy’s thought insists on a relation 
between sovereignty and law. Colonial sovereignty can only be preserved and 
disavowed as the ground of ‘postcolonial’ law and society if sovereignty can be 
contained, that is, presented as a discrete finite entity. One implication of Nancy’s 
critique, when it is brought to bear on the attempt to inaugurate ‘postcolonial’ law and 
society in Australia, is that it undoes the possibility of finite sovereignty as a discrete, 
delimited ground of (‘postcolonial’) law and society.52 As finitude has no ‘presence’ 
outside its sharing or relation, the very possibility of a self-sufficient, finite 
sovereignty is refuted. Sovereignty-as-One cannot ‘be alone’. The birth of finitude, 
Nancy argues, is without “ground”:
The “ground” is itself and as such, already the finitude of singularities.
It is a groundless “ground”, less in the sense that it opens up the gaping chasm 
of an abyss than that it is made up only of the network, the interweaving, and 
the sharing of singularities. ... There is nothing behind singularities -  but there 
is outside it and in it, the immaterial and material space that distributes it and 
shares it out as singularity. (Nancy, 1991, 27)
If finitude is without ‘ground’, if it takes place only in and through the distribution 
and sharing of singularities, then there is scope to question the very possibility of an 
absolute ground of law and society which can be preserved and disavowed as an
52 At this point I am not attempting a comprehensive instantiation of Nancy’s thought by bringing it to 
bear on the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context. Instead, I merely wish to signal the concrete significance 
o f Nancy’s thought for the problematic of finite/infinite sovereignty in the Australian ‘postcolonial’ 
context which I identified at the outset. I will return to a more thorough instantiation o f Nancy’s 
thought in the next Chapter.
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‘event’ that took place ‘back then’. Sovereignty cannot be finite and thus capable of 
being grasped and disavowed. Nor can sovereignty be infinite -  preserved as an 
absolute ground of all that is to come. This was the problematic identified in my 
reading of Mabo. Nancy’s critique of finitude suggests that it is the distribution of 
‘singularities’ and the sharing that takes place at the ‘limit’ of singularity that 
accounts for the possibility of finite being. Bringing this thought to bear on a finite 
conception of sovereignty, we need to ask what are its limits, what are the networks in 
which it is distributed? How is sovereignty shared out as a singularity? I will take up 
these questions of the ‘limit’ and ‘end’ of sovereignty through Nancy’s thought on the 
sovereign right to war. Before moving to that I will discuss how, for Nancy, the 
absent ‘ground’ of finitude (of sovereignty) is the condition of community. 
Community is not the result, the ‘product’, of the absence of a ground for finitude. 
Community is the ‘co-appearance’ of finitude. This demands more explanation. This 
discussion of finitude, with which I will persist for a little longer, sets up the basis for 
the claim (elaborated at the end of Chapter Two and in Chapter Three), that 
‘jurisdiction’ designates the co-presence of sovereignty, law and political community.
1.2.3 Dis-position o f  Origins - Refusing One-Origin o f  Law
For Nancy “finitude itself is nothing” (Nancy, 1991, 28). It is not a ground, 
essence or substance (ibid). Finitude is always a sharing. Nancy persistently makes 
the point, in several texts, that there is no “original or origin of identity” (ibid, 33) 
which takes form through “exclusion”, not even an “inclusive exclusion” (Nancy, 
2000b, 24). Rather than a self-sufficient being, or a being constituted by exclusion, 
Nancy proposes the original “dis-position” of beings (ibid, 24-5). For Nancy, the
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“origin” of being is a “dis-position” (ibid, 25). Central to this claim is the proposition 
that “the “outside” of the origin is “inside”” (ibid, 11, 13). There is no purely 
delimited ‘outside’ that grounds or constitutes being. I will briefly set out what 
Nancy means by original ‘dis-position’.
Nancy approaches this question through an account of the origin which refuses 
an essential ground of being in community as reason or humanity - the appeal to “one- 
origin” (ibid, 24).53 Instead he proposes an ontology of origin where access to an 
origin is refused by its concealment in multiplicity (ibid, 10-11). ‘We’ can’t identify 
ourselves in or as the origin -  ‘we’ can only identify with it. Nancy refers to this as 
“originary coexistence” (ibid, 11). To hazard putting this simply, I am a singular 
being among a multiplicity of other singular beings. I and each other I are originarily 
singular, but it is a singularity that is at once plural: the latin singuli means “one by 
one” (a word that exists only as a plural) (Nancy, 2000d, 156). The other of a singular 
being-origin is not the “essential stranger who is opposed to what is proper” (Nancy, 
2000b, 11), as in many constructivist accounts. The other of being-origins is “one of 
the two” (ibid). This ‘other’ “is “one” among many insofar as they are many; it is 
each one, and it is each time one, one among them, one among all and one among us 
all” (ibid). Each one is the other origin of us all because we cannot ‘be alone being 
alone’. I am, we are, singular plural. In this way the ‘being-with’ is never secondary 
to an origin (Nancy, 1991, 14; Nancy, 2000b, 27, 32). The origin itself is a 
coexistence of origins. The ‘origin’ is not to be found ‘outside’ being. This is 
essentially what is expressed in the phrase ‘Being singular plural’: “The plurality of 
beings is at the foundation of Being” (Nancy, 2000b, 12). The meaning of Being, the
53 The politico-philosophical traditions that Nancy wishes to displace with his account are the social 
contract theories of Rousseau and liberal humanism.
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significance of the relationship between being(s) and Being, and the original dis­
position of beings is explained in the following passage which is worth quoting at 
length:
A single being is a contradiction in terms. Such a being, which would be its 
own foundation, origin and intimacy, would be incapable of Being, in every 
sense that this expression can have here. “Being” is neither a state nor a 
quality, but rather the action according to which what Kant calls “the [mere] 
positing of a thing” takes place (“is”). The very simplicity of “position” 
implies no more, although no less, than its being discrete, in the mathematical 
sense, or its distinction from, in the sense of with, other (at least possible) 
positions, or its distinction among, in the sense of between, other positions. In 
other words, every position is also dis-position, and considering the appearing 
that takes the place of and takes place in the position, all appearance is co­
appearance [com-parution]. This is why the meaning of Being is given as 
existence, being-in-oneself-outside-oneself, which we make explicit, we 
“humans”, but which we make explicit, as I have said, for  the totality of 
beings, (ibid, 12, original emphasis)
This dis-position is the instance of a sharing. Though the significance of this point for 
the thought of sovereignty is more directly posed in “War, Right, Sovereignty - 
Techne” (Nancy, 2000c), a text I will turn to shortly, it is worth emphasising here that 
the ‘original dis-position’ of finite beings is the ontology that informs Nancy’s 
thought on sovereignty.
Along with Nancy I want to argue that sovereignty does not occupy a finite 
position ‘outside’ law. Nor can it be ‘contained’ for the purpose of ‘preservation’ and
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‘disavowal’ as we observed in the attempt to inaugurate a ‘postcolonial’ law and 
society in Australia. The ‘position’ of the sovereign is always already a ‘dis­
position!*. That is, sovereignty always appears together, alongside, along with, a law 
that is a law of community. Just as finite being cannot be separate, cannot ‘be alone 
being alone’, sovereignty is not capable of such finitude. Singularity is, as we 
observed in the discussion above, always a being-exposed as ‘plurality’. Nancy also 
makes this point in “The Inoperative Community”:
what holds the place of the “origin” is the sharing of singularities. This means 
that this “origin” -  the origin of community or the originary community -  is 
nothing other than the limit: the origin is the tracing of the borders upon which 
or along which singular beings are exposed. (Nancy, 1991, 33)
The question of ground or origin is about the ‘limit’. To the extent that sovereignty 
(as singular) is posed as the ground of state, law, society etc., such singularity raises 
the question of its ‘limit’. What Nancy emphasises is that a ‘limit’ is the occasion of a 
communication, an exposure to what lies across the ‘limit’.
Finitude appears, is exposed, and thus exists as communication (ibid). 
Finitude “co-appears”, “compears” (ibid). That is, finite being always presents itself 
together:
for finitude always presents itself in being-in-common and as this being itself, 
and it always presents itself at a hearing and before the judgment of the law of 
community, or, more originarily, before the judgment of community as law. 
(ibid)
A finite, singular being (one that I take to be indicative of a monistic sovereign -  that 
is to say, also indicative of the impossibility of such monism) presents itself,
59
according to Nancy, before the ‘law of community’ and ‘community as law’. What is 
this ‘law of community’ before which finitude presents itself? What does it mean to 
say that finitude is ‘more originarily’ presented before the ‘judgment’ of ‘community 
as law’? The Taw of community’ connotes the ontology of ‘being-in-common’. 
Being-in-common is how finitude always presents itself. ‘Community as law’ is the 
presentation, or the originary co-presentation, the co-presence, of finitude. There is 
no One origin. Nancy confirms this in his recent reflection on the “The Inoperative 
Community”, when he claims that:
there has been, already, always already, a ‘work’ of community, an operation 
of sharing out that will always have gone before any singular or generic 
existence, a communication and a contagion without which it would be 
unthinkable to have, in an absolutely general manner, any presence or any 
world, since each of these terms brings with it the implication of a co­
existence or of a co-belonging .. . .  (Nancy, 2003d, 32)
The origin is always already a co-origination. This is the law of community that 
Nancy refers to in “The Inoperative Community” (Nancy, 1991, 28). The ‘presence’ 
of a concept such as sovereignty is always already a co-appearance that raises the 
problem of the ‘limit’ that separates -  the limit that is a site of a sharing.
I have argued that sovereignty is a relational concept that involves a ‘sharing’ 
across limits. This offers one approach through which the ‘presence’ of sovereignty 
can be called into question. Indeed, the very ‘place’ of sovereignty as unity and 
essence must be undone. Pursuing this line of discussion is a useful way to 
concentrate my concern to call into question the possibility of a finite or infinite 
conception of sovereignty. In what follows I will extend the critique of finitude
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(sovereignty as One), the co-appearance of singularity, through a discussion of 
Nancy’s consideration of the relationship between sovereign war and law. How 
might we consider the ‘End’ of sovereignty? The ‘End’ of sovereignty interrogated 
by Nancy not only calls into question the ‘presence’ of sovereignty, it calls for an end 
to Sovereign Ends. That is, we must consider what it means to call for an evacuation 
of the place of the sovereign.
1.3 The Empty Place of Sovereignty
The discussion in the previous section considered the persistence of One- 
origin and suggested that the critique of the finitude of being points to the original dis­
position of origins. The ‘presence’ of a concept such as sovereignty can then no 
longer be thought as monistic, as One, or as the ‘cause’ in a linear narrative of 
‘events’ such as ‘sovereignty is the source of law’. But what are the juridico-political 
implications of pointing to the ‘sharing’ that takes place between a ‘limit’ or asserting 
the ontological plurality of being? It is not sufficient to merely assert a singular-plural 
ontology in order to deconstruct the monistic ‘presence’ of sovereignty. Nancy’s 
thought moves in the direction of bringing an end to the ‘Sovereign End’ (Nancy, 
2000c, 136-7). That is, he argues that the plural spacing of the world “z's itself the 
empty place of sovereignty” (ibid, 137, original emphasis). The ‘empty place’ of 
sovereignty refers to the impossibility of an essential ‘unity’, commonality, or idea of 
the ‘good’. What he means by this is that any idea of “the end”, or the “common 
good”, or the “common as good” is no longer viable (ibid). The impossibility of an 
essential good associated with a sovereign ‘end’ is highlighted, for my purposes, 
when Nancy refers to the example of the “the empty place o f justice (at the foundation
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of the law)” (ibid, original emphasis). There is no essence, no democracy, no unity as 
‘people’, and indeed, no law, that can form the just foundation of law.54 Sovereignty 
or power is thus emptied of any essentialised content that represents the ‘good’. 
Nancy’s argument resonates with Claude Lefort’s influential study of modem 
democracy where he explores the problematic of the ‘empty place of power’ in 
representative democracies (Lefort, 1988). I will relate Lefort’s thought on the 
‘empty place of power’ to Nancy’s consideration of this question below. First I will 
set out how Nancy reaches the point of claiming that the ‘empty place of sovereignty’ 
must be thought as “nonsovereign” in the sense that Georges Bataille intended when 
he said “Sovereignty is NOTHING” (Nancy, 1991, 18; and Nancy, 2000c, 139).55 I 
will consider what it might mean for sovereignty to be ‘Nothing’ in the final Chapter 
of this thesis, where I give an account of contemporary instantiations of imperial 
sovereignty.
1.3.1 Towards a Thought o f  the ‘End’ o f  Sovereignty
The question of the ‘limit’ which has pervaded the preceding discussion of 
Nancy’s thought will now be taken up through the notion of an ‘End’ -  the ‘End’ as
54 Below I will consider the work of John Borrows in this light -  his attempt to inaugurate a ‘proper’ 
‘postcolonial’ law and society in accordance with the ‘rule of law’. My claim, in accordance with 
Nancy, is that the foundation, the sovereign place, must be emptied rather than filled again (and again) 
with the pretensions of Oneness, or the ‘propriety’ of another ‘proper’ ground.
55 See also Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, Volume III, 
Sovereignty (1993). Bataille’s thought on sovereignty arose out of a consideration of the gift economy 
in opposition to a restricted economy of exchange. A sovereign life, for Bataille, involved the radically 
anti-utilitarian possibility of a life without limits -  a life that grappled with overcoming the anguish of 
death, where a state of “objectlessness” would be experienced as NOTHING, (Bataille, 1993, 195-257 
at 234). In Chapter Four I develop a reading of Nancy’s reception of Bataille. There I will argue that 
the singular-plural character of sovereignty, its in-fmitude, offers an insight to what it means to claim 
that sovereignty is ‘Nothing’ in contemporary geopolitical contexts such as the ‘war on terror’. I also 
return, in Chapter Four, to consider the implications of sovereignty as ‘Nothing’ for ‘postcolonial’ law 
and society. It is apposite to wait until Chapter Four to develop this argument as it will follow more 
directly from my attempt to de-position imperial sovereignty. However, I will offer some introductory 
comments on sovereignty as ‘Nothing’, shortly.
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limit and telos, and also as the end of a place occupied by a ‘sovereign’ (Nancy, 
2000c, 138). Sovereign ‘End’ signifies the sovereign claim to designate and 
determine a telos as law and its exception in War. Nancy’s thought seeks an end to 
this sovereign extremity through a deconstruction of the ‘presence’ of sovereignty. 
The question of the ‘end’ is linked to the limits of ‘presence’ in Nancy’s thought. As 
Emma Campbell notes:
“The end” does not simply mark the termination of a certain idea or concept; it 
indicates the erasure of any clearly assignable meaning associated with that 
concept or idea. Likewise, the recognition of finitude does not ground a 
concept that replaces it; it “establishes” new concepts as evacuations of 
meanings that -  in being continually exposed to their own limit -  are never 
established or complete. (Campbell, 2003, 44)
For Nancy, “every question about ends leads back to sovereignty” (Nancy, 2000c,
120), and to war as the “execution” of sovereignty (ibid, 117). War is the 
‘technology’ of sovereignty not only as its means (not as a means to a sovereign end), 
but as its “mode of execution, manifestation, and effectuation in general” (ibid). War 
is sovereignty’s “mode of accomplishment”, its “finish” (ibid). What is meant by 
‘finish’ is something being carried “to the limit of its own logic and its own good, that 
is, to the extremity of its own Being” (ibid, 118). How to think this ‘extremity’, the 
question of the ‘limit’, is at the heart of coming to terms with the relation between 
sovereignty and law. Nancy’s engagement with these questions raises the problematic 
of sovereignty in the form I identified in relation to Mabo:
The whole problem, if there is a problem, is of knowing if the execution, the 
finish, is finite or infinite, and in what sense of these words, (ibid)
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This brings the problem being discussed here into very sharp focus. When it is 
asserted that Taw’ is the ‘end’ (as telos) of sovereignty, is the character attributed to 
sovereignty finite or infinite? Is law produced by a finite sovereign ‘event’ ‘back 
then’?56 Or does the sovereign capacity to exceed all limits, to be uncontained by 
law, to be law’s exception and excess, disclose an infinite quality? Infinite 
sovereignty, if it were possible, would be a thoroughly accomplished sovereignty. 
Nancy’s persistent concern is to call into question such a completeness of ‘position’ 
or ‘relation’ -  that is, the possibility of such an accomplished sovereignty. I will 
return, in Chapter Two, to discuss the implications of this critique of a finite/infinite 
sovereignty - a sovereign telos as the establishment of a juridical order and colonial 
settler society or an infinite sovereign where sovereignty is an accomplished totality - 
for ‘postcolonial’ law and society.
Nancy explores the critique of a finite and infinite conception of sovereignty
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in his essay “The Jurisdiction of the Hegelian Monarch” (Nancy, 1993c). There he 
argues against the possibility of a ‘singular’ sovereignty that is complete as ‘unity’ or 
‘essence’ which can ‘symbolise’ or represent the ‘people’. ‘Singular’ sovereignty is 
never accomplished absolutely. What results from this incompleteness of being, this 
failure of ‘position’, ‘singularity’, or ‘presence’ is central to accounting for 
community. Nancy’s point is that both finite and infinite sovereignty are impossible, 
or at the very least, there must be a thought of sovereignty beyond a finite/infinite 
sovereignty (Nancy, 2000c, 139). Though there have been numerous attempts to 
subordinate or even erase the persistence of sovereignty-as-end by the creation of
56 For an account of the foundational role of sovereignty in relation law, see Nancy, 2000c, 131-32.
57 This text will be discussed below in considering the problematic of sovereignty as it is manifested 
through the notion of ‘jurisdiction’.
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“inter-, trans-, or supranational sovereignties” (ibid, 130) (the League of Nations, 
United Nations, “Europe” are the examples Nancy mentions), the problem of “End” 
persists (ibid, 131). The question is how to think without ‘end’, without finitude and 
the ‘finishing’ of sovereignty:
How [is one] to think without end, without finishing, without sovereignty -  
and, in this, without resigning oneself to a weak, instrumental, and slavishly 
humanist thinking of the law (and/or “communication,” “justice,” the 
“individual,” the “community” -  all of which are concepts that are debilitated 
insofar as there has been no response to this question)? (ibid, 133)
By addressing the relation between sovereignty and law through the figure of ‘War’, 
Nancy demonstrates that the nature of sovereignty is a question that can be taken up 
as the question of the ‘limit’. Nancy’s objective is to think sovereignty beyond its 
conception as an ‘exception’ “pure and simple” (Nancy, 2000c, 108). Another way of 
putting the question of the limit is as a problem of ‘spacing’ and ‘relation’ (ibid, 136- 
7).58
The relationship between a sovereign war and law (as distinct from a war as 
‘police action’ or as ‘civil war’) is posed as a problem of the ‘spacing’ between 
sovereignty and law.59 How do we account for a ‘spacing’ or separation between 
sovereign war and law when the possibility of their separation (difference) is 
undermined by the fact that sovereign war is an execution of (international) law, as 
‘just war’, ‘policing’ ‘rogue states’ and ‘bad leaders’? It is thus difficult to separate 
war from law. Additionally, a difference between sovereign war and law is
581 will elaborate this notion of ‘spacing’ below.
59 For a discussion of sovereign war distinct from ‘police action’, see Nancy, 2000c, 106-9; for a 
discussion of the sovereign ‘end’ as law, ibid, 115-121; for a discussion of sovereignty, law and 
finitude as a matter of ‘spacing’, ibid, 136-139.
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undermined when the sovereign exception exempts itself from law, takes itself 
‘outside’ law, and yet preserves law.60 The ‘position’ of One-being (sovereignty) 
discloses a ‘relation’ with conditions and phenomena that are other than, other to, the 
sovereign ‘event’ -  for instance, ‘law’ and ‘community’ (Nancy, 2000c, 136-140). 
This unsettles the possibility of a discrete, finite sovereignty. But then there is the 
challenge of thinking law and community as something other than a ‘Sovereign End’. 
There are thus two aspects to Nancy’s interrogation of sovereignty -  the critique of its 
character as finite/infinite, and a questioning of how law and community can be 
thought without being symbolised, grounded or ‘finished’ (to use his term), by a 
sovereign decision. A shorthand means of expressing this collection of reflections on 
the singular-plural character of sovereignty is to claim that sovereignty is at once 
finite and infinite, in-finite. The in-finitude of sovereignty is an im-possibility. In­
finitude cannot be presented as such. Conceptualising this ‘lack’, this non-place or 
‘empty-place’ of sovereignty must be considered by rigorously thinking the character 
of the sovereign ‘limit’.
Nancy addresses the ‘limit’ of sovereignty as a question of the very possibility
of a sovereign-being as a discrete entity. The limit of sovereignty is posed in relation
to other sovereigns and in relation to law. Sovereignty exists in relation to other
sovereigns, in a system of sovereignties. The right to wage war, Nancy argues, is the
most sovereign of all rights:
because it allows a sovereign to decide that another sovereign is its enemy and
to try to subjugate it, indeed to destroy it, that is, to relieve it of its sovereignty
(here, life comes into the bargain ... ). It is the sovereign’s right to confront
60 There is some proximity between this line of questioning and Carl Schmitt’s decisionist approach to 
sovereignty. There are, however, significant differences. I will critique Schmitt’s thought in Chapter 
Three in light of Nancy’s critique of the finitude of being.
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his alter ego ad mortem; this is not only an effect of sovereignty but also its 
supreme manifestation . . . .  (Nancy, 2000c, 106)
The sovereign decision on the enemy and its destruction has the capacity to create 
new law and a new distribution of sovereignties. The majority of national and state 
sovereignties have such an origin (ibid, 107). Sovereignty has an existence in and 
through its relation to law. That is, one “extremity” of war is law, convention and 
order (ibid, 106). The sovereign right to war exempts itself from all law, but it has law 
as an ‘end’ -  an ‘end’ as telos and limit:
The right to wage war excepts itself from law at the very point where it 
belongs to it both as an origin and as end. This point is a point of foundation, 
in so far as we are incapable of thinking of foundation without sovereignty, or 
of sovereignty itself without thinking in terms of exception and excess. The 
right to wage war excepts itself from law at a point replete with sovereign 
brilliance. Law does not possess this brilliance, but it needs its light, and its 
founding event, (ibid, 107)
The sovereign exception on war ‘excepts’ itself from law and ‘belongs’ to law as 
origin and end. There is then a ‘sharing’ in sovereignty-law, a passing between, a 
passage from war-to-law.61 There is a possibility that law may be suspended, 
destroyed, re-inaugurated, as sovereignties re-distribute themselves. Law can then be 
expressed as a sovereign distribution. Thus, at the most sovereign moment of war 
(where the sovereign is usually ‘positioned’ ‘beyond’ law), there is a ‘relation’ to law. 
The sovereign ‘event’ which is regarded as archetypically ‘singular’ reveals itself to 
be ‘plural’:
61 This claim can be sustained empirically when considering the ‘war on terror’ as a ‘war without end’.
I would argue that such an ‘infinite’ sovereign war is impossible. War is for the preservation of a 
‘particular’ order or ‘nation’ -  and is thus imbued with particular ‘ends’ and ‘limits’. I will return to 
this point when considering the habeas corpus cases in relation to the Guantanamo detainees in 
Chapter Three.
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If sovereignty is the grand, political term for defining community (its leader or 
its essence) that has nothing beyond itself, with no foundation or end but itself, 
what becomes of sovereignty when it is revealed that it is nothing but a 
singularly plural spacing? How is one to think sovereignty as the nothing of 
the with that is laid bare? (Nancy, 2000b, 36)
Nancy’s claim is that sovereignty is not a singularity, it is not finite. Sovereignty is a 
‘plural’ relation, a spacing between entities. Thinking sovereignty as the ‘nothing of 
the with that is laid bare’ involves thinking of sovereignty not as end but as ‘an empty 
place’ (Nancy, 2000c, 137).
Nancy has developed his thought of the ‘empty place’ of sovereignty in 
relation to the problem of sovereignty as a form of ‘worldwide’ authority (Nancy,
fO1997, 3). There are a plethora of claims that sovereign authority is becoming 
‘worldwide’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000 and 2004; Bauman, 2002; Urry 2002; Ignatieff 
2003b). According to these pronouncements sovereignty is now ‘without limit’. Is 
this the arrival of the ‘empty place’ of sovereignty, where an amorphous sovereignty 
is now without ‘limit’? Has a new form of sovereignty encompassed the ‘world’? 
Nancy confronts the problem of ‘worldwide’ authority by examining the notions of 
‘sense’ (value) and ‘world’ (Nancy, 1997, 54-7).64 The problem of the ‘sense of the 
world’ matches the problem of the possibility of ‘worldwide’ authority in the 
following way. The question of authority, in its modem ‘theologicopoliticaF
621 don’t propose to develop this link of the end of sovereignty to the question of ‘globalness’ at length 
here. In Chapter Four I will contrast Nancy and Antonio Negri in light of the critique of sovereignty 
developed here. There I consider at length what it means to confront an ‘imperial sovereign’, a 
sovereign ‘empire’ that is becoming ‘worldwide’. Is ‘worldwide’ sovereignty possible? In addressing 
this question I will consider Nancy’s recent writings on ‘globalisation’, for instance, Nancy, 1997, 
2003e, and 2003f. On the implications of Nancy’s thought for a critique of ‘globalisation’, see Ignaas 
Devisch, 2002.
631 will give a detailed account of these in Chapter Four.
641 should stress that I am only providing a brief sketch of this problematisation by Nancy. A full 
account of each of these terms will be provided in Chapter Four.
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manifestation has always been a question of the ‘source’ of value. Modem accounts 
of authority placed the ‘West’ as the source of ‘civilisation’ (Nancy, 2003c, 37). The 
‘history’ of the ‘West’, its ‘reason’ and ‘humanity’, were the source of the ‘sense’ of 
the ‘world’. However, this ‘centrality’, this finitude of the West, is no longer 
sustainable. ‘Globalisation’ is the becoming ‘infinite’ of a ‘finitude’ -  that is, the 
dispersal of sovereignty, identity, community and so on. The source of the ‘sense of 
the world’ is no longer a transcendent Christian God (Nancy, 1997, 54-5). The 
‘spacing of the ‘world’ is thus not measured or arranged by reference to a 
‘transcendent’ source of authority. This is what drives the now pressing question of 
‘worldwide’ authority. Worldwide authority is a manifestation of “sovereignty 
without sovereignty” (Nancy, 2000c, 134, and generally 136-140). This is the 
problem of the ‘nonsovereign’ or ‘empty place’ of sovereignty.65
The ‘empty place of sovereignty’ is, of course, not a ‘place’ to be named or 
identified but a condition that is to be approached through a critique of finitude. That 
is, the ‘empty place’ of sovereignty is to be understood through the im-possibility of a 
monistic conception of sovereignty, the exposure to ‘being in common’, and the 
absence of an ‘essence’ or discrete unity that purports to occupy a ‘sovereign place’ 
(Nancy, 2000c, 138-9). The approach offered by Nancy for seeking the extreme limit 
of the ‘end of sovereignty’ is proposed through a question -  “the question of a 
nonsovereign meaning as the very sense o f the humanity o f humans and the 
globalness o f the world9' (ibid, 138, original emphasis). The “relation of 
nonsovereign meaning” is to be ‘invented’, it is to come (ibid). Drawing on Bataille’s 
vision that ‘sovereignty is NOTHING’, Nancy offers the following attributes that an
651 will return to consider this questioning of ‘worldwide’ sovereignty and its implications for 
undermining ‘imperial sovereignty’ in Chapter Four.
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end to the archaism of sovereignty must involve: there should be nothing to “attain”, 
no “accomplishment”, “achievement”, or “finishing” (ibid, 139). In contrast, 
sovereignty as an ‘event’ involve these characteristics of ‘attainment’, 
‘accomplishment’, or ‘achievement’ of a ‘new order’, ‘society’ and so on. These 
were all attributes of the finite and infinite conceptions of sovereignty that I identified 
in Australian ‘postcolonial’ law’s characterisation of sovereignty. While finitude, the 
‘presence’ of sovereignty, is a spacing that is always already a ‘sharing’ -  one that 
Nancy treats as a condition of the “global world” -  what is central to ‘emptying’ the 
monistic place of the sovereign is that the meaning of sovereignty should no longer 
occur “in a totalization and presentation (of a finite and accomplished infinite)” (ibid). 
A ‘totalization’, a presentation of sovereignty as discrete and accomplished is 
precisely what occurred in Mabo. I will return in the next Chapter to explain how 
such a characterisation of sovereignty, though pitched as the condition of 
‘postcolonial’ law and society, reasserted One sovereignty and One law as an 
essential basis for community. I will close this section by relating Nancy’s thought on 
the ‘empty place of sovereignty’ to Lefort’s consideration of the ‘empty place of 
power’ in modem democracies (Lefort, 1988).66 This will facilitate relating Nancy’s 
critique of finitude, in later Chapters, to other thinkers who have grappled with the 
relationship between sovereignty and law.
66 There are several reasons for relating Nancy’s thought to Lefort. First and foremost, the formulation 
of the question of the ‘empty place of power’ and the reasons for posing it are virtually identical in the 
two thinkers. Second, Lefort’s thought is generally more accessible and may assist in relating Nancy’s 
thought to other thinkers who grapple with questions of foundation, legitimacy of power, the ground of 
community and so on.
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1.3.2 The Lack o f  Sovereignty
According to Lefort, the ‘empty place of power’ in modernity is a corollary of 
the absent essence of law (Lefort, ibid, 17-8). I will not rehearse the history of 
modem political thought which Lefort discusses in order to arrive at the condition of 
an absent essence. Suffice it to say that the abject condition that results from the loss 
of God or the absence of another transcendent basis for grounding law creates a 
problem of legitimacy for posited law. Moreover, the positing of another ‘essence’ in 
the twentieth century, another ‘One’ as the basis for law, took the totalitarian forms of 
History (Communism) and ‘People-as-One’ (Fascism) (ibid, 13, 45-6). What follows, 
then, in modernity is a preoccupation with foundations -  that is, the search for a 
legitimate basis for the exercise of power. Lefort contends that a distinctive feature of 
modem democracy is the search for a new “determination-representation” of the 
‘place of power’ (ibid, 224-5). The feature of modem democracy is that power is an 
‘empty place’, and it thereby maintains a gap between the symbolic and the real:
It does so by virtue of a discourse that reveals that power belongs to no one; 
that those who exercise power do not posses it; that they do not indeed 
embody it; that the exercise of power requires a periodic and repeated contest; 
that the authority of those vested with power is created and re-created as a 
result of the manifestation of the will of the people, (ibid, 225)
Lefort then draws a distinction between ‘power belonging to no one’ and the notion of 
the ‘empty place of power’ (ibid, 225-6). The idea that ‘power belongs to no one’
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involves the denial of power to any particular person (ibid).67 This reflects the 
distribution of power in models of representative democracy where no single person 
holds absolute power.
In contrast, the notion of the ‘empty place of power’ is very close to Nancy’s 
formulation of the original dis-position of beings - the sharing and exposure of one 
being to another without an essential condition that gives content and determination to 
their being-in-common. Here it is worth quoting Lefort in full to show how his 
concern with the question of legitimacy for modem law and democracy, and his 
notion of the ‘empty place of power’ reflect the trajectories of Nancy’s arguments in 
relation to the ‘nonsovereign’ place -  the idea that sovereignty should be ‘nothing’:
The reference to an empty place ... implies a society without any positive 
determination, which cannot be represented by the figure of a community. It 
is because the division of power does not, in a modem democracy, refer to an 
outside that can be assigned to the Gods, the city or holy ground; because it 
does not refer to an inside that can be assigned to the substance of the 
community. Or, to put it another way, it is because there is no materialisation 
of the Other -  which would allow power to function as a mediator, no matter 
how it were defined -  that there is no materialisation of the One -  which 
would allow power to function as an incarnation. Nor can power be divorced 
from the work of division by which society is instituted; a society can 
therefore relate to itself only through the experience of an internal division
67 Lefort puts it like this: It is akin to “The old Greek formula to the effect that power is in the middle 
(and historians tell us that it was elaborated within the framework of an aristocratic society before 
being bequeathed to democracy) still indicates the presence of a group which has an image of itself, of 
its space and of its bounds”, ibid.
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which proves to be not a de facto division, but a division that generates its
constitution, (ibid)
A society that can only relate to itself through the experience of an internal ‘division 
that generates its constitution’, I wish to argue, matches Nancy’s formulation of the 
im-possibility of the fmitude of being. Recall that it is the exposure across ‘limits’, 
being at once contained and exposed, the in-finitude of being, that accounts for the 
im-possibility of fmitude. Finitude can only be because of its necessary exposure 
across a ‘limit’. Thus finitude is the experience of the inevitable transgression of such 
limits. Sovereignty, like all being, is made present through a ‘division’. The 
‘division’ is not a mere constitutive exclusion of the unremitting other. Rather, it is 
an internal division, a setting and transgression of horizons. In Chapter Three I will 
provide an instantiation of how this ‘horizon’ is marked through the ‘abandonment’ of 
a ‘life’ mediated by law, the life of the detainee in Guantanamo Bay. For the time 
being I will persist with explaining why it is necessary to capitalise on the Tack of 
sovereignty’, on the ‘empty place of power’.
For Lefort, when the place of power is empty there is no material Other to 
ground the community, nor is there a singular incarnation of power as One. What 
generates a society for Lefort are internal divisions - relations of production, action, 
exchange ordered by norms and goals (ibid, 226). This is not to say that ‘society’ has 
lost its religious basis. For Lefort, the theologico-political structure persists in 
modernity through, among other things, the myth of the ‘nation’ (ibid, 232). Nancy 
also directs his critique at theologico-political formulations of sovereign power where 
“Divine creation and royal decision compose its double image: to make or unmake a 
world, to submit to a will, to designate an enemy” (Nancy, 2000c, 120). Nancy seeks
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to undermine the ‘proper’ accomplishment of the “Executive” essence of sovereignty 
which is presented as the “prince, State, nation, people, fatherland, and so on” (ibid,
121). It is in this way that Nancy claims that sovereignty is purported to have the 
power of “finishing” -  a power of execution that is not subordinated to something else 
(ibid, 120). But these monistic and transcendent conceptions of sovereignty are 
undermined when the distinction between ‘Sovereign war’ and ‘police action’ 
collapses -  as with a ‘just war’ against a ‘rogue state’ or ‘bad leader’ by an alliance of 
sovereigns in the name of human rights, democracy, and the enforcement of 
international law (ibid, 123-4, 130). The figure of war is becoming the “ambiguous 
sovereign-slave of economics”(ibid, 111). This is, then, no longer the heroic, 
‘brilliant’ sovereign -  but yet there is a “world that does not know how to displace or 
go beyond sovereignty” (ibid, 123-4). Sovereignty does not manifest a ‘unity’, but 
the failure to think beyond sovereignty as ‘unity’ -  as essence, ground, End etc - 
persists. The conclusion Lefort draws from his examination of the vacated place of 
power in modernity also resembles Nancy’s account. According to Lefort, in the 
schema of the theologico-political:
any move towards immanence is also a move towards transcendence; that any 
attempt to explain the contours of social relations implies an internalisation of 
unity; that any attempt to define objective, impersonal entities implies a 
personification of those entities. (Lefort, 1988, 254)
68 Nancy expands this account of the transformation of sovereignty in the post-cold war era through an 
account of what he terms “ecotechnics”, a term that signifies ‘planetary technology’ and ‘world 
economy’ (ibid, 133, and see generally 129-136). Nancy interrogates the relationship between 
“world”, sovereignty, economy, technology and law. It is an account that has much to say about 
contemporary debates about the nature of ‘globalisation’, but it is beyond the scope of my analysis to 
take up this trajectory here.
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What this highlights is the persistence of an urge to provide a transcendent source of 
unification for law and society. I wish to bring this questioning to bear on the 
‘postcolonial’ context of Australia in the following Chapter.
Before moving to that I should clarify how the impossibility of fmitude, the 
impossibility of a singular ‘position’, monism, or limit that absolutely separates, is 
applicable to discourses of sovereignty and law. It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to recount the plethora of theories on the nature of sovereignty or law. Instead I will 
recount Bartelson’s thought on ‘sovereignty’ and Fitzpatrick on the nature of ‘law’. I 
have selected these authors because their concerns resonate with Nancy -  each seeks 
to ‘empty’ the ‘ground’ of sovereignty and law or demonstrate how a singular, 
monistic conception of the origin is impossible. Bartelson and Fitzpatrick are 
exemplary reflections of how Nancy’s critique of the finitude of being resonates with 
more explicit treatments of sovereignty and law. The objective is not to be exhaustive 
in relating Nancy’s theory to theories of sovereignty and law. Rather, an engagement 
with theorists that explicitly deal with sovereignty and law will facilitate relating 
Nancy’s thought, in later Chapters, to other theorists who have grappled with the 
problem of the sovereign ‘event’ (Derrida) or the exceptional decision that constitutes 
the law (Schmitt).
1.4 De-positioning Sovereignty
The imperative to move sovereignty to a ‘non-place’ has been articulated by 
Jens Bartelson in his thoughtful critique of empiricist treatments of sovereignty in 
‘international relations’ literature. I will consider Baratleson’s arguments in light of
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the impossibility of a finite conception of sovereignty and the imperative to ‘empty’ 
the place of the sovereign identified through Nancy’s thought. In the next section I 
will bring Nancy’s arguments on the impossible limit that absolutely separates, the 
impossibility of a determinate ‘ground’ for being, to bear on law through Fitzpatrick’s 
articulation of the impossibility of a ‘position’ that can be attributed to law.
The methodologically empiricist account of the source of sovereignty is 
proposed in two discourses, ‘international political theory’ and ‘macrosociology’, 
both amply set out in Bartelson’s A Genealogy o f Sovereignty (1995, 19-49). 
Bartelson deploys a Foucauldian genealogical critique against the empiricist accounts. 
In traditional international political theory, the state is seen as historically and 
ontologically prior to a system of states (ibid, 23). Sovereignty is the defining 
property of this state, and as the state is regarded as a necessary condition of the larger 
system of states, state sovereignty is also an essential pre-condition of the 
international system (ibid). In this account the emergence of the state is regarded as 
resulting from the fall of ‘primordial political unity’ when ‘mediaeval Christendom 
dissolved and the modem sovereign state was bom’ (ibid). But the ‘difference’ that 
historical origin may pose is not allowed to get in the way for long, for “sovereignty is 
stripped of its historical origin and reinstated ahistorically as an organising principle” 
(ibid). All states can then be presented as the ‘same’, presumably provided they 
escape primordial stasis and make the leap in the direction of modernity. These 
‘units’, now the same, present a sort of ontological international anarchy, an ‘absence’ 
which is the ontological partner of sovereignty, a ‘prior presence’ (ibid, 23-4, 36). 
Order grows out of this disorder by way of the familiar contractual theories and the 
‘transposing’ of ‘natural’ conflicts into higher levels of complexity or a different
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historical stage (ibid, 24). The ‘past’, in this account, is explained in terms of the 
‘present’ (ibid).69 The ‘external order’ of international relations is a derivative of the 
‘internal’ sovereignty of the ontologically assumed state.
In ‘macrosociology’ this approach is reversed. Instead of the ‘ontologically 
unproblematic and primitive entity’ macrosociology attempts to elucidate the concept 
of sovereignty and present an empirical account of its actual formation in time, its 
consolidation in the European context and global spread (ibid, 35, 36-44). Rather 
than the state preceding the ‘international’, the emergence of the state is explained 
through ‘conflict theories’ (ibid, 37-8) where the consolidation of states coincide with 
the emergence of an international sphere (ibid, 36-9). It is suggested that a sphere of 
social action exists prior to the state. The movement now is from a ‘past to a present’ 
where that which precedes the state is regarded as an absence: “Logical and 
chronological priority [is given] to the notion of society as a kind of anarchical 
condition, out of which the state emerges as a gradual concentration of power” (ibid, 
36-8). ‘The state of nature’, ‘anarchy’, and ‘order void’ are themes repeated by 
modem macrosociologists. The emergence of the state out of this prior stage is 
matched by a “concomitant sublimation” to the international level (ibid, 38). Essential 
to this story of state formation is an ‘acting subject’ that must be present in order to 
constitute itself and the state as an ‘inside’ “that remains identical with itself 
throughout the formative process, no matter how it is conditioned by ‘outside’ forces 
in the course of its historical development from embryo to full blown state” (ibid, 39): 
The ‘unit’ or subject that makes such an empirical reference possible is an individual
69 For a critique of the Whiggish character of this discourse see Bartelson, 1995, 56-58; and McHugh, 
1991, 170.
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or collective ‘rational will’ that will effect the transfer of power from King to people, 
the presence of an essence that is common to the state and to Man (ibid, 39-40).
However, such a concept as ‘rational will’ present unto itself, sovereignty as 
an object of knowledge, or self-sufficient individual collectivity as acting subject that 
is the driving force of history is anathema to the Foucauldian conception of 
knowledge and genealogical approach that Bartelson employs. For Foucault:
one has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, 
that’s to say to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of 
the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call 
genealogy, that is a form of history which can account for the constitution of 
knowledges, discourses and domains of objects etc., without having to make 
reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of 
events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history. 
(Bartelson, 1995, 74)70 
According to the two empiricist approaches considered by Bartelson the sovereign 
state is either ontologically prior to the international order, the ‘inside’ exists before 
the ‘outside’; or ‘internal sovereignty’ is dependent on something like the anarchical 
society which is structurally prior to the state that emerges from it. In the latter 
“sovereignty grows out of absence, and the inside is constituted from the outside” 
(Bartelson, 1995, 44). The commonality in both versions of the emergence of 
sovereignty is a conception of sovereignty as unicity with a ‘presence’ that is 
discretely ‘inside’ or ‘outside’. Such a finite ‘presence’, as we observed through 
Nancy, is impossible. A finite will, subject, or state presumes a spatial separation that
70 See Foucault, 1980, 117, cited in Bartelson, 1995, 74. See also, for a critique of knowledge through 
the presupposition of the subject, Foucault, 1997, 3, 14-5.
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is always an exposure across the limit that separates. Bartelson does, however, call 
into question the possibility of a limit that absolutely separates. He does this through 
the notion of a ‘parergon’ which I will now consider.
It is trite to mention that neither ‘inside’ nor ‘outside’ can exist without the 
other. As Bartelson suggests, this impossibility of sovereignty and its other as 
entirely distinct self-sustaining phenomena may be discerned through the notion of a 
‘parergon’. ‘Parergon’ was a concern of ancient writings on art and was reintroduced 
by Kant when discussing the ‘relation of a frame or an ornament to the work of art 
itself and its background’ (ibid, 61).71 The notion of the ‘parergon’ has been 
elaborated by Jacques Derrida in Truth in Painting (1978). It is Derrida’s elaboration 
that Bartelson draws on in deploying the notion of the ‘parergon’ as a means of 
questioning the ‘fixity’ or substance of a line that separates ‘inside’ from ‘outside’. 
The problem of the parergon concerns the relationship of the frame to that which is 
being framed. The solution is that:
a frame, a line of demarcation, an ontological divide, or a geographical or 
chronological boundary all assert and manifest class membership of 
phenomena, but the frame or the line itself cannot be a member of either class. 
It is neither inside nor outside, yet it is the condition of possibility of both. A 
parergon does not exist in the same sense as that which it helps to constitute; 
there is a ceaseless activity of framing, but the frame itself is never present, 
since it is itself unframed. (Bartelson, 1995, 51)
But this ‘never present’ frame is ‘a composite of inside and outside’:
71 Referring to Immanuel Kant, 1951, 61.
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it is ‘an outside which is called inside the inside to constitute it as inside’. 
And conversely: it is an inside which is called outside the outside to constitute 
it as outside. Once brought into being, a parergonal frame ‘detaches itself 
from two backgrounds, but in relation to each it backs into the other’, (ibid, 
51-2)
Bartelson uses this notion of parergonality to demonstrate that sovereignty has 
no fixed reference. ‘It’ is in constant movement between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and 
exists in relation to that which is adjacent to the ground it occupies. Sovereignty has 
no ontological presence and the notion of parergonality helps to illustrate this. 
Bartelson suggests that the concept of sovereignty should not be regarded as an 
implicit ontological concern of contemporary knowledge, and that ‘it’ should be 
moved to a “non-place” (ibid, 52). For Bartelson sovereignty is articulated through 
discourse -  it is constantly drawn and redrawn through knowledge. It is through the 
interplay of knowledge/discourse that the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ are 
discursively constituted. Changes in knowledge/discourse through history determine 
the content of the concept of sovereignty (ibid).
The ‘non-place’ to which Bartelson would wish to move sovereignty arises out 
of his analysis that sovereignty only has a ‘presence’ through its discursive 
construction over time. The absence of any essential content that can be attributed to 
sovereignty, does not however, mean that the place of the sovereign is rendered 
‘empty’. The radical potential of Nancy and Lefort’s drive to think a ‘nonsovereign’ 
or ‘empty place’ of sovereignty is not to be found in Baratelson’s treatment of the 
concept. The value of Bartelson’s work is that he questions the ‘presence’ of
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sovereignty and addresses this critique to influential variations of international 
relations theory. However, sovereignty as a discursive construct which is in 
indeterminate movement between inside/outside has its limits. For instance, it does 
assume that some stable content can be given to sovereignty -  for this would be 
necessary to move ‘it’ to a ‘non-place’. The discursive critique of sovereignty also 
encourages liberal pluralist agendas that see sovereignty as a construct that can be 
filled with variable content or made subject to a Taw’ that will occupy the place of
77sovereignty -  the ‘non-place’ that Bartelson referred to. Constructivist accounts 
deploy the indeterminate notion of sovereignty as a means of replacing, renewing and 
re-inaugurating sovereignty. But these approaches return us to the problem of 
finitude. Nancy, in contrast, would wish to assert the ontological condition of a 
sharing -  a dis-position of sovereignty whereby it is the failure of any containing limit 
that is the occasion of community. The sharing that takes place across limits is not a 
‘construction’ of discourse but the very condition of a finite limit that must always 
already be exposed to what is beside it. Furthermore, Nancy’s project extends far 
beyond the critique of fmitude. He undertakes the task of thinking community 
without ground or essence -  not just an assertion of indeterminacy of substance and 
content that can be attributed to sovereignty. I will contrast Nancy’s approach with 
attempts to renew and re-inaugurate sovereignty by legal and constitutional theorists 
who draw on Bartelson (such as Macklem) in the next Chapter.
72 In the next Chapter I consider the work of John Borrows, 2002, and Patrick Macklem, 2001, both 
leading Canadian constitutional scholars who have argued for the renewal of national sovereignty so 
that it accommodates indigenous sovereignties. For Borrows this renewal must conform to the ‘rule of 
law’. For Macklem, who expressly relies on Bartelson, pluralising sovereignty is simply a matter of 
accepting that sovereignty is a discursive construct and giving this construct new content.
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1.5 De-Positioning Law
The impossibility of a fixed position which characterises sovereignty can also 
be attributed to law. The conception of law as a movement between ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ - that law occupies the ‘space of a line’; law occupying the line co-adjacent 
with both sides not contained in either - is a central argument in Fitzpatrick’s 
Modernism and the Grounds o f Law (2001a). For Fitzpatrick, there can be no fixed 
‘origin’ or ‘position’ for law. Law is in constant movement between determination 
and responsiveness to a beyond. Law’s experience of indeterminacy, I wish to argue, 
is comparable to Nancy’s critique of the impossibility of finite being. Law’s limit is 
determined by the transgression of a line that it must unceasingly constitute by 
crossing, by being exposed and communicating with its beyond.
Fitzpatrick’s articulation of the impossibility of a fixed ‘ground’ of law offers 
important insights into the relationship between sovereignty and law. While in the so 
called pre-modem era it is ‘myth’ that offers a mediating device for the ‘irresolution’ 
of the foundation or origin of taboo and the regulation of social practice, in modernity 
this place of the ‘transcendent’ is occupied by law as the mediating device which 
offers determination with a putative responsiveness to its beyond.73 In Fitzpatrick’s 
thought ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are theorised in terms of a ‘norm’ and its 
‘transgression’:
73 For an account of the irresolution o f the origin and the putative settlement offered by law, a narrative 
rendered through Freud’s myth of origin, see ibid, 22-36.
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[p]ut in terms of Foucault’s suggestion ‘that transgression has its entire space 
in the line it crosses’, this line could be taken as the limit at which what is 
‘inside’ it continually forms and transforms. For that inside to subsist, the 
limit has both to mark it inclusively and open it relationally to all that would 
impinge on and challenge or deny it. The line divides an enclosing presence 
and a disruptive transgression beyond it. Yet despite and because of the 
dissociation, each ‘side’ of this divide is also integral to the other, (ibid, 60) 
This illustrates the impossibility of inside/outside, norm/transgression, 
sovereignty/law, ‘being alone’, as Nancy put it, and stresses the relation ‘in-between’ 
each side of the line that separates. The significance of emphasising the impossibility 
of a line that could separate ‘inside’ from ‘outside’ can be seen through the 
persistence of this spatial metaphor in the influential accounts of modem law.
Fitzpatrick brings his theory on the impossibility a fixed ‘position’ that can be 
attributed to modem law to bear on the canon of modem jurisprudential thought: 
Hobbes, Austin and Hart (ibid, 93-101). I will not recount the extensive treatment by 
Fitzpatrick of these positivist accounts of modem law. What is useful for my 
purposes is to stress the significance of the impossibility of a fixed ‘position’ that can 
be attributed to sovereignty or law, contrary to these conventional jurisprudential 
accounts. ‘Position’, as we observed through Nancy and we are about to see 
instantiated by Fitzpatrick in relation to the dominant instances of English 
jurisprudence, is always already responsive and thus in ‘relation’ with its beyond.
According to Fitzpatrick, English jurisprudence asserts the autonomy of law 
through two modes of the “talismanic spatial metaphor of inside and outside” (ibid,
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93).74 One way is to assume that law is an “integrated whole” that has a localised 
origin or source in a particular office or entity (ibid). John Austin’s command of the 
sovereign that must be habitually obeyed is one example of this: law is law existing 
by “position” (Austin’s term), and “that position was occupied by a ‘determinate’ and 
independent ‘political superior’ who ‘set’ the law ‘to political inferiors’” (ibid, 95). 
The second marks a boundary between what is inside law and outside it with 
reference to “morality, fact, administration, society, territory, and savagery” (ibid). 
Fitzpatrick argues that such determinate positing of the position of a law giver and 
law, always requires its other -a  responsiveness to a beyond that is spatially 
conceived. So in Hobbes’s Leviathan for instance, the command of the sovereign 
Leviathan is said to be possessed of a complete power to posit law (ibid, 93). This 
completeness flows from the dependence and commitment that those who subject 
themselves to Leviathan must show. Anything less would risk the recurrence and 
reversion of natural passions -  the lawlessness of the state of nature. The absolute 
character of Leviathan flows from its spatial characterisation as the opposition to its 
other, the state of nature (ibid). The various ‘natural laws’ and ‘proto laws’ of the 
state of nature which allows a covenant to be produced in the first place, leaves 
Leviathan, the power of positive determination, having “responsive regard to where 
that power came from” (ibid, 94).75 The power of the subject to resist Leviathan’s 
attempt to take the life of the subject, Leviathan’s ‘duties’ to preserve and improve the 
well-being of the people, the ‘good’ and ‘equality’ demanded of its laws, and the 
ambiguity of law that suggests that they should be used sparingly, are all aspects of
74 Throughout this section the accounts of Hobbes, Austin and Hart are derived from Fitzpatrick 
(2001a).
75 Fitzpatrick provides a telling account of the restrictions on Leviathan which has to be responsive to 
the extensive list of liberties of the subject, ibid, 94-5.
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the responsiveness of Leviathan beyond the harsh determinancy with which it is 
commonly endowed.
By the time of Austin, the “spatial instancing” of law by Hobbes becomes a 
“chasmic division of the globe between savage and civilised places” (ibid, 96). The 
‘political society’ that habitually obeys Austin’s sovereign is contrasted with society 
in its natural state, savage society. Fitzpatrick’s point is that the archetypical 
positivist, Austin, who stressed the singular determinacy of the sovereign as the 
source of law, could not sustain his ‘political society’ without its negative contrast 
with a savage one (ibid, 96-7). The same point is devastatingly made in relation to 
H.L.A Hart. The distinction between Austin and Hart is that the latter insisted that 
rule governed behaviour does not simply follow from a command, as Austin put it, 
but that there is an internal and reflective aspect to the obligation to follow rules. 
Fitzpatrick identifies a litany of instances where Hart contrasts the reflective, rule 
following society of ‘developed law’, with ‘primitive communities’ regulated by 
‘custom’ or ‘primary rules of obligation’ which are not possessed of the advances of 
societies with ‘secondary rules’ (ibid, 97-99). It is beyond the scope of my inquiry to 
recount all these instances here. What is relevant is the ‘relation’ with a beyond that 
is central to the archetypical instances of positive law. The position of law is always 
already in relation with an other that is disavowed. Thus the unicity of posited law 
hardly seems to have the quality of certain position.
Nancy’s critique of the fmitude of being, as we observed above, also asserts 
the impossibility of ‘pure’ position or separation. The relation that upsets One 
sovereignty manifests the problematic of ‘limits’ that constantly face the fact of their
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imminent disappearance in the relation to which they are exposed. This is a dynamic 
that Foucault splendidly explained in his “Preface to Transgression” (1977). As 
Foucault put it:
[t]transgression is an action which involves the limit, that narrow zone of a 
line where it displays the flash of its passage, but perhaps also its entire 
trajectory, even its origin; it is likely that transgression has its entire space in 
the line it crosses, (ibid, 33-4)
Whatever the ‘density’ of limit or transgression, each could not exist without the 
other. “A limit could not exist if it was absolutely uncrossable” for this would amount 
to an unfathomable stasis (ibid, 34). And “transgression would be pointless if the 
limits it faced were illusions and shadows” (ibid). Every time transgression crosses 
the limit it effaces the condition of its own existence (ibid, 35). This is the paradox 
that Fitzpatrick brings unceasingly to bear on the character of law. For Fitzpatrick, 
this dynamic is manifested ‘within’ a law which must transgress ‘itself in order to be 
‘itself -  to be a law that is ‘responsive’ to its beyond (Fitzpatrick, 2001a, 54-62).
If we were to ask more specifically what gives law its quiddity or substance, 
for Fitzpatrick it would be the ‘movement’ in-between ‘determination and 
responsiveness’ which “in-forms” law (ibid, 70). Law coheres ‘in itself through a 
movement in-between the determinant and the responsive (ibid). Law is not entirely 
autonomous or independent for it has to respond to that which lies beyond the rule. 
The rule is never an absolute position (determination), as what is beyond it must be 
gathered or brought within its purview. Fitzpatrick brings the impossibility of 
experiencing death, the impossibility of autonomously experiencing finitude, as 
Nancy articulated it, expressly to bear on the impossibility of law’s autonomous
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position (ibid, 100). Death is the “horizon of the law” (ibid) in the same way that 
being could not experience its own finitude. The impossibility of experiencing death 
is the instance of an opening to what is beyond an affirmed, autonomous, self- 
sustaining position. In an idiom that is consistent with Nancy, Fitzpatrick states:
law is tied to the irresolution of the horizon -  the horizon both as a condition 
and quality of law’s contained being and the horizon as opening onto all which 
lies beyond that being. These dimensions of law are integral to each other, 
(ibid)
Law cannot respond to a beyond without a position from which to respond (ibid, 73). 
However, such a ‘beyond’, as we observed in his treatment of Hobbes, Austin and 
Hart, is a prerequisite for law’s own ‘position’. The relation of law to its limit is thus 
explained through its inextricability from what is beyond such a limit. Fitzpatrick 
emphasises the failure of law’s “assured determination which creates the very demand 
for law” (ibid, 102). The failure of an autonomous position that can be attributed to a 
law-giving sovereign or posited law is the occasion of law’s relation to a beyond. 
This beyond is what a unitary conception of sovereignty or autonomous notion of law 
cannot be separated from. That is, the failure of such finitude, as we observed 
through Nancy, is the occasion of community. Community cuts into the monism of 
sovereignty and the autonomy of law in a variety of ways that I will explore in the 
next two Chapters.
*  *  *
This Chapter identified the finite and infinite character of sovereignty in 
Mabo, and considered this as a problematic that can be interrogated through the 
thought of Jean-Luc Nancy’s critique of finitude. We observed that Nancy
87
persistently argues that a ‘limit’ that separates absolutely is impossible. A ‘limit’, 
according to Nancy, is a ‘relation’ - a ‘being with’ and ‘sharing’. The impossibility of 
finitude, of sovereignty as One, is the occasion of community. Community as 
‘sharing’, ‘being with’, or ‘being in common’, is an exposure (a communication) that 
takes place through the failure of an absolute ‘limit’ that separates. There can thus be 
no ‘One’, no absolute ground, no essence of community, no calculation, not even an 
‘inclusive exclusion’ that ought to determine and regulate community. Community is 
the instance of the failure of ‘ground’ and ‘essence’. Nancy’s critique of finitude thus 
offers several insights for evaluating the attempt to inaugurate a ‘postcolonial’ law 
and society of the ‘future’ while retaining the contradictory lineaments of a finite and 
infinite concept of sovereignty that is largely attributed to an ‘event’ in the ‘past’.
To outline how the argument progresses - in the next Chapter I will elaborate 
Nancy’s critique of the ‘finitude of being’ as a basis for understanding the relationship 
between sovereignty, law and ‘political community’. I have resisted introducing the 
notion of ‘political community’ thus far so as not to encumber the elaboration of the 
impossibility of finite and infinite conceptions of sovereignty. However, at numerous 
points in the discussion the impossibility of finitude and infinity was characterised as 
the occasion of an exposure that is the instance of community. I also emphasised 
Nancy’s persistent concern to refuse an ‘essence’ or absolute ‘ground’ of community. 
The discussion in the next three Chapters will extend these insights. In Chapter Two I 
will return to consider the problem of community as it is presented in the 
‘postcolonial’ context -  the focus will mainly be on Australia, but reference will also 
be made to the problem of ‘postcoloniality’ in Canada. In Chapter Three the question 
of the relation between sovereignty and law will be generalised by considering the
habeas corpus cases that pertain to the detainees in Guantanamo Bay Cuba. The 
treatment of these cases, despite their seeming disparity to the ‘postcolonial’ context 
has already been explained in the Introduction. As I noted, the seeming disparity only 
serves to dramatically indicate that the issue of the in-fmitude of sovereignty is not 
confined to departing from a colonial ‘past’, the particular situation of indigenous 
people, or the production of a ‘postcolonial’ law and society. The problematic of the 
in-fmitude of sovereignty is of more general significance. Moreover, consideration of 
the habeas corpus cases brings the centrality of membership in ‘political community’ 
when grappling with the in-finitude of sovereignty, into sharper focus. Legal 
decisions in relation to sovereignty are articulated through the spatial, territorialised 
notion of ‘jurisdiction’. These decisions seek to position and re-position law in 
relation to sovereignty. The ‘subject’ caught up in these sovereign and legal 
distributions, whether that be the proper(tied) ‘native’ or the ‘unlawful combatant’, 
have their status determined by law’s regulation of ‘political community’. The notion 
of ‘jurisdiction’, I will argue through Nancy, is a notion that manifests the relation 
between sovereignty, law and the political. Finally, in Chapter Four, I will bring my 
analytic of in-finite sovereignty to bear on contemporary accounts of imperial 
sovereignty as they relate to ‘worldwide’ authority. The de-positioning of sovereignty 
in Chapters 1-3 is confined to ‘national’ sovereignty and law. However, no treatment 
of sovereignty can be complete without treating the ‘international’ or ‘global’ 
manifestations of the problematic which I have posed as the in-finite ‘position’ of 
sovereignty. What are the implications of characterising sovereignty as in-finite or as 
‘Nothing’ when numerous theorists claim that a new mode of imperial sovereignty 
manifests itself as ‘worldwide’ authority (Nancy, 1997; Hardt and Negri, 2000, and
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2004)? Confining my treatment to the imperial manifestation of sovereignty, once 
again, I will argue that ‘worldwide’ sovereignty is an im-possibility.
90
CHAPTER 2
De-Positioning ‘Postcolonial’ Law
[I]t is not possible to say, as was said by Marshall CJ of the Cherokee 
Nation, that the aboriginal people of Australia are organised as a ‘distinct 
political society separated from others or that they have been uniformly 
treated as a state.... The aboriginal people are subject to the laws of the 
Commonwealth and of the States or Territories in which they 
respectively reside. They have no legislative, executive or judicial 
organs by which sovereignty might be exercised.
Mason CJ, Coe v The Commonwealth (1993) (emphasis added)76
Fanatics have their dreams, wherewith they weave 
A paradise for a sect; the savage too 
From forth the loftiest fashion of his sleep 
Guesses at 
Heaven... .
John Keats, The Fall o f Hyperion: A Dream (1819)
The Australian court in Mabo, and Coe v The Commonwealth (No. 2) which 
followed hotly in its wake, insisted on the unicity of ‘political community’. Such a 
unitary conception of ‘political community’ deploys monistic conceptions of 
sovereignty and One law (of the State) as the ground of “political society” (Coe (No. 
2), 1993, 115). Unitary conceptions of sovereignty and law refuse the possibility of 
plurality and thus of the very possibility of a ‘postcolonial’ society. In this Chapter 
the manner in which the Australian courts delimit and regulate community will be 
discussed. The regulation, that is to say the determination of the very existence of 
indigenous community is undertaken through the courts’ administration of the notion 
o f ‘tradition and custom’. The existence of indigenous community is made subject to 
a ‘measure’ administered by the courts. Additionally, the allocation of indigenous 
rights and the regulation of indigenous social organisation are undertaken through the
76 Mason CJ in Coe (No. 2) (1993), referring to Marshall CJ in Cherokee Nation v State o f Georgia 
(1831).
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insistence of One jurisdiction to ‘manage’ the social and economic deprivation 
experienced by indigenous people. I will argue that the insistence of One jurisdiction 
is a ‘carrier’ of a monistic conception of sovereignty. The impossibility of such 
monism, the essential plurality of being, is the insistence of a ‘postcolonial’ 
community to come. The Australian approach will be compared with the approach 
advocated by some Canadian constitutional theorists whose approach to a plurality of 
normative systems has been to suggest a ‘legal’ ground for a ‘new sovereignty’ or the 
allocation of a subordinate form of sovereignty for indigenous people. In both cases, I 
argue, a monistic conception of sovereignty is retained. The attempt to inaugurate a 
postcolonial law and society encountered in the Australian and Canadian contexts 
presents a more generalisable problem of One jurisdiction as the expression or 
‘carrier’ of sovereignty. Thus I will close the Chapter with a discussion of Nancy’s 
treatment of the notion of jurisdiction. I will argue that political community is ‘co- 
present’ with sovereignty and law and that this ‘co-presence’ is manifested in the 
notion of jurisdiction. This discussion will open lines of inquiry into attempts to 
confine sovereignty as jurisdiction in contexts other than ‘postcolonial’ societies 
discussed thus far.
In this Chapter there will be an insistence that the ‘political’ is not a 
substance or substantial entity. This refusal of the ‘essence’ of the ‘political’ is best 
made through a discussion of attempts to inaugurate a ‘postcolonial’ community, 
recognise a ‘traditional Aboriginal community’, or grant legal protection to a ‘subject’ 
whose membership of the ‘people’ is a condition for a life mediated by law. I would 
also emphasise that the treatment of the ‘political’ in this Chapter is preliminary and 
directed at interrogating the attempt to re-inaugurate a ‘postcolonial’ law and society
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in settler societies like Australia and Canada. A more thoroughgoing treatment of the 
‘political’ will be undertaken in Chapter Three of this thesis where I will examine the 
notion of the ‘political’ in the context of the habeas corpus cases on the detainees in 
the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This latter context presents 
problematics, such as the relation between sovereign War, law and jurisdiction, which 
cannot be easily extracted from ‘postcolonial’ contexts. Moreover, the question of 
jurisdiction in relation to Guantanamo Bay offers the opportunity to extend my 
argument into areas characteristically associated with a sovereign assertion but not 
covered in the situations of the ‘postcolonial’ considered in the first two Chapters. 
The sovereign exception and its relation to law, the problem of ‘democracy’ as a 
delimited space patrolled by a sovereign, and the ‘essences’ of citizenship and 
subjection by which life is mediated by law are matters crucial to examining the 
possibilities of vacating or ‘emptying’ the place of sovereignty -  an imperative that 
follows from the critique of sovereignty undertaken through Nancy in Chapter One.
I should, however, provide a preliminary account of what I mean by the 
‘political’ when I use the phrase ‘political community’. The question of the 
‘political’, as with sovereignty, is a problem of the ‘limit’. Indeed, as Lacoue- 
Labarthe and Nancy explain it, the ‘political’ is a problematic constituted by the 
concepts o f ‘people’ and ‘sovereignty’ (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997, 115-6).77 
The ‘people’ and ‘sovereignty’ are questions of the ‘limit’ to the extent that they are 
staged as a ‘closure’ (ibid). There is a ‘measure’ for membership of the ‘people’ as
77 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy insist that a re-treatment of the ‘political’ must take place through an 
examination of the “co-belonging” of the philosophical and the political (ibid, 109). This is a 
questioning of the relationship between logos (as a relation) shared in-common and the ‘social bond’ 
that is presented in the city, polls, civilisation, political community etc. That is, they wish to call into 
question logos as the philosophical ground of the polls. It is the presentation of an ‘essence’, as logos 
for instance, as the ground of community that they wish to discredit. As we observed in the previous 
Chapter, it is the ontology of a singular-plural relation that Nancy would use to characterise existence.
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‘race’, ‘ethnos’, pr civilised ‘humanity’. Who are the ‘people’?; who is ‘proper’ to a 
‘people’?; which collectivity is entitled to ‘sovereignty’? - are questions determined 
through an ‘essence’.78 There are qualities of ‘statehood’ that purport to determine 
when it is ‘proper’ to designate a collective that occupies a finite territory a sovereign 
state in international law (Crawford, 1979). The political is also deployed in the 
common-place ‘everything is political’ -  a “blindingly obvious” notion from which 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy would wish to “withdraw” the notion of the ‘political’ 
(Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997, 112). The ‘political’ is also a question o f ‘space’
70and the ‘spacing’ of being (Nancy, 1993a, 75). In Nancy’s critique of the finitude of 
being we observed the impossibility of being One -  a singular being cannot ‘be alone 
being alone’. The ‘relation’ this implies has no ground, no foundation. Existence as 
relation is the ‘co-appearance’ of being. In his thought on freedom, Nancy stresses 
that “existence as the sharing of being” takes place in a “political space” which is not 
a space for guaranteeing freedom - for instance through a community of natural right, 
‘humanity’ or ‘equality’ - but in a space of the ‘political’ which is a “spaciocity” that 
cannot be determined by any “measure” (ibid. 71-5). Rather than being determined 
by a ‘measure’ (humanity, equality etc), freedom and the political (as the sharing of 
being) must measure itself against “nothing” (ibid, 71).80 This nothing is an “excess”,
78 Aristotle’s opening teleological assumption that “every state is an association, and that every 
association is formed with a view to some good purpose” leads him to proclaim the state, the “most 
sovereign of associations”, as the entity that pursues the “most sovereign of all goods”, “the political”, 
see Aristotle, 1981, para. 1252al. The ‘political’ immediately raises the question of what determines 
membership. What cohering force or essence will form the ‘we’ of a particular political community? 
Carl Schmitt’s opening assertion in the Concept o f  the Political is: “The concept of the state 
presupposes the concept of the political”, Schmitt, 1996, 19. A decision on the contours of the political 
thus precedes the state.
79 Nancy’s thought on freedom is a deeply philosophical, reflecting and replying to the thought of 
Hume, Kant and Heidegger - but which is beyond the scope of my purposes to recount here. See 
generally, Nancy, 1993a, and Nancy, 2003b.
80 A more comprehensive discussion of sovereignty as ‘Nothing’, and the refusal of a ‘measure’ for 
political community will be considered at length in Chapter Four. Sovereignty as ‘Nothing’ is the 
limit point of thinking sovereignty. I foreshadowed this in Chapter One, and it seems apt to deal with 
it fully at the end of the thesis once the problem of the finitude of sovereignty and its relationship to 
law and the ‘political’ has been elaborated in the intervening Chapters.
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a demesure (ibid). The ‘political’ as the ‘space’ of the ‘sharing’ of the plurality of 
being should have no absolute ‘measure’, no determination by ‘essence’. I will now 
contextualise these claims about the ‘political’ through the notion of the stable 
‘nation’ and ‘traditional Aboriginal community’ that were deployed in Mabo as the 
elements that conditioned or delimited law’s attempt to inaugurate a ‘postcolonial’ 
law and society in Australia.
2.1 Finite Sovereignty and ‘Postcolonial’ Political Community
In Australia the attempt to inaugurate a ‘postcolonial’ political community was 
dealt with through two devices: the stability of a ‘nation’, and the insistence on an 
authentic ‘native’ determined by the continuity of Aboriginal ‘tradition and custom’. 
These devices manifest the insistence on ‘unity’ and ‘essence’ of a political 
community as a means of re-positioning a now abhorrent ‘colonial’ sovereignty. How 
does ‘political community’ facilitate the positioning and re-positioning of sovereignty 
in relation to law? The Australian High Court’s response to indigenous claims for 
justice was regulated by the imperative of maintaining the stability of ‘one’ political 
community, the Australian ‘nation’, and ‘one’ law as the Taw of the land’. The 
recognition of indigenous law and custom and the existence or absence of indigenous 
community were subordinated to preserving past ‘sovereign’ decisions that usurped 
sovereignty, appropriated land, and established a legal order and political community.
An exemplary instance of the significance of ‘political community’ for 
understanding the relationship between sovereignty and law may be gleaned through 
the two elements that regulated the recognition of native title in Mabo. The first is the
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significance of the ‘peace and order of Australian society’ as the factor that regulates 
(sets limits) on the extent of justice that may be granted to indigenous people. As 
Brennan J put it:
The peace and order of Australian society is built on the legal system. It can 
be modified to bring it into conformity with contemporary notions of justice 
and human rights, but it cannot be destroyed. (.Mabo, 30)
The limits of justice (and thus of law’s responsiveness to the ‘previously’ 
marginalised) is determined by the need to maintain the stability of ‘Australian 
society’ and its legal system. It is no surprise, however, that ‘Australian society’ is 
not given any content as such. Indeed, it is clear from previous decisions of the High 
Court, including cases such as the Seas and Submerged Lands Case which greatly 
informed Mabo, that the Court cannot clearly assert what the ‘nation’ is or when it 
came into existence.81
The second element that regulates justice in Mabo is the determination of the 
continuity or not of ‘traditional indigenous community’ {Mabo, 59-60). Indigenous 
communities must be sufficiently ‘traditional’ though without elements that would be 
“repugnant” to the common law in order to benefit from the common law’s
81 See New South Wales v The Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Case) (1975). In this case 
Stephen and Gibbs JJ dissented, but their decisions on the nature of sovereignty and ‘act of state’ 
influenced Brennan J’s reasoning in Mabo, 31. A nation state, it seems, can be a power unto itself even 
before it achieves the status of ‘nation’ in international law. The Commonwealth is ‘by the 
Constitution, endowed with the capacity to take its place as a nation state’ (per Stephen J, Seas and 
Submerged Lands Case, ibid, 444). But this is initially “an inchoate capacity to act and be recognised 
as an international person” (ibid). While it is the case for both Stephen and Gibbs JJ that ‘for the 
purposes of international law, Australia is now a sovereign state’ (Stephen J, 444; Gibbs J, 385), the 
assent to this status of a state with international personality is a gradual, and indeterminate 
phenomenon. Indeed, none of the judges are clear about when, what they are now certain of, that 
Australia is a state in international law, took place:
“At the time of federation the Commonwealth was not an independent nation -  not a person 
recognised by international law. That remained the situation until after the First World War -  
probably until after the Imperial Conference of 1926. At federation, and until the Statute of 
Westminster, the Commonwealth had no more power to enact legislation having extra­
territorial operation than did any State”. (Gibbs J, ibid, 408).
He is referring here to the States of the Commonwealth of Australia. See also, Stephen J at 444.
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recognition (ibid, 61). By deploying ‘Australian society’ or ‘acceptable tradition’ as 
the factor that limits legal responsiveness, the overarching political power of ‘one 
sovereignty’, ‘one law’ and the homogenising drive of a ‘civilised society’ is 
reiterated in the name of justice and human rights. It is through this assertion and 
regulation of political community, I want to argue, that a monistic sense of 
sovereignty and the limits of law are instantiated. These assertions about the 
significance of ‘political community’ for re-positioning sovereignty call for further 
elaboration.
2.1.1 The *Postcolonial9 Through a Propertied) Community
In Mabo the complex problematic of sovereignty and its relationship to law 
and political community is converted into a question of proprietary rights (native 
title). According to the Court the colonial sovereign acquired title to the territory but 
not absolute property in the land. This is wrought (with no sign of irony given the 
task at hand was to inaugurate a ‘postcolonial’ law and society) by reinvigorating the 
English feudal system of land tenure in which a distinction is drawn between ‘title’ to 
territory held by the sovereign and ‘possession’ of land either by the sovereign or 
anyone else (43-52).82 The attempt to graft a ‘postcolonial’ law and polity out of
Australia’s brutal colonial history is purportedly accomplished by recasting the 
indigenous inhabitants as proper(tied) subjects. The proprietary interests in land of 
the native inhabitants (native title) are now recognised as a species of title that is a 
burden on the radical title of the Crown. The incidence of native title, though 
determined by Aboriginal ‘traditional law and custom’, is subject to the continuity of
82 Fitzpatrick provides a more nuanced account of the ‘feudal’ notion deployed in Mabo, see 
Fitzpatrick, 2002, 241.
such ‘tradition and custom’ being recognised by the common law.83 Native title is 
thus subject to the recognition of the common law, providing it has not already been 
destroyed by sovereign appropriation and alienation (the grant of freehold tenures for 
instance). Granting property rights to the natives, rights which were apparently 
always already there, is the means by which a ‘postcolonial law’ based on a colonial 
foundation attempts to redeem itself. But this renewal is regulated by yet another 
imposition, this time by ‘postcolonial’ law. The principles for recognition set out in 
Mabo insist that the ‘tradition and custom’, which determines the incidence of native 
title, be sufficiently continuous with ‘tradition and custom’ at the time sovereignty is 
asserted. So recognition by the common law depends on the natives being sufficiently 
native. A ‘traditional community’ must exist in order to sustain ‘traditional law and 
custom. This is another sense (in addition to the ‘peace and order of the Australian 
‘nation’) in which ‘political community’ sits between colonial sovereignty and 
‘postcolonial’ law and society. Let me explain this further.
Despite the High Court’s attempt to turn the question of sovereignty into a 
question of title to land, the ‘postcolonial’ moment cannot be confined to the 
recognition of the natives’ antecedent property rights. Both colonial and 
‘postcolonial’ law insist on a community whose essence is announced and regulated 
by law. Colonial law viewed the native as ‘barbarous and without a settled law’ (37- 
8). ‘Postcolonial’ law seeks the barbarous savage in order to include her. As noted 
above, ‘postcolonial’ law calls on the two modes of regulating and regularising 
political community. There can be no change to the consequences of the colonial 
assertion of sovereignty (the recognition, now, of native title) unless this renewal of
83 More detailed examination of cases which illustrate this point follow below.
84 In the next section I will discuss the notorious case of Yorta Yorta v Victoria (1998) where this 
insistence had its most insidious manifestation.
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law and society is ‘delimited’ or regulated in some way. The delimitation of the 
‘postcolonial’ moment is contingent on what is deemed favourable to maintaining the 
‘peace and order of Australian society’. ‘Postcolonial’ inclusion and recognition is 
also contingent on the ‘natives’ being members of a sufficiently ‘traditional’ 
community.
The position of a colonial sovereign and its law was refashioned in Mabo. 
Australian law, Brennan J insistently declares, “is free of Imperial control” (ibid). 
The following assertion is deployed to sustain this: “The law that governs Australia is 
Australian law” (ibid). Thus there is a re-positioning of Australian law in relation to 
the enterprise of the imperial sovereign and its courts. The reason given for this re­
positioning is the emergence now of a post-racist political community that seeks 
justice and respects human rights. Brennan J announces a post-racist nation whose 
“people” (42) now respect the “values of justice and human rights” (30). The 
sovereignty of this renewed nation is itself positioned in a wider legal and political 
frame, for the courts must respond in accordance with the “expectations of the 
international community” (42). The response to indigenous claims for justice thus 
renews and purportedly re-inaugurates a ‘nation’ and its ‘people’. The concomitant of 
this repositioning of sovereignty and law is the common law’s recognition of 
‘traditional’ Aboriginal interests. However, only the factual incidence of native title 
is to be determined by indigenous traditional laws and customs (58-63).85
85 A ‘primitive’, ‘sacred’ law will determine the nature and incidence of native title. But the common 
law will determine the continuity and acceptability (repugnance) of the sacred in the modem, ibid, 61.
I will return to this latter point when I examine the Australian cases more closely below. This point has 
been well made by Ken Gelder and Jane M. Jacobs (1998).
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The difference between a colonial sovereign operating on racist assumptions 
and a ‘postcolonial’ law is cast explicitly through the sovereign/legal acts of 
dispossession. There is a ‘difference’, a separation, asserted between colonial 
sovereignty and the ‘postcolonial’ law that now recognises ‘native title’. The 
conception of sovereignty deployed in Mabo must be both finite and infinite. A finite 
sovereignty is attributed to the establishment of the colony and an infinite quality is 
attributed to its ever ‘present’ effects -  the dispossession of indigenous people by 
‘acts of state’. The ‘difference’ between colonial sovereignty and ‘postcolonial’ law 
is recognised by Brennan J as manifesting itself in relation to community: the 
dispossession of indigenous peoples “underwrote the development of the nation” (69). 
What’s more, this is not a matter for which Taw’ is responsible or accountable. 
Dispossession is the (now) disavowed practice that enables the separation between 
colonial sovereignty and ‘postcolonial’ law:
As the Governments o f the Australian colonies and, latterly, the Governments 
of the Commonwealth, States and Territories have alienated or appropriated to 
their own purposes most of the land in this country during the last two hundred 
years, the Australian Aboriginal peoples have been substantially dispossessed 
of their traditional lands. They were dispossessed by the Crown’s exercise of 
its sovereign powers to grant land to whom it chose . . . .  Aboriginal rights and 
interests were not stripped away by operation o f the common law on first 
settlement by British colonists, but by the exercise of sovereign authority over 
land exercised recurrently by Governments. (68, emphasis added)
According to this formulation, the injustice of the appropriation of land cannot be 
addressed by the common law. The common law, it is asserted, cannot call these 
sovereign, governmental decisions into question. The impossibility of such a clear
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separation between sovereignty and law is precisely what my enquiry calls into 
question.
As we observed through Nancy’s critique of fmitude, the ‘limit’ that separates 
is ‘shared’ with its ‘outside’. Colonial sovereignty cannot be contained as the 
absolute ground that established law and a ‘nation’ ‘back then’. Colonial sovereignty, 
the ‘acts’ of dispossession, cannot be separated from ‘postcolonial’ law’s acceptance 
of these appropriations of land. As we observed in the passage from Mabo quoted 
above, law ‘positions’ itself as being ‘outside’ these ‘sovereign’ appropriations. But 
this ‘fmitude’ of sovereignty fails precisely because the sovereign acts cannot be de­
limited as taking place in the ‘past’. The authority and consequences of sovereign 
acts reach into the present. These sovereign acts also condition the limits of a 
‘postcolonial’ future. Therefore, the impossible finitude of colonial sovereignty calls 
into question the very ‘postcoloniality’ of Australian law and society.
2.1.2 The ‘Essence9 o f a Propertied) Native
Recall the non-justiciability of the colonial assertion of sovereignty discussed 
above as one instance of the impossible finitude of sovereignty. To this can be added 
the separation between the Crown’s sovereign power to grant land and law’s inability 
to scrutinise and hold this power accountable. While the ‘Australian common law’
86 The common device by which law deals with compulsory acquisition of land by governments is 
‘compensation’. Following Mabo, the Labour Government passed the Native Title Act 1993. This was 
a hasty compromise reached between the Government and some indigenous leaders which validated the 
extinguishment of ‘native title’ prior to the enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. In effect 
all racially discriminatory appropriations of indigenous proprietary interests prior to 1975 were 
retrospectively validated by the Native Title Act 1993. This legislation also introduced a scheme to 
provide compensation for ‘future acts’ that extinguish native title.
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is busy absolving itself of responsibility for dispossession, the effect of the doctrine of 
extinguishment it articulates on indigenous law and custom is terminal:
since European settlement of Australia, many clans or groups of indigenous 
people have been physically separated from their traditional land and have lost 
their connexion with it [sic], ... Where a clan or group has continued to 
acknowledge the laws and (so far as practicable) to observe the customs based 
on the traditions of that clan or group, whereby their traditional connexion 
with the land has been substantially maintained, the traditional community 
title of that clan or group can be said to remain in existence. ... However, 
when the tide of history has washed away any real acknowledgement of 
traditional law and any real observance of traditional customs, the foundation 
of native title has disappeared. A native title that has ceased with the 
abandoning of laws and customs based on tradition cannot be revived for 
contemporary recognition [sic]. (60-1, emphasis added)
This passage contains several of the most violent gestures and inaccuracies by which 
the continuity of the colonial usurpation of indigenous land was reinforced in Mabo. 
For instance Brennan J begins by acknowledging the fact of the forced removal of 
Aboriginal people from their lands. The consequences of this removal on indigenous 
law and custom are its alteration or ‘disappearance’. The courts then draw the 
conclusion that indigenous people have Tost’ their laws and customs -  a conclusion 
that is terminal for indigenous community and the recognition of their proprietary 
interests in land.
Though aboriginal traditions must only be observed as ‘far as they are 
practicable’, they have to conform to standards of ‘real acknowledgement’ and ‘real
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observance’. These standards are applied by the coloniser’s courts. Povinelli argues 
that this substitutes the notion of ‘culture’ for the “older version of race” whereby if 
“Aboriginal culture interbred with another “heritage” to some undefined degree” it 
forfeits its antecedent rights (Povinelli, 2004, 164). Or as Borrows has so poignantly 
put it in relation to the Canadian cases that established a similar regime for regulating 
aboriginal rights, judges are deciding what it means to be Aboriginal: “Aboriginal is 
retrospective”, it means “once upon a time” (Borrows, 2002, 60).87 With this notion 
of cultural purity which in the discourse of multiculturalism is rendered as 
‘distinctness’, Aboriginal community, law and tradition is thrown into a process of 
having its ‘presence’ determined by sovereign acts and their legal consequences.88
Aboriginality and ‘native title’ are made subject to several determinative 
‘essences’. There is the assertion of the ‘presence’ of ‘One origin’ for law and 
society. The Crown asserts that it has title to the territory and the common law 
becomes the Taw of the land’. Far from emptying the ‘place of sovereignty’, it is 
given a finite and infinite quality. There is also an ‘essential’ notion of tradition and 
custom which may ‘disappear’. The incidence of native title is to be determined by 
traditional laws and customs “provided those laws and customs are not so repugnant 
to natural justice, equity and good conscience that judicial sanctions under the new 
regime must be withheld” (61). There are thus several ‘essential’ grounds for 
‘postcolonial’ law and community deployed in Mabo: the colonial assertion of 
sovereignty that is retained (as the foundation of the common law) and disavowed 
because of the ‘new’ civilised standards that promote justice, ‘human rights’, and the
87 Discussing Lamer CJ in R v Van der Peet [1996].
88 See Povinelli, Ch. 4, generally, for a rich, critical discussion of Mabo, Wik and subsequent cases 
examined in the context of transnational discourses of postcolonialism and multiculturalism.
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recognition of the previously marginalised. Rather than the necessary ‘dis-position’ 
of origins that we observed through Nancy, Mabo retains ‘One origin’ for law and 
society, and merely adjusts law’s recognition of proprietary interests within one 
united, ‘civilised’ society that respects human rights. This recognition is also made 
subject to the essential qualification of a ‘proper’ tradition that must not be repugnant 
to ‘natural justice, equity and good conscience’. I will now turn to consider the 
specific instances where an ‘essential’ notion of ‘tradition and custom’ has been 
deployed in native title cases that have followed Mabo in Australia.
The most notorious example of the insistence of an essential ground of 
community as the precursor to recognition of native title rights and interests is the
O Q
case of The Members o f the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v State o f Victoria. 
Justice Olney, the trial judge in this native title application, found that the claimants 
had lost their ‘character’ as a ‘traditional Aboriginal community’ (ibid, para. 128).90 
Given this loss of ‘traditional’ character, the claimants failed to demonstrate that they 
held rights and interests in accordance with traditional laws and customs. This 
conclusion was reached through the application of principles set out in Mabo. Here I 
will provide a brief account of how the case was decided. Justice Olney summarised 
what he believed to be the elements, as they were set out in Mabo, that a claimant 
group must establish in order to make out a claim for native title (ibid, para. 3-4). It is 
worth setting these out serially:
89 Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v The State o f  Victoria (1998) 1606 FCA. This was the first 
application to come to trial after the enactment of the Native Title Act 1993. It was lodged in 1995 and 
was finally determined by the High Court in December, 2002. The decision of Olney J, the trial judge, 
was appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court which upheld him in a majority of 2-1. The Full 
Court decision was appealed to the High Court which, although varying some elements of the test 
applied by Olney J, dismissed the appeal. The consequence is that the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal 
Community were not successful in establishing any native title rights and interests.
90 For a useful summary of the Full Federal Court’s consideration of this issue and the High Court’s 
confirmation of these findings, see the High Court decision of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, and Hayne JJ, 
Members o f  the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [2002], paras. 16-27.
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■ The claimant group, whether they are a clan, community or otherwise, must 
show that they are the descendents of indigenous people who occupied the 
claim area prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty;
■ The nature and content of traditional laws and customs acknowledged and 
observed in relation to traditional land must be established;
■ The claimants must demonstrate that a traditional connexion with the land 
has been “substantially maintained” since the time sovereignty was asserted;
■ Once all this is established, the claim will be subject to whether the rights 
and interests are those of a kind recognised by the common law of Australia, 
(ibid, para. 4)
As earlier mentioned, the weight placed on the existence of traditional laws and 
customs is separate to the fact that native title can be ‘validly’ extinguished by other 
sovereign acts. It is only if the land claimed has not already been alienated by 
sovereign acts that a ‘community’ may attempt to meet the elements set out above for 
establishing native title.
It is widely acknowledged, including in Mabo, that indigenous communities 
were forcibly displaced from their traditional lands during the process of colonisation. 
Violent struggles at the frontiers of settlement, and later, the forced assimilation of 
indigenous people has led to the ‘adaptation’ and transformation of traditional norms 
and customs. The central contentious issue in the Yorta Yorta decision, then, was 
whether the claimant group, the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community, could be said to 
possess traditional laws and customs that have a recognisable “continuity” from the 
time of the assertion of colonial sovereignty. Olney J concluded that there was no 
such continuity:
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The evidence does not support a finding that the descendants of the original 
inhabitants of the claimed land have occupied the land in the relevant sense 
since 1788 nor that they have continued to observe and acknowledge, 
throughout that period, the traditional laws and customs in relation to land of 
their forebears. The facts in this case lead inevitably to the conclusion that 
before the end of the 19th century the ancestors through whom the claimants 
claim title had ceased to occupy their traditional lands in accordance with their 
traditional laws and customs. The tide of history has indeed washed away any 
real acknowledgment of their traditional laws and any real observance of their 
traditional customs, (ibid, para. 129)
What is evidence of ‘traditional’ community? What qualities and characteristics must 
a community possess in order to be sufficiently ‘traditional’? The conclusions reached 
in relation to these questions were based on privileging written “history” -  the 
amateur observations of a “squatter” (the term used to signify a colonial settler in 
Australia) - over the oral history of the claimant group.91
91 Olney J privileged the writing of a squatter over the oral history of the claimants: “The most credible 
source of information concerning the traditional laws and customs o f the area from which Edward 
Walker's and Kitty Atkinson/Cooper's [claimants] early forebears came is to be found in Curr's 
writings. He at least observed an Aboriginal society that had not yet disintegrated and he obviously 
established a degree of rapport with the Aboriginals with whom he came into contact. His record of his 
own observations should be accorded considerable weight. The oral testimony of the witnesses from 
the claimant group is a further source of evidence but being based upon oral tradition passed down 
through many generations extending over a period in excess of two hundred years, less weight should 
be accorded to it than to the information recorded by Curr”, ibid., para. 106. I will shortly point out 
what Curr’s evidence amounted to.
Edward M Curr, was one of the first squatters to occupy land in the claim area. Curr’s two 
books were - Recollections o f  Squatting in Victoria: Then Called the Port Phillip District (From 1841 
to 1851), (published in 1883), and a four volume work entitled The Australian Race: Its Origin, 
Languages, Customs, Place o f  Landing in Australia and the Routes by which it Spread itself over that 
Continent, first published in 1886. The High Court decision of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ, 
point out that this was part of the written material tendered by the applicants -  a practice that is 
adopted, ironically given its consequences in the present case, as such ‘historical’ material is deemed 
necessary to establish ‘traditional law and custom’, (2002) para. 59.
106
I will recount the most insidious aspects of this evidence. The Court insisted 
that rights determined by ‘tradition and custom’ require ‘traditional’ natives. I will 
shortly recount the courts reasoning and then consider how the High Court 
incorporated this account of ‘tradition’ into its version of the relationship between 
sovereignty, “pre-sovereignty normative systems” and what it termed ‘society’.92 The 
Yorta Yorta case, from first instance to the final dismissal of the applicants’ claim in 
the High Court, is indicative of the general point I wish to make in this section -  that 
an ‘essential’ ground of community, given content in native title cases through the 
notion of ‘traditional law and custom’, is central to maintaining a finite, monistic 
conception of sovereignty. The colonial assertion of sovereignty which purportedly 
displaced the existing normative system asserts itself in native title cases as the One 
law of the land. The assertion of this One law, One jurisdiction, is central to 
maintaining the singular and unitary sense of sovereignty -  despite the common law’s 
claim that a ‘postcolonial’ law and society has emerged from the ‘age of racial 
discrimination’.
The treatment of ‘tradition’ in the Yorta Yorta case goes something like this: 
‘they were wasteful savages then and now they are caring/sharing environmentalists -  
they must not be traditional’. Olney J concluded that the claimants were no longer 
‘traditional’ by comparing their current practices with those of the past:
With regard to their practices relating to the use of food resources, Curr wrote
(.Recollections, p 262):
92 Yorta Yorta v Victoria (2002) paras. 37-57. The joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne 
JJ are regarded as the leading judgment. They dismissed the Yorta Yorta Community’s application. 
McHugh and Callinan JJ wrote separate judgments and also dismissed the application. Guadron and 
Kirby JJ dissented in a joint judgement that allowed the appeal. For a useful account of the Federal and 
High Court decisions in Yorta Yorta, see Anker (2004).
107
It is a noteworthy fact connected with the Bangerang [the ancestors of the 
Yorta Yorta community], ... that as they neither sowed nor reaped, so they 
never abstained from eating the whole of any food they had got with a view to 
the wants of the morrow. If anything was left for Tuesday, it was merely that 
they had been unable to consume it on Monday. In this they were like the 
beasts of the forest. To-day they would feast - aye, gorge - no matter about the 
morrow. So, also, they never spared a young animal with a view to its growing 
bigger.
And at p 263:
I have often seen them, as an instance, land large quantities of fish with their 
nets and leave all the small ones to die within a yard of the water. (Yorta 
Yorta, 1998, para. 115)
There is no effort to demonstrate why these particular practices stand out as
‘traditions’ or more pertinently, the traditional laws, of the ‘past’. Nonetheless, Olney
J compares the practices observed by Curr with the practices of the present:
Another contemporary practice which is said to be part of the Yorta Yorta 
tradition is the conservation of food resources. A number of witnesses gave 
evidence that they hunt and fish on the land and in the waters of the claim area 
and to some limited extent, gather "bush tucker" for their personal 
consumption. Of these activities fishing appears to be by far the most popular 
but is currently engaged in as a recreational activity rather than as a means of 
sustaining life. It is said by a number of witnesses that consistent with 
traditional laws and customs it is their practice to take from the land and
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waters only such food as is necessary for immediate consumption. This 
practice, commendable as it is, is not one which, according to Curr's 
observations, was adopted by the Aboriginal people with whom he came into 
contact and cannot be regarded as the continuation of a traditional custom, 
(ibid. para. 123)93
The ‘essence’ of Aboriginal Community is reduced to a bundle of practices that must 
demonstrate some continuity between the present and the past. There is no 
determination of whether the particular practices have a sufficiently ‘normative’ 
quality so that they amount to traditional laws or customs. The “significant 
adaptation” (Yorta Yorta, (2002), para. 44) that had taken place was sufficient to 
signify the death of tradition. The relationship between traditional laws of a 
community and the existence of One normative system after the assertion of 
sovereignty was, however, a key plank in the High Court’s confirmation of Olney J’s 
approach.
2.1.3 Pre-Colonial Normative Systems -  The Dead Weight o f  the Past
In Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) the High Court articulated the relationship 
between native title held in accordance with traditional laws and customs, and the 
common law’s recognition of those rights, as the “intersection” of laws (traditional 
and common law) (Fejo (1998), 128). In Yorta Yorta this metaphor of ‘intersection’ 
was expanded or clarified further (Yorta Yorta, (2002), 39ff). Yorta Yorta confirmed
93 The slippage between laws and customs manifest in this passage is dismissed by the High Court in 
Yorta Yorta (2002). Though informed by the positivism of Austin and Hart, the High Court refrain 
from expressing a firm view on whether ‘tradition and custom’ amounts mere habitual behaviour. As 
we will see below, the possibility that ‘traditional law amounted to a normative systems tied to the 
existence of a ‘society’ that can sustain such normativity: Yorta Yorta (2002) para. 41. For a useful 
discussion of the High Court decision see Anker (2004).
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that what was not intended in Mabo or Fejo was a plurality of laws whereby the 
‘native’ normative system would continue to generate laws and customs, after the 
assertion of colonial sovereignty, that may be recognised by the common law. 
Instead, traditional law is the ‘dead weight’ of the past. Gleeson CJ, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ put it thus:
Upon the Crown acquiring sovereignty, the normative or law-making system 
which then existed could not thereafter validly create new rights, duties or 
interests. Rights or interests in land created after sovereignty and which owed 
their origin and continued existence only to a normative system other than that 
of the new sovereign power, would not and will not be given effect by the 
legal order of the new sovereign, (ibid, 43)
There can be no parallel law making systems. To hold otherwise, the judges tell us, 
“would be to deny the acquisition of sovereignty” (ibid, 44). The concomitant of One 
sovereignty is One law. Recognition is only accorded to rights and interests that 
existed at the time sovereignty was acquired. If the (traditional) normative system on 
which the rights and interests are based ceases to exist, then neither the rights and 
interests or the system on which it is based cah be reconstituted (ibid, 47).
The continuity of traditional laws and customs is determined by a circular 
formulation where continuity is dependent on the existence of a ‘society’ which in 
turn is determined by its ‘unification’ by laws and customs. There can be no 
‘traditional law’ without a ‘traditional society’ and vice versa. The key determinant of 
the existence of ‘traditional law’ is a loosely defined idea of “society” that needs to 
have continued from the time of the change of sovereignty: “society is to be
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understood as a body of persons united in and by its acknowledgement and 
observance of a body of law and customs” (ibid, 49). Laws and customs are “socially 
derivative” and ‘society’ is the entity unified by laws and customs (ibid).94 This 
unification, in the case of the native, cannot be revived after it has lapsed or be newly 
created:
In so far as it is useful to analyse the problem in the jurisprudential terms of 
the legal positivist, the relevant rule of recognition of a traditional law or 
custom is a rule of recognition found in the social structures of the relevant 
indigenous society as those structures existed at sovereignty. It is not some 
later created rule of recognition rooted in the social structures of a society, 
even an indigenous society, if those structures were structures newly created 
after, or even because of, the change in sovereignty. So much necessarily 
follows as a consequence of the assertion of sovereignty and it finds reflection 
in the definition of native title and its reference to possession of rights and 
interests under traditional law and custom, (ibid, para. 54)
Thus the monistic conception of sovereignty deployed by the High Court in the key 
native title cases, Mabo, Fejo, and Yorta Yorta, insists on a singular normative order 
as the source of indigenous rights and interests. According to the High Court in Yorta 
Yorta, ‘social structures’ are the source of norms such as ‘traditional laws and 
customs’. Adopting H.L.A Hart’s nomenclature of the ‘rule of recognition’ (Hart, 
1997, Ch. 6), the judges state that the condition for the existence of norms is a 
particular ‘social structure’ or ‘society’. Once colonial sovereignty was asserted, the
94 The Judges quote Julius Stone, The Province and Function o f  Law, (1946) at 649: laws and customs 
are “socially derivative and non-autonomous”. The circularity in the formulation, as far as I can gather, 
is contributed by the High Court.
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new sovereign may recognise the antecedent rights and interests of the indigenous 
population providing that population ‘substantially’ maintains its traditional 
connection with the land, and providing such observance accords with a ‘real’ 
acknowledgement and observance of traditional custom {Mabo, 59-60). What is 
‘real’ tradition and custom is determined by the coloniser’s law. In the case of 
Australia and other settler societies recognition has tended to be retrospective. This 
legal recognition apparently reflects the emergence of a ‘society that now respects 
universal human rights’ (ibid, 42). However, the attempt to inaugurate a 
‘postcolonial’ law and society involves the reassertion of a singular ‘normative 
system’, as the High Court put it in Yorta Yorta. Moreover, the normative system of 
the unified ‘postcolonial’ nation will not allow a parallel normative system, even an 
indigenous one.
In the previous chapter I discussed the impossibility of a finite sovereignty 
which, through the exposure of its limit, is the condition of community. I also argued 
that sovereignty could not be infinite -  its absolute ‘timeless’ character is disrupted by 
the need to adjust the ‘event’ ‘back then’ to the ‘post-racist’ aspirations and 
conditions of the present. However, the ‘postcolonial’ law and society of the present, 
as we have observed in the native title cases discussed above, insists on a singular 
normative order of the One sovereign ‘nation’. A plurality of normative systems and 
‘social structures’ has been treated as disrupting the singularity of the assertion of 
sovereignty and the One Taw of the land’ it purportedly established. In the next two 
sections of this Chapter I will move to undermine this insistence of a singular 
sovereignty and law -  a questioning of the very possibility of such singularity -  
through an examination of how this singular conception of sovereignty and normative
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order manifests itself as ‘jurisdiction’. I will argue, through Nancy, that a ‘unitary’ 
conception of jurisdiction is an impossibility.
In the preceding sections of this Chapter I identified the ‘essential’ grounds for 
law and ‘political community’ that flow from the finite and infinite character 
attributed to sovereignty. I have argued that the court’s treatment of sovereignty as 
finite and infinite calls into question the very ‘postcoloniality’ of Australian law and 
society. An ‘essential’ ground for determining community, I have argued, flows from 
the courts treatment of sovereignty as both finite and infinite. I now wish to move the 
discussion towards generalising the observations made about the impossibility of a 
finite or infinite conception of sovereignty. In the following two sections I will 
develop a critique of the ‘unity’ attributed to sovereignty, law and ‘political 
community’ by interrogating the notion of jurisdiction. ‘Jurisdiction’ is a notion that 
Nancy has used to examine the relationship between sovereignty, law and political 
community in order to undermine the possibility of their presence as a ‘unity’. 
‘Jurisdiction’ is the event of sovereignty, legal order, and political community.
2.2 Sovereignty and the (Il)Legality of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction, as Dorsett and McVeigh elaborate it, suggests a relation between 
a sovereign event, territory, land and the limit point of law: “The formula that the 
sovereign is, in a sense, both beyond and part of the law, also articulates the inaugural 
topological gesture of jurisdiction as it delimits the law” (Dorsett and Mcveigh, 2002, 
291). Jurisdiction is a gesture of enunciation - it gives voice “to sovereignty and to 
the order of nomos” (ibid, 298). The sovereign event, as Dorsett and McVeigh put it
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drawing from Agamben, is “at once an ordering (Ordnungen) of space and a 
localisation (Ortung)” (ibid, 291). The question raised by them in relation to Mabo is 
why jurisdiction and a monistic conception of sovereignty are equated? Why is a 
plurality of jurisdictions not recognised? This questioning goes to the heart of what is 
at stake in democratic renewal and reconciliation in ‘postcolonial’ societies. For 
instance, in the Canadian context, constitutional theorists advocate recognition of 
multiple, divided sovereignties which reflect a plurality of normative orders as the 
basis for a ‘postcolonial’ law and society (Macklem, 2002, Ch. 4). I will examine 
some of the leading arguments below. The point of this engagement, for my 
purposes, is to demonstrate that the assertion of a ‘plurality’ of sovereignty and law, 
the discourse of legal pluralism as the response to ‘difference’, does not overcome the 
violence of a monistic conception of sovereignty in the colonial context. Indeed, the 
most that is advocated through these discourses is ‘second’ or ‘third order’ self- 
government in a federal system that does not disrupt ‘national unity’ or ‘territorial 
integrity’ (ibid, 123). A monistic conception of sovereignty, where ‘collectivities’ are 
‘united’ within the ‘nation’ and organised through ‘essentialised’ grounds of 
community pervade much of this discourse.
By the close of this Chapter, I hope to have demonstrated that Jean-Luc Nancy 
offers a far more nuanced means of understanding the problem of sovereignty as it 
relates to the notion of ‘jurisdictions’ in the ‘postcolonial’ context. Mere plurality of 
authority in the organisation of governance hardly addresses the deeper problematic 
of a finite conception of sovereignty. The point I wish to make here is that the 
plurality of law and community -  the ‘difference’ for which liberal constitutional 
theorists seek a means of recognition -  cannot be produced by making law and
114
community subject to a ‘proper’ origin or the ‘unity’ of the ‘nation’. Plurality of 
sovereignty, law and community is an ‘exposure’ to a co-presence in which neither 
term of this triad can be the ground of the other. A sufficiently critical account of 
sovereignty must have regard to the failure of grounds - the impossibility of finitude 
elaborated in the previous Chapter. Indigenous claims to self-determination continue 
to be made because, at an ontological level, the sovereign ‘absolute’ fails to be 
absolute. Finitude, as we saw through Nancy, is always already a ‘sharing’. In what 
follows I consi4er the problem of inaugurating divided sovereignty and a plurality of 
law in the ‘postcolonial’ context. I will then consider Nancy’s thought on 
jurisdiction.
The ‘unities’ by which sovereignty is (re)presented in ‘postcolonial’ societies 
-  nation, state, people, community of human rights etc -  conceal the violence of the 
sovereign event in the phantasm of democracy. The Will of the colonial sovereign 
establishes a new juridico-political order that is later democratised. The sovereign 
Will then takes the form of popular sovereignty -  the ‘will of the people’ purportedly 
replacing the ‘exceptional’ Will of the colonial sovereign. The re-treatment of the 
sovereign event, one that becomes necessary in determining/explaining the colonial 
acquisition of sovereignty as the foundation of a ‘postcolonial’ law, resurrects the 
question of what force and violence lies beneath the democratic polity and its law. Is 
sovereignty the finite force beyond legality that ‘comes first’, animating and 
actualising law and political community? Is ‘One’ sovereignty which purportedly 
inaugurated a legal order now capable of being the reflection of a plurality of legal 
orders? That is, can a normative system be grounded on a new normativity? Rather 
than rehearse the traditional jurisprudential debates about the nature of rules and their
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source, I will consider these questions through the problematic of ‘postcoloniality’ 
and law.
2.2.1 Lawful Sovereignty and a Plurality o f  Law?
Indigenous peoples demand justice for the denigration of their traditional laws 
and customs, destruction of their communities, and appropriation of their lands. Can 
a legal system, based as it is on a violent foundation, but regarding itself as 
‘postcolonial’ and thus willing to respond to some of these claims for justice, be 
renewed and redeemed by a re-inauguration through law? This is the question that 
legal theorists I consider in this section have answered affirmatively. However, I will 
call into question the affirmation of a ‘proper’ origin through law. The key difference 
between the Canadian scholars I examine and my approach to ‘postcolonial’ 
sovereignty is the ‘voluntarism’ in inaugurating a ‘just’ law that the former seem to 
assume, and the impossibility of escaping the arbitrary and excessive qualities of 
sovereignty that feature in my analysis. Apart from that crucial difference the 
problematic defined and addressed by John Borrows Recovering Canada (2002) and 
Patrick Macklem in Indigenous Difference and the Constitution o f Canada (2001) 
mirror the attempt in Australia to inaugurate the ‘postcolonial’ juridical order and 
polity by disavowing a ‘finite’ (imperial) sovereignty that took place back then.
In the previous Chapter I outlined Fitzpatrick’s argument that no ‘fixed 
position’ can be attributed to law. Given law is a combination of ‘determination and 
responsiveness’ it is not able to take “any consistent position or positing” (Fitzpatrick, 
2001a, 78). Attempts to re-inaugurate sovereignty by making it conform to law -  the
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attempt to ‘properly’ originate law -  fail because of the impossibility of a fixed 
‘position’ that can be attributed to law. The origin, as Fitzpatrick explains through 
Derrida’s account of the ‘paradox of iterability’, has to be repeated ‘originarily’ (be 
preserved as an event that took place ‘back then’), and also be adjusted to be the 
origin of what is now (ibid). The ground of law is thus an ‘unending formation’ (ibid, 
79). A ‘proper’ origination of Canadian law is precisely what is proposed in the 
courageous and imaginative book by Borrows (2002). The problem is also dealt with 
by Macklem (2001) who calls for a plurality of normative systems.
As with Australian courts after Mabo, Canadian courts have used the notion of 
‘underlying title’ or ‘radical title’ to describe the type of ownership and control that 
the Crown acquires over a territory. Radical title, it is worth noting, has also been 
described as ‘jurisdiction’. In Mabo, Toohey J quoted the noted Canadian scholar on 
native title, Kent McNeil, to the following effect:
The blurring of the distinction between sovereignty and title to land should not 
obscure the fact that:
‘[t]he former is mainly a matter of jurisdiction, involving questions of 
international law, whereas the latter is a matter of proprietary 
rights...’... . {Mabo, 108)95 
This distinction between law’s jurisdiction established by the ‘one’ sovereign and 
proprietary interests in land is one that Borrows would wish to shatter. What Borrows 
and Macklem seek, in different ways, is recognition of a plurality of normative 
frameworks, a plurality of jurisdiction. In contrast, courts in Australia and Canada 
limit justice to the recognition of the antecedent proprietary rights of indigenous
95 Citing Kent McNeil, 1989, 108.
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people. The existence of these rights is ‘reconciled’, as part of the ‘postcolonial’ 
process, with the monistic conception of sovereignty asserted by the Crown. The 
jurisdiction of the legal system established by the sovereign assertion is not called into 
question in state-sponsored discourses on reconciliation.96 Reconciliation of 
Aboriginal society and Crown sovereignty can only take the form of property rights 
held by an appropriately ‘traditional’ native.97 Challenging the compromise that 
features in the distinction between title to territory and title to land, Borrows argues 
that courts that “unquestioningly support notions of underlying Crown title and 
exclusive sovereignty in the face of contrary Aboriginal evidence” do not “respect the 
constitution’s rule of law” (Borrows, 2002, 116). According to Borrows, and this is 
consistent with the claims of indigenous communities dispossessed by colonial 
expansion throughout the world, courts have uncritically accepted “Crown 
proclamations to the effect that sovereignty and underlying title to land throughout the 
country belongs solely to Canada despite the presence of an unextinguished prior and 
continuing legal order” (ibid, 112-3).
Borrows’ strategy for undermining and reconfiguring this monistic conception 
of sovereignty is to subject sovereignty to the ‘rule of law’:
A faithful application of the rule of law to the Crown’s assertion of title 
throughout Canada would suggest that Aboriginal peoples possess the very 
right claimed by the Crown. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
rule o f law consists of two interrelated legal principles: it precludes arbitrary
96 In Canada this conception of reconciliation is articulated in s. 35 of the Canada Constitution Act 
1982 (Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms), and elaborated in the decision of Lamer CJ in R v Van der 
Peet [1996], For an excellent critique of this see Borrows, 2002, 58-61.
97 A critique of this approach to the ‘distinctive’ culture/race of the native was undertaken in the 
previous section in relation to the court’s reasoning in relation to Mabo. Much the same critique can 
unsurprisingly be levelled at Canadian native title law which has been one of the keys sources of 
concepts applied in the process of ‘postcolonial’ recognition in Australia.
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state power and requires the maintenance o f a positive legal order, (ibid, 113, 
emphasis added)
Borrows characterises the Anglo-Europeans’ assertion that the colonial sovereign has 
underlying title to the land as an example of ‘arbitrary power’. The usurpation of 
Aboriginal sovereignty by this assertion is also regarded as arbitrary. Arbitrariness is 
also to be found in Aboriginal people having their status redefined by the state of 
Canada without “persuasive judicial reasoning” (ibid, 117). To the extent that reasons 
were given by colonial powers, these have not proved to be ‘legitimate’ bases:
The Supreme Court has not effectively articulated how, and by what legal 
right, assertions of Crown sovereignty grant underlying title to the Crown or 
displace Aboriginal governance. Doctrines of discovery, terra nullius, 
conquest, and adverse possession have all been discredited in the common law 
and in international legal systems as legitimate bases to dispossess aboriginal 
people of their land, (ibid)
It is true that the reasons for the assertion of sovereignty are no longer, if they ever 
were, persuasive. But the central question is whether the establishment of a legal 
order can ever be legitimate and free of violence? Can the assertion of sovereignty 
‘back then’ be reconditioned ‘now’ so that it accords with contemporary legal values? 
According to Borrows it can be. Canadian laws are invalid because their “arbitrary, 
non-legal foundation violates the first principle of the rule of law” (ibid, 119). They 
may remain “operative until they can be fixed by the federal Crown, negotiating with 
First Nations to place Crown sovereignty in a workable, but proper, legal framework”
QO
(ibid, emphasis added).
98 In a footnote Borrows points to the Nisga’a treaty as one model for creating this ‘proper legal 
framework’, n. 47, 247. The Nisga’a Final Agreement, May 2000, provided for Nisga’a ownership and 
use of lands and resources in British Columbia. It set out a new relationship between Federal,
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My argument is that such a ‘proper’ legal framework for sovereignty can only 
be brought about by rendering sovereignty ‘finite’ -  an event that took place ‘back 
then’, and one that is thus capable of disavowal. We observed that such a process of 
rendering colonial sovereignty finite was deployed in the Australian ‘postcolonial’ 
context. To that extent Borrows is on the right track. However, the conditions and 
criteria by which a ‘finite’ sovereignty is ‘adjusted’ are hard to predict or discipline in 
advance. What for instance will be the (permissible) pragmatic limits that determine 
such an adjustment -  the argument that the ‘stability’ of the juridical and social order 
must not be compromised (as we saw in Mabo)l
The second condition of the ‘rule of law’ violated by the colonial assertion of 
sovereignty, according to Borrows, drawing from the definition of the rule of law of 
the Canadian Supreme Court, is the ‘maintenance of a positive legal order’. What is 
meant by this is the “creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws 
which preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative order”.99 For 
Borrows the “near anarchy and constant strife within Aboriginal communities” is the 
result of the stifling of the creation and maintenance of Aboriginal normative orders 
(ibid). The Crown’s assertion of sovereignty is thus contrary to the rule of law 
because it “destroys the normative orderliness within Aboriginal communities” (ibid, 
119). The solution according to Borrows is that “Aboriginal normative orders be 
facilitated by recognising their powers of governance” and that Canadian laws 
“continue in effect until the parties correct the invalidity by grounding Crown title
Provincial and Nisga’a laws within the Nass Area. This includes the administration of justice and local 
policing.
99 Reference Re Language Rights Under s. 23 o f the Manitoba Act, 1870 and s. 133 o f  Constitution Act, 
1867 (Manitoba Language Reference), [1985] 749, as cited in Borrows, 2002, 118.
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and sovereignty on a sound, substantiated legal foundation” (ibid, emphasis added). 
Such a foundation would require a finite colonial sovereignty that can be grasped and 
discarded in favour of another finite sovereignty. The re-inaugurated sovereignty 
would have to be ‘finite’ once again as it would need to be grasped and substantiated 
by a law that could operate independently -  that is, a law ‘outside’ the sovereignty it 
substantiates.
Borrows’ book is an articulation of the meaning of justice for Aboriginal 
peoples if the precepts of a liberal legal order are taken seriously and carried to their 
logical limit. The arguments made by Borrows are indicative of a political project 
that seeks to remain optimistic about renewing society through law. Law is presented 
as capable of infinite responsiveness to claims for justice. This approach is contingent 
on the possibility of rendering sovereignty finite, and a fixed ‘position’ that can be 
attributed to law. Such fixity combined with responsiveness to a beyond is possible, 
as we observed through Fitzpatrick and Nancy above. The brutal assertion of colonial 
sovereignty “back then” would have to be contained and cast off. The foundation of a 
new political community of ‘reconciled’ sovereignties and laws would have to take 
place in a time/space separated from the ‘event’ of the colonial assertion of 
sovereignty and its reiteration by ‘postcolonial’ law. Moreover, law would have to be 
capable of originating the present and a future for which it would have to be adjusted. 
Law would have to be imbued with the contradictory elements of fixed position to 
originate the present and be capable of a malleability, a non-fixity, by which it would 
be the origin of a future. While all this is possible, and on my account has taken place 
in the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context, the adjustment was arbitrarily subordinated to 
what judges determined to be conducive to the stability of the political community of
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the nation state. It is not clear why a more desirable outcome would be delivered by 
(another) ‘legal’ adjustment of the past.
Macklem begins his treatment of indigenous claims to self-government by 
adopting a conception of sovereignty as a discursive construct (Macklem, 2001, 1 OS- 
112).100 Rather than one meaning being attributed to sovereignty, its meaning is said 
to be a function of interpretative acts by those who posses and seek sovereignty (ibid, 
108). Sovereignty is “a contested site of interpretation, it remains open to 
transformation and application to diverse forms of human association” (ibid). The 
key reason for protecting and constitutionally recognising a form of sovereignty for 
indigenous people is that the ‘grant’ of sovereignty to a “collectivity permits that 
collectivity to express its collective difference” (ibid, 110). Indeed, ‘collective 
difference’ “is in fact a precondition of such recognition” (ibid, 111) (no timidity 
about essences here!). Sovereignty is valuable to a community because it establishes 
a “legal space” for a community to “construct, protect and transform” its collective 
identity (ibid). Highlighting the obvious circularity, then, a sovereign community 
would already have to exist in order to be recognised as a ‘collectivity’, though being 
a ‘collectivity’ is a condition of being recognised as a sovereign community. The 
‘ground’ occupied by a collectivity would already have to define it and separate it out 
from ‘other’ collectivities. A collectivity would already have to occupy the ‘position’ 
that gives it substantial ‘presence’. The paradox raised by Macklem, but also arising
100 It is worth noting here that Macklem purports to adopt Bartelson’s treatment of sovereignty -  see 
Bartleson, 1995, discussed in Chapter One above. However, Bartelson offers a far richer account of 
the nature of sovereignty than as a mere discursive construct. As we observed in the previous Chapter, 
for Bartelson the nature of sovereignty is intimately connected with the conceptualisation of the ‘limit’. 
He adopts Kant’s notion of the ‘parergon’ as a frame that is not clearly outside or inside what is being 
framed. This ‘sharing’ of the limit resonates with Nancy’s treatment of the impossibility of limits, 
though there are significant differences between Bartelson and Nancy on sovereignty, as I pointed out.
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out of Borrows’ attempt to inaugurate a new order, can be expressed and amplified 
through Derrida.
The question of the ‘people’, the law they have in ‘common’, and the authority 
of the ‘Will’ that articulates their ‘presence’ is a problematic taken up by Derrida in a 
number of texts. But here, for the purposes of dealing with the problem expressed but 
not tackled by Macklem, “Declarations of Independence” appears apt for discussion 
given its direct interrogation of the appearance of a ‘people’ and their law through a 
claim to inaugurate a sovereign state, the United States (Derrida, 1986). The paradox 
of sovereignty and representation of the United States Declaration of Independence is 
posed by Derrida as the question of “who signs, and with what so-called proper name, 
the declarative act which founds an institution?”(ibid, 8). It is a question that seeks an 
elaboration of the nothing or nowhere from which a juridical order springs. Derrida 
disrupts any linear account of cause-effect through the “rumbling” that affects all 
concepts such as “act, performative, signature, the ‘present’ and ‘we’” that purport to 
authorise) a new order, society, or state (ibid, 8). The question of the relationship 
between ‘Will’ and representation is posed thus:
The declaration which founds an institution, a constitution or a State requires 
that a signer engage him- or herself. The signature maintains a link with the 
instituting act, as an act of language and of writing, a link which has 
absolutely nothing of the empirical accident about it. (ibid, 8)
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Derrida’s engagement is with the “instance”101 of the founding event, of the instance 
as foundation, but an instance that cannot be separated from coming into existence 
within itself {ibid, 8).
The question ‘who signs?’ is not just a question of mediation and 
representation. “In the first instance”, in a manner of speaking that does not say 
nearly enough about the event of the foundation, there must have been a people whose 
place is taken by representatives (“the representatives of the United States in General 
Congress assembled”), the proxies who sign on behalf of the “good people ... of these 
independent states” (ibid, 9). These representatives are in turn represented by 
Jefferson, the ‘draftsman’ (ibid, 8). The “good people” declare themselves through 
these representatives to be free, but:
one cannot decide -  and that’s the interesting thing, the force and the coup of 
force of such a declarative act -  whether independence is stated or produced 
by this utterance, (ibid, 9)
Not only do they declare themselves to be free, they also declare themselves. The 
‘people’ do not exist ‘as such’ before the declaration. And so:
if it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, as possible signer, 
this can hold only in the act of the signature. The signature invents the signer. 
This signer can only authorize him- or herself to sign once he or she has come 
to the end [parvenu au vout], if one can say this, of his or her own signature, in 
a sort of fabulous retroactivity, (ibid, 10)
This ‘coup of writing’, the invention of the subject by the signature, the giving to 
itself of a ‘proper name’, coming into existence by the marking of a sign, is “the coup
101 see endnote 3, ibid, 8: the semantic range of the French word ‘instance’ includes “agency, acting 
subject, effecting force, insistence, tribunal or place of judgment”.
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of force [that] makes right, founds right or the law, gives right, brings the law to the 
light o f day, gives both birth and day to the law” (ibid, original emphasis).
Returning to Borrows and Macklem, now, it is precisely this ‘coup’ and 
‘force’ of inauguration that they fail to account for in their call for a ‘new’ law or 
divided sovereignty. The reform advocated by Macklem is that sovereignty be treated 
as a ‘thing’ which has a ‘malleable nature’ that can be divided-out in accordance with 
the exigencies of ‘postcolonial’ justice (ibid, 124). A community (of ‘difference’) 
that can make a just claim to a ‘piece’ of sovereignty is a precursor to its recognition 
as a sovereign community. What ‘coup’ will produce the ‘people’ that can appoint 
the ‘representative’ to sign the signature that will usher in the ‘postcolonial’ juridical 
order and political community? And what of the other communities in the pluralist 
order? The ‘difference’ that separates ‘immigrant’, and ‘slave-descendent’ 
communities from ‘indigenous’ communities thus becomes another ‘essential’ ground 
for the allocation of sovereignty to indigenous people but not the other ‘others’ (ibid, 
128-131).102 This selectivity produces yet another mis-recognition. The ‘coup’ and 
the ‘force’, then, lie in separating out the worthy ‘victim’ who will command the new 
‘postcolonial’ order.
The questions arising out of Borrows and Macklem’s arguments in relation to 
Canadian ‘postcolonial’ law and my discussion of the Australian ‘postcolonial’ 
context can be generalised as follows. In what way is law’s jurisdiction -  law’s 
becoming ‘operative’ and applying to territory or subjects/citizens - a sovereign event
102 A variety of liberal constitutional theorists base their articulations of ‘postcolonial’ recognition of 
special indigenous rights on ‘essential’ difference. I will not rehearse all the liberal accounts here.
See, for a notorious example which privileges ‘indigenous difference’ over other ‘difference’, Will 
Kymlicka (1995).
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that is connected to a conception of ‘political community’? To what extent can law 
and political community become operative and remain separate from a sovereign 
violence that is the condition of their actualisation? Does the sovereign occupy a 
position apart from law and community, or is it capable of being conditioned by law 
and new societal values such as the newly discovered respect for human rights in the 
Australian polity? I will take up these questions in the next section through an 
account of Nancy’s treatment of the co-presence of sovereignty, law and the political.
2.3 Jurisdiction as the Co-presence of Sovereignty, Law and the 
Political
The juridical, the province of law’s authority, is a question of jurisdiction in 
more than one sense. At the level of law’s day-to-day operation, there is the question 
of what territory, subjects, space/time (for instance with questions of retrospectivity, 
responsibility and judgement) will be mediated by a particular law. At a more 
fundamental level the juridical is also a question of what commands the law -  what 
actualises or conditions its ‘presence’. This latter sense is precisely the question that 
colonised populations have posed in relation to the coloniser’s law. Both these 
senses raise the question of law’s authorisation -  a question that manifests itself in 
every legal decision and thus cannot be separated as the day-to-day operation of law 
distinct from the violence of law’s foundation. In this section I want to establish that 
the relation between ‘sovereignty, law and the political’, is one that can be abstracted 
and discussed as a question of ‘position’ and ‘relation’. We have already undertaken 
this questioning through Nancy and Fitzpatrick above. Here I wish to elaborate 
Nancy’s thinking on ‘jurisdiction’. This will set the scene for generalising the
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problematic of the ‘position’ of sovereignty in relation to law in contexts other than 
the ‘postcolonial’ legal contexts that I have discussed in the preceding two Chapters.
Jean-Luc Nancy poses the question of position and relation between 
sovereignty, law and the political in the following way:
How do things stand with respect to the minimal articulation of the 
actualisation of the law [droit] -  not of its execution or its application as a 
practical or material process, but of the decision that makes the law effective? 
This decision itself is an act of law. But it is not in the order of the generality 
of the law; it inheres in the order of the particularity of its employment [mise 
en oeuvre]. (Nancy, 1993c, 110, original emphasis)
This ‘employment’ for Nancy is “nothing other than that of the social institution as 
such” which requires “right [droit]” not as “an instrument of regulation but as that by 
which the social institution recognises itself or “symbolises” itself reflexively (that is 
to say, institutes itself)” (ibid, 110-11). In this formulation we already see a 
rudimentary sketch of the possible co-presence and being-in-relation of sovereignty, 
law and the political. The ‘articulation of the actualisation of the law’ takes place 
through a ‘decision that makes the law effective’. This ‘decision’ is not the act of a 
sovereign whose plenitude is assured as the entity that posits the law -  Nancy 
explicitly distances himself from a ‘decisionist’ problematic (ibid, 111). How do 
sovereignty and law become actualised? I will argue through Nancy that the relation 
between sovereignty and law is rendered operative through the ‘political’.
How is the juridical rendered operative through the political? At play in this 
question is not only the doublet of the juridical and political but also their relation to
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sovereignty. What cannot be asserted with any confidence is which of the triad 
‘sovereignty, law and the political’ comes first:
The political articulates with the juridical at this point [through right (droit)] as 
the latter’s operative implication. But since the law is such only if it declares 
and decides itself actually as the actual law of such and such a collectivity, the 
juridical articulates itself equally well at this point to the political, as to its 
own instituting condition: a double articulation which, one could show is that 
of the sovereign and of the prince in Rousseau. It is in general the articulation 
of the judgement that decides as to the law, of the judgement that pronounces 
legitimacy as such ... .  (ibid, 111, original emphasis)
The actualisation of the political and the juridical are articulated by the sovereign. 
But such actualisation is itself in need of law, right {droit), at the moment of origin 
(ibid). Nancy develops this formulation of the relationship between sovereignty, law 
and the political through a discussion and critique of the “union” of the monarch,
i mState, and ‘people’ in Hegel’s philosophy. The monarch is for Hegel:
neither the substance, nor the finality, nor the foundation of the State; nor is he
either its right or its power. But he is all that at once insofar as he is
absolutely - but only - the “at once ” o f all that. He is the co-presence of the
elements of the State and of the moments of its Idea (institutions, powers, and
persons), as this organic co-presence itself, that is to say, as an actual
presence, the Da-sein of the political, of the essence of the political existing in
and as this zoon. (ibid, 115, original emphasis)
For Hegel the monarch is the “existence of sovereignty”; a “self-determination with
no foundation”; and an “ultimate element of decision” (Nancy quoting Hegel,
103 See the section titled “The Monarch the Whole of the State”, ibid., pp. 114-118. While I do not 
propose to engage with Hegel’s thought as such in this thesis or provide a full account of Nancy’s 
nuanced reading, it is apt that I set out a brief outline of how Nancy develops his argument.
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references omitted, ibid, 116). The problematic that Nancy poses in relation to the 
existence of the political as co-present with the person of the monarch in Hegel’s 
thought is the question of the “actualisation” of the political as such (ibid, 17-18).104 
What gives content to the ‘union’ that has its existence in the person of the monarch 
who is ‘at once’ co-present with the political?
According to Nancy there are two ways in which the content of the ‘union’ in 
Hegel can begin to be envisaged. The first is the “position” of the monarch which is 
manifested as “law”, “posited right” or jurisdiction (Nancy, 1993c, 119), and the 
second is the “relation” between monarch, State, and people, which Nancy, in contra­
distinction to Hegel, examines as a limit question, rather than “relation in an archi- 
teleological unity” (ibid, 121). The monarch as “the existence of the union as such of 
the people” (ibid, 119) presents the existence of free will and its recognition: “the law 
[das Gesetz] is [the content of this truth] posited [gesetzt] for the consciousness of 
intelligence with determination as a power having validity” (Nancy quoting Hegel, 
ibid, references omitted (original emphasis)). It is this positing or “position” of right 
that is “juris-diction” (ibid). Considering “relation” (of consciousnesses, subjects, 
States, people) as a limit-question, Nancy takes up the challenge (including in texts 
other that the “The Hegelian Monarch”105) “of thinking relation without origin and 
without realisation in a substantial unity” (Nancy, 1993c, 130).
104 This is a question that Nancy has explored at considerable length in several essays. I will only 
mention one other example here. In his lengthy essay “Of Being Singular Plural” (2000b) 24-5, Nancy 
argues that philosophy understood as the subject of the city, taking place in the city, and as a 
communication of essences between logos, community and humanity seeks a common origin that can 
be the foundation of philosophy as politics in the ‘fullest sense’, a unity to which it can have no access. 
The co-presence of the ‘decision’, the people, institutions of the State in the person of the Hegelian 
monarch represents such a unity. This is why “philosophical politics and political philosophy regularly 
runs aground on the essence of community or community as origin”, ibid, 24.
105 In particular see Nancy, (1991).
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Nancy problematises the ‘position’ of the sovereign as a “singularity” (ibid, 
131). The jurisdiction of the monarch presupposes the unity that is the place or 
territory of ‘right’ and the accomplishment of a ‘people’. Once the purported ‘unity’ 
is reached, the role of the sovereign becomes a “formal manifestation or presentation” 
of the unity of ‘right’ and people (ibid). However, this formality is immediately 
contradicted by the fact that the sovereign enunciates the “substantial actuality” of the 
“decision” which institutes the totality/unity by the sovereign’s “name’, “signature”, 
and “mouth” which says the “I will” that constitutes “the saying of the law” (ibid). 
This ‘decision’ is “infinitely undecidable: it adds nothing and it adds itself’ (ibid) -  it 
“inaugurates all activity and actuality” (ibid, 132). The decision manifests a 
“performative” - “The monarch is the subject of the enunciation, while the people -  
the spirit of the people - is the subject of the statement [<enonce]” (ibid). But as the 
enunciation by the sovereign brings the ‘people’ into existence as the subjects of 
‘right’ whose being-in-relation is mediated by law, the ‘law’ that is actualised always 
contains a “residue” that cannot be accounted for through its enunciation or 
actualisation. The ‘position’ of the sovereign, then, harbours a contra-diction in the 
process of enunciating and actualising “juris-diction” (ibid, the last phrase is Nancy’s 
and the emphasis is his). The questions Nancy then poses are these: “Is the voice in 
general, and the voice of sovereign jurisdiction in particular, definitively indivisible, 
atomic? Would it not be already divided when it enunciates [itself]?” (ibid, 137). 
This questioning leads to an undoing of the singularity of the sovereign:
And the singularity of the proper name is never, as we know (as Derrida 
knows), singular enough not to be iterable. As an absolute singularity, the 
monarch fits also into absolute iterability, or better, he is exactly, juridically
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and exactly iterable and interchangeable. Which means that his jurisdiction is 
absolutely “democratic” in a nonconstitutional sense of the term, (ibid, 139) 
There is thus a “rupture” between the totalising aspect of the sovereign (the sovereign 
of the State as ‘unity’ and being-in-relation of the ‘people’) and the individuality and 
singularity that he is supposed to represent. This rupture is opened by the fact that the 
‘relation’ the sovereign represents is incomplete -  it is never accomplished absolutely. 
The iterability of the sovereign’s enunciation of the ‘law’ and the ‘people’ de­
positions the singular, monistic quality attributed to it. This resonates with 
Fitzpatrick’s treatment of law as not occupying a fixed ‘position’ which was discussed 
above.
To recap, then, for Nancy, “the term “jurisdiction” contains the motif of the 
declaration that decides and, in its modem sense, the motif of the actual power of the 
law” (ibid, 111). He calls this “articulation political jurisdiction” (ibid, original 
emphasis). The Will of the sovereign enunciates the decision that actualises the 
conjunction ‘political-jurisdiction’ as the event of a ‘juris-diction’. The purportedly 
singular sovereign is supposed to accomplish this through the sovereign’s position 
apart from the juridical and the political. However, this separation is also a ‘relation’: 
the separation does not signify, it distances, and in this sense it inscribes.
What it inscribes is the finitude of relation. Relation is in finitude because it is 
incompleteness, (ibid, 140-41)
By questioning the position of the monarch and re-opening the question of relation, 
Nancy suggests that ‘political jurisdiction’ must be rethought so that it no longer 
involves submission to a “Subject”, or a “Symbolism” (such as a flag) (ibid, 142). 
Rethinking ‘political jurisdiction’, and the position of the sovereign must involve a re­
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conceiving of relation and “the trace of its separation” (ibid). Nancy’s thought draws 
attention to the possibility of deconstructing the finitude of position and substance 
usually attributed to the sovereign, state, people or the law of a collectivity. Attention 
to position and relation when considering the actualisation of the triad ‘sovereignty, 
law and the political’ serves as a means of undermining any sense in which each term 
might have a substantial ‘presence’ or a singular existence.
*  *  *
In this Chapter I extended the critique of sovereignty as neither finite nor 
infinite which was developed in Chapter One by considering how such finite 
(monistic) or infinite (absolute) conceptions of sovereignty are maintained through the 
insistence of a unitary ‘political community’ in the form of the nation-state with One 
law. The social, political and juridical concomitants of finite and infinite conceptions 
of sovereignty are the refusal of plurality (of law and community). I also 
demonstrated how the insistence on a finite or monistic conception of sovereignty 
relies on an absolute ground of law in the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context. I 
examined recent ‘native title’ cases from Australia which have insisted on subjecting 
the ‘postcoloniality’ of Australian law and society to the following conditions: a 
unitary ‘political community’ as the Australian ‘nation’, and an essential ground for 
indigenous law and community regulated through the notion of ‘traditional law and 
custom’. I demonstrated how such unicity and essential ground for community 
refuses the plurality of existence. The re-presentation of the ‘postcolonial’ takes the 
juridical form of ‘one jurisdiction’, one Taw of the land’. Such finitude and fixed 
position of law, I argued through Fitzpatrick and Nancy, is impossible. I compared
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the Australian approach with the treatment of a plurality of law and sovereignty in the 
Canadian ‘postcolonial’ context. The objective was not to exhaustively cover the 
relevant case law in these two contexts, but to identify the insistence on monism and 
the refusal of plurality as phenomena manifested through the notion of ‘jurisdiction’. 
This discussion sets the scene for generalising my argument in the next two Chapters.
Nancy’s consideration of the notion of ‘jurisdiction’, examined at the end of 
this Chapter, undermines the monism and essential ground by which the relation 
between sovereignty and law are articulated by courts and legal theorists. He 
questions the possibility of a monistic position (by State, Monarch, Sovereign) that 
can symbolise or be the carrier of One law or One political community. ‘Jurisdiction’ 
is the spatial, territorialized manifestation of the ‘relation’ between sovereignty, law 
and the political. The co-presence of sovereignty, law and political community 
manifests the failure of finite or infinite sovereignty. This co-presence is re-presented 
by Nancy through the notion of ‘jurisdiction’.
In the next Chapter I will generalise these arguments about sovereignty, law 
and the political by considering the habeas corpus cases in relation to detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The U.S Federal Court’s consideration of the notion of 
‘jurisdiction’ is conditioned by the centrality of ‘finite’ sovereignty -  an exceptional 
sovereign at war whose actions are beyond law, and formal sovereignty over a 
delimited territory. Jurisdiction is also articulated with reference to membership in a 
political community. The co-presence of ‘sovereignty, law and the political’ can be 
readily discerned through an examination of the habeas corpus cases brought on 
behalf of those detained at Guantanamo Bay. I will discuss these cases with a view
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to posing and addressing the question of how the decision on ‘jurisdiction’ manifests 
the im-possible ‘position’ of sovereignty beyond law. It is the enunciation of the zone 
of right (‘juris-diction’), the determination of when life will be mediated by civil law 
which, as we will see, constitutes political community.
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CHAPTER 3
Sovereignty, Law and the Limits of Political Community
[U]nder the [U.S] Government’s theory, it is free to imprison Gherebi 
indefinitely [in Guantanamo Bay] ... without acknowledging any 
judicial forum in which its actions may be challenged. Indeed, at oral 
argument, the government advised us that its position would be the 
same even if the claims were that it was engaging in acts of torture or 
that it was summarily executing the detainees.
Gherebi v Bush and Rumsfeld (2003b) U.S Court of Appeals, 9th 
Circuit, 46.
They are ... “detainees”, those who are held in waiting, those for whom 
waiting may well be without end. To the extent that the state arranges 
for this pre-legal state as an “indefinite” one, it maintains that there will 
be those held by the Government for whom the law does not apply, not 
only for the present, but for the indefinite future. ... if the detention is 
indefinite, then the lawless exercise of state sovereignty becomes 
indefinite as well. In this sense, indefinite detention provides the 
condition for the indefinite exercise of extra-legal state power.
Judith Butler, “Indefinite Detention” in Judith Butler, Precarious
Life: The Powers o f Mourning and Violence (2004), 64.
This Chapter serves two principal functions. The first is to elaborate how the 
‘position’ of sovereignty in relation to law is determined in and through the ‘limits’ of 
‘political community’. The second is to demonstrate the wider significance of my 
account of sovereignty developed with reference to ‘postcolonial’ Australia by 
examining its relevance for understanding the relation between sovereignty and law in 
what Derek Gregory has called the “colonial present” (Gregory, 2004). In short, I 
consolidate the significance of the ‘political’ for determining the ‘position’ of 
sovereignty in relation to law and generalise my argument beyond a particular 
‘postcolonial’ context. These twin tasks are advanced by taking up a contemporary
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instance of courts defining the position of sovereign power in relation to law in the 
context of an imperial sovereign at ‘war’, namely the ‘war on terror’. The habeas 
corpus cases in relation to those detained in the U.S Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay 
are an apt choice for considering the link between sovereignty, law and ‘political 
community’ (hereafter, the ‘political’). But I should justify my sustained treatment of 
them.
The U.S Executive asserted an archaic sovereign prerogative to detain, torture 
and execute people without trial (see epigraph from Gherebi above).106 The detainees 
were captured during the ‘war on terror’ -  a war which is purportedly without 
geographical or temporal limits. It is a war, like previous imperial conflagrations, 
which has been undertaken in the name of ‘civilisation’ with the objective of 
defeating ‘barbarians’ (Ignatieff, 2003b, 3, 21; for a critique see Gregory, 2004, 251). 
The ‘barbarian’ is once again a racialised foe -  often the ‘Arab’, but more widely, the 
‘rigid’ and ‘frozen’ ‘Muslim fundamentalist’, a member of the ‘Muslim world’ which 
seeks to destroy another chimera of colonialism, the ‘West’.107 The question of a 
court’s jurisdiction to intervene in the face of an excessive sovereign demand for civil
106 Although the recent Supreme Court decision in Rasul v Bush (2004) grants the detainees access to 
U.S Courts and thus rejects the extremes of the U.S Government’s assertion of absolute sovereign 
power, as I will argue below, indefinite detention is likely to continue. Indeed, the decision in Hamdi v 
Rumsfeld (2004) confirms that normal due process will not apply in times of war.
107 See the collection of articles that have both deployed and critically engaged the opposition between 
civilisation and barbarism in “State of Emergency” the Special Issue of the Journal Theory, Culture 
and Society: Vol: 19, 2002. Some of these articles deploy more sanitised metaphors for the opposition 
between civilisation and barbarism, but they remain symptomatic of a literature and discourse that 
sustains the imperial extension of the military power of the United States in the name of the ‘West’. 
Consider, for instance, how the barabarian people and places are represented: ‘safe zones’ and ‘wild 
zones’ (Urry, 2002, 57-70); ‘governance deficits’ (Sassen, 2002, 233-244); the ‘Muslim world which 
lacks a viable political agenda’ (Dallmayr, 2002, 137-46). For characterisation of the post-September 
11 era as involving Americans taking on the civilising “burden” that Kipling allocated to the English -  
o f bringing order to the “frontier zones”, and “barbarian zones” see Ignatieff, 2003a and 2003b. For a 
penetrating critique of this literature with valuable insights into the nature o f neo-imperialism see 
Gregory (2004, especially, 248-256). For a critique of the figure of the ‘West’ as it is deployed in 
relation to the ‘war on terror’ see Jean-Luc Nancy, (2003c) and (2003d). I will return to discuss this 
literature and particularly the authors mentioned here in the next Chapter.
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law to play no part in mediating the ‘life’ of the detainee (the ‘barbarian’, the ‘Muslim 
fundamentalist’ or ‘unlawful combatant’), harbours the problem of the relation 
between sovereignty, law and the political. The law, through the device of delimited 
jurisdiction, is being asked to withdraw in the face of the sovereign exception (see 
epigraph from Gherebi above). For reasons to be set out shortly, the nature of 
‘jurisdiction’ is aptly considered through a discussion of the U.S Federal and Supreme 
Court decisions in habeas corpus petitions brought on behalf of detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Given the juridical status of the detainee has only recently been determined by
the U.S Supreme Court {Rasul (2004)) there is a paucity of commentary on these
cases. A significant portion of this Chapter will be devoted to giving an account of
the habeas corpus cases which have turned on whether U.S Courts have ‘jurisdiction’
to grant the writ to those detained in Guantanamo Bay. The Chapter will be divided
into two Parts. In Part A I will give an account of the case law. In Part B I will seek
to displace the view that the decision to place a person deemed an ‘unlawful
combatant’ beyond the reach of the law is a ‘purely’ exceptional decision that exceeds
law. I will consider whether the condition of a ‘subject’ whose life appears
unmediated by law (‘abandoned being’) (Nancy, 1993b) is the bearer of a sovereign
exclusion which constitutes a political community.108 In what way does the condition
of the detainee whose life is unmediated by civil law disclose the delimitation of
political community? This question addresses both the ‘position’ of sovereignty in
relation to jurisdiction and the significance of the abandoned ‘subject’ for constituting
the political. Contradicting the common view that the exception is beyond law, I will
108 The etymological root of ‘abandon’, a-bandon, is bandon which means “jurisdiction and control”, 
OED. To be ‘abandoned’ is thus quite literally to be placed beyond ‘jurisdiction’. There are other 
meanings attributed to ‘abandonment’. I will return to consider these below.
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argue that the purportedly illimitable sovereign occupies a ‘position’ that is 
constituted by the ‘limit’ of law and political community. Moreover, this position is 
inscribed by law.
Though commentary on the habeas cases has been sparse, there are some 
notable and provocative exceptions which I will draw on to frame my theoretical 
discussion of the cases. According to Judith Butler, the indefinite detention of persons 
in Guantanamo Bay represents the sovereign creation of a “pre-legal” state which is 
now made “indefinite” (Butler, 2004, 64). This is an advance on the Schmittian claim 
that the sovereign decides the exception (Schmitt, [1922] 1985). For Schmitt the 
sovereign is an ‘unlimited power’ that decides who the “enemy” is, decides when 
there is an emergency -  but this is an “unlimited power that makes limits” to the 
extent that the exception is never “chaos” (Norris, 2000, 6). For Schmitt order in the 
juristic sense prevails. According to Butler, the sovereign introduces a ‘pre-legal’ 
exception which now becomes ‘indefinite’. For Butler, the return of the ‘archaic’, 
‘pre-legal’ sovereign is also accompanied by Foucault’s ‘official’: “we have to 
consider the act of suspending the law as a performative one which brings a 
contemporary configuration of sovereignty into being or, more precisely, reanimates a 
spectral sovereignty within the field of govemmentality” (Butler, 2004, 61). Is the 
exception ‘pre-legal’ or is a ‘particular’ law and community precisely what is 
guaranteed by the exception? How is an archaic, ‘spectral’ sovereignty reconciled 
with the notion of ‘govemmentality’? In the discussion that follows I will draw on 
Foucault’s treatment of sovereignty and account of the emergence of 
‘govemmentality’, not only because Butler has drawn on his thought to account for
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the juridical status of the detainee, but also because of the centrality of Foucault’s 
thought for Agamben’s account of sovereignty.
A substantial portion of this Chapter is devoted to examining the habeas 
corpus decisions by U.S Federal Courts and Supreme Court. On 28th June, 2004 the 
Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged that the detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay would have access to U.S Courts.109 These Federal and Supreme Court cases 
manifest numerous formulations where a finite and infinite character is attributed to 
‘sovereignty’ in the course of the Court determining its jurisdiction. Many of the 
varied characterisations of sovereignty circulating in the Federal Court decisions - 
sovereignty as a concomitant of ‘territory’, an attribute of a ‘nation’s dominion’, 
derived from a ‘people’s delegation of authority and thus allegiance to a supreme 
authority’ and so on - were not discussed or finally determined in the Supreme Court. 
As we gathered from the discussion in Chapter One, no such firm and conclusive 
determination of a ‘thing’ called sovereignty is possible. However, as long as a 
‘limit’ to the normal juridical order is asserted in the form of a ‘sovereign exception’, 
it will remain pertinent to ask what determines this ‘limit’ (or finitude of sovereignty).
As I argue below, it is not likely that the Supreme Court decisions which grant 
the detainees access to U.S Courts will actually result in the detainees’ lives being 
mediated by the normal procedures of civil law. The sovereign prerogative to identify 
the ‘enemy’ (‘enemy combatant’, (unlawful combatant and so on), and to determine 
both the conditions under which these persons are detained and the duration of their 
detention has not been substantially curtailed by the Supreme Court. The distinction
109 See Rasul v Bush (2004), Hamdi v Rumsfeld (2004), and Padilla v Rumsfeld (2004).
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between a ‘lawful’ and ‘unlawful’ combatant has not been explained or settled. 
Moreover, the ‘exceptional’ condition of being in war affects the content of ‘due 
process’ that the Courts have agreed to grant the detainees. The ‘limits’ of sovereign 
power and the parameters of the juridical order (the wider concern of this thesis), and 
more specifically, the extent to which life is mediated by civil law and not the ‘bare’ 
will of a sovereign as the U.S Government asserted in Gherebi (see epigraph above), 
is thus a pertinent question that needs to be addressed. It is a question that could not 
have been adequately dealt with in the context of a ‘postcolonial’ polity and juridical 
order examined in the previous two Chapters. The question of the finitude or 
limit(lessness) of sovereignty does not only present itself when an ‘old’ colonialism is 
renewed by courts attempting to inaugurate ‘postcolonial’ law and society. The 
examination of the habeas corpus cases arising out of an indefinite ‘war on terror’ 
thus provides a setting to link the re-colonising gestures of the ‘postcolonial’ observed 
in Australia, such as monistic sovereignty, the centrality of ‘nation’, and a proper 
community which conforms to One law (discussed in the first two Chapters), with the 
persistence of these gestures in a new era of colonial and imperial expansion. The 
juxtaposition in my enquiry of the colonial ‘past’ of Australia with the colonial 
‘present’ of U.S imperialism foregrounds the heterogeneity of colonialism.
Permit me a few more words to justify the examination of the habeas corpus 
cases which pertain to detention in Guantanamo Bay in this enquiry. The decision to 
grant the writ is dependent on whether the court has jurisdiction. But jurisdiction over 
which subject (custodian or detainee), in which ‘territory’ or space (U.S or Cuba or all 
places where military power extends), and at what point in time (is the writ available 
at a time of war/emergency)? The significance of the notion of ‘jurisdiction’ for
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understanding the relationship between sovereignty and law is one important 
justification for examining the habeas corpus cases. Jurisdiction, I argued at the end 
of Chapter Two through Nancy’s “The Jurisdiction of the Hegelian Monarch” 
(1993c), marks the co-presence of sovereignty, law and the political. Jurisdiction is 
thus a central notion through which to examine the question of the ‘limit’ or finitude 
of sovereignty and law. Jurisdiction is determined by the Courts’ enunciation of the 
limits of the juridical order -  literally, juris-dicere is ‘to say’ ‘right’. This enunciation 
of an order of ‘right’ {droit), ‘jurisdiction’, is simultaneously the positioning of a 
‘people’, the law that mediates their existence, and the spatial and temporal ‘limit’ 
over which such regulation extends. Though sovereign power in its imperial 
extension (as a ‘war on terror’) is ‘permitted’ an infinite reach in space and time, no 
such extravagance is practiced by courts who regard their own jurisdiction as finite. 
As I will explain below, the liminal figure of the detainee, ‘bare life’ or the ‘camp- 
dweller’, occupies the limit point at which sovereignty, law and political community 
converge (Agamben, 1998, 85; Butler, 2004, 67-8; Gregory, 2004, 62-3).110
110 This is clearly a simplification of a complex range of arguments in relation to the nature of the 
‘biopolitical’ and the (sovereign) power that regulates it. The work of Schmitt, Foucault, and Agamben 
will be explored below with a view to elaborating this point.
PART A
3.1 Guantanamo Bay: Delimiting Sovereignty and Jurisdiction
Over six hundred detainees from forty nations have been held without charge 
or trial at the US Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay since January 2002. The land on 
which the Naval Base is situated was leased to the U.S by Cuba for the purpose of 
coaling and naval stations in 1903. The individuals labelled ‘enemy combatants’ 
were detained by the United States military and security agencies in the course of 
‘military operations’ commonly termed the “war on terror”. Following the attacks on 
the World Trade Centre in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, Congress 
authorised the President of the United States to use all “appropriate force” against 
nations, organisations, or persons who may have planned, authorised or committed the 
attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001 (Authorisation for use of Military 
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). The Authorisation for the use of 
force was also directed at nations, organisations or persons who might harbour 
terrorists or who may commit “international terrorism” in the future. On 13th 
November, 2001, the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of its 
Armed Forces issued a ‘Military Order’ authorising the “Detention, Treatment, and 
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism” (Presidential 
Documents, Federal Register November 16, 2001, Volume 66, No. 222, 57831- 
57836). According to section 2 of this Military Order, an “individual subject to this 
order” means “any individual who is not a United States Citizen with respect to whom 
I [the President] determine from time to time in writing” that, inter alia, an individual
is or was a member of al Qaida, or the person aims to cause “adverse effects” to 
United States citizens, security, foreign policy or economy (s. 2(1)). There is also a 
catch all provision in the Military Order - an individual can be so detained if “it is in 
the interests of the United States that such individual be subject to this order” (s. 
2(2)). Section 4 provides for a Military Commission to try such individuals. The 
Commission may punish such individuals with “life imprisonment or death” (s. 4(a)). 
The President also declares the limits of all ‘other law’ to the extent that the Order 
purports to foreclose not only U.S courts, but the Court of any nation-state, or 
international tribunal from hearing an application (see quote below). The breadth of 
the Order is so excessive, so imperial in its purview, that it seems to be grounded on 
the assumption that the Commander in Chief of the U.S Armed Forces can make an 
order with respect to the jurisdiction of any tribunal, national or international. 
According to section 7(b)(1) and (2), military tribunals shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction with respect to offences by the individual subject to an order, and:
the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any 
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding 
sought on the individuals behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any 
State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international 
tribunal, (s. 7(b)(2))
What might be sought by an applicant is far from a ‘privilege’. What the Order seeks 
to prohibit is the possibility that the legality of detention will be scrutinised by a civil 
tribunal. This Executive Order presumes to foreclose the jurisdiction of U.S courts, 
the courts of other nations, and that of international tribunals. I will now examine the 
leading decisions in the U.S Federal Courts which have determined whether the 
jurisdiction of civil courts extend to Guantanamo Bay.
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United States Federal Court decisions in habeas corpus applications brought 
on behalf of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay have determined whether the 
jurisdiction of U.S courts extend to the U.S Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
The U.S Supreme Court on 28th June, 2004 ruled that the detainees should have 
access to U.S courts (Rasul (2004), Hamdi (2004), Padilla (2004)). The U.S 
Government asserted that Constitutional protections do not apply to the detainees as 
Guantanamo Bay is outside the ‘sovereign territory’ of the U.S. The Government also 
asserted that international norms contained in treaties such as the Geneva Conventions 
do not apply because the detainees are ‘unlawful combatants’. All but one of the 
Federal Court decisions accepted that Guantanamo Bay is outside the ‘sovereign 
territory’ of the U.S.111 The issue of whether Guantanamo Bay is part of the 
‘sovereign territory’ of the U.S or whether the jurisdiction of a U.S court extends to 
the territory/space of Guantanamo Bay was not conclusively determined by the 
Supreme Court. Though ‘plenary jurisdiction’ was affirmed, it was held that the U.S 
does not have ‘ultimate sovereignty’ over Guantanamo Bay (Rasul (2004), 6). It was 
also held that if the ‘custodian’ (Defence Department, Secretary of Defence or the 
agencies they control) is ‘within the jurisdiction’112 of a particular Federal District 
Court and thus can be reached by service of process, then the writ could be granted 
(Rasul (2004), 10, 15). The Federal Court decisions contain a more wide-ranging 
treatment of the relationship between sovereignty and jurisdiction. For this reason 
the finitude of sovereignty and its relation to law (considered through the jurisdiction 
of courts) should be examined through Federal Court and Supreme Court decisions.
111 Gherebi v Bush and Rumsfeld (2003) was the first and only Federal Court decision to admit 
jurisdiction and bring executive action in Guantanamo Bay within the purview of judicial supervision. 
The earlier applications in Rasul and Odah (2002) refused to accept that the Court’s jurisdiction 
extended to Guantanamo Bay as the latter was not within the ‘sovereign territory’ of the U.S.
112 Much turned on this phrase which will be explained below.
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There are several approaches taken by the U.S Federal Courts and Supreme 
Court to sovereignty and its relationship to jurisdiction in the key habeas corpus 
cases. I will consider these cases in detail, but will shortly summarise the overall 
approaches by way of introduction. In the process of eliciting the multiple meanings 
attributed to sovereignty in these cases I will also identify the problem of the ‘limit’ or 
finitude of sovereignty as it arises in these cases.
Here then are the multiple approaches to sovereignty and jurisdiction that have 
emerged in the habeas corpus cases and the discourses on the ‘war on terror’, the ‘war 
without end’:
i. The approach in Rasul and Odah v Bush (2002) (multiple habeas corpus 
applications heard together) treated jurisdiction as a concomitant of a state’s 
sovereignty over ‘territory’. Sovereignty over a territory is deemed finite, 
delimited in time and space, and attributable to One sovereign. The courts of a 
state can have no jurisdiction over a territory unless the state also has formal 
sovereignty over that territory. Whether the U.S has sovereignty over 
Guantanamo Bay is determined by the meaning given to the words “ultimate. 
sovereignty” in the 1903 Lease Agreement between the U.S and Cuba in 
relation to Guantanamo Bay. According to the reading of the Lease 
Agreement in Rasul and Odah, Cuba retains ‘ultimate sovereignty’ and the 
U.S has ‘jurisdiction and control’ (Rasul and Odah, 23). For the Court in 
Rasul and Odah, a finite sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, which cannot be 
divided, shared or qualified, is attached to the nation-state of Cuba. Thus it
concluded that jurisdiction does not extend to Guantanamo Bay and the writ of 
habeas corpus is not available.
ii. The approach developed by the majority in Gherebi (2003b) is multifaceted. 
On the one hand ‘jurisdiction’ is regarded as a notion which can be separated 
from sovereignty and indeed exist without sovereignty. In a circular 
formulation, the majority argued that jurisdiction follows from the exclusivity 
of ‘control and jurisdiction’ exercised over a territory. On the other hand the 
majority also tied jurisdiction to sovereignty, but unlike the earlier decisions in 
Rasul and Odah, found that the U.S exercises sovereignty over Guantanamo 
Bay. This conclusion was reached by regarding ‘sovereignty’ as capable of 
being divided or shared as a “present” and “future” interest (Gherebi, 31). 
This is also a finite conception of sovereignty whereby its finitude is graspable 
and capable of being divided and distributed -  held by a particular sovereign 
at a certain point in space and time. Sovereignty is regarded as akin to the 
proprietary right to possession held differentially by a landlord and tenant. 
During the duration of the lease the tenant has a right to use and possess. On 
the expiration of the lease-period the right to use and possess reverts to the 
landlord. Cuba’s “ultimate sovereignty” was characterised as a “reversionary 
right” (ibid, 28). Sovereignty, for the time being, is held by the U.S. This 
crude analogy was applied as a means of conceptualising sovereignty as a 
‘temporal’ phenomenon that can be multiply held over a period of time. 
Sovereignty, on this account, is attributed a ‘substance’ and finitude that can 
be divided and shared.
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iii. The Supreme Court decision in Rasul v Bush (2004) finally determined the
question of whether the writ of habeas corpus was available to the detainees.
The Court determined the question by examining whether the Federal District 
Courts have jurisdiction under a habeas statute, 28 U.S.C §2241, to grant the 
writ “within their respective jurisdictions”. As the custodians of the detainees 
are ‘within the jurisdiction’ of a particular District Court, the statute authorises 
the court to issue the writ. This result does not adopt either of the two 
approaches outlined above. Jurisdiction is not a concomitant of ‘territorial 
sovereignty’. Nor is it the result of the elaborate ‘division’ of sovereignty 
observed in Gherebi. Territory is still an important pre-condition of 
jurisdiction. But it is the ‘territory’ of the respective Federal District Courts 
within which the custodian must be present. Providing the custodians are 
within that territory, the writ will be available. The significance of territory 
was made evident in Rumsfeld v Padilla (2004). The Court decided that 
Padilla’s petition was not brought in the correct jurisdiction. He is being held 
in South Carolina and the appropriate Respondent/custodian is the 
Commandant of the Naval Brig and not the Secretary of Defence.
iv. Sovereignty is also regarded as infinite to the extent that the actions of the
Executive during the ‘indefinite’ ‘war on terror’ are elevated beyond the limits
of law. In Hamdi the Supreme Court acknowledged that the war currently 
being prosecuted by the U.S could last ‘two generations’ {Hamdi, 2004, 12). 
Although the Court in Hamdi did recognise that the Geneva Convention 
restricts detention to the duration of hostilities, such hostilities may continue 
indefinitely.
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I am not attempting an exhaustive study here of the ‘war on terror’ conducted 
post September 11, 2001 by the U.S and its allies. Rather, what I wish to elicit for 
investigation are the implications of a globalised ‘war without end’ for thinking the 
sovereign exception, its finitude, representation, and delimitability. The ‘war on 
terror’ raises wider juridical and theoretical concerns than are capable of being 
considered within the confines of what is aptly justiciable. The ‘war on terror’ is an 
‘exception’ that challenges the paradigm of inquiries which query whether the 
sovereign ‘event’ is inside/outside law (I would include Butler, (2004), among these). 
According to the decisionist model (which I will explain below) the sovereign is the 
one who decides on the exception. The decision on the exception is the sovereign 
decision to suspend the normal order, usually with the ‘end’ of preserving that order 
(Schmitt, [1922] 1985, 12).113 But as the ‘emergency’ which accompanies the ‘war on 
terror’ is regarded as ‘without end’ -  the detention of prisoners may be ‘for the 
duration of the conflict’, that is, indefinite (Hamdi, (2004), 10). A ‘war on terror’ 
presents particular difficulties when inquiring about the ‘limits’ and (teleological) 
ends of a sovereign power that decides on such a ‘war’. A ‘war on terror’ cannot be 
waged against a conventional ‘sovereign’. Nor is it the case, in this instance, that a 
‘terrorist organisation’ with the usual ‘ends’ of terror such as extortion, founding a 
new order and so on can be identified and delimited. The ‘enemies’, it seems, are also 
‘infinite’ -  a “terrorist network” called “al-Qa’ida” (ibid, 10) with leaders who 
operate training camps throughout the world, with links to organised crime, money 
laundering and so on.114
113 According to Schmitt: “[b]ecause the exception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the 
juristic sense still prevails even if it is not o f the ordinary kind” (Schmitt, 1985, 12).
114 The global deployment of military power to combat al-Qa’ida was summed up in both President 
George Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair’s response to the beheading of the American Paul Johnson
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The ‘war on terror’ is a ‘war’ that extends beyond ‘space’ and ‘time’ and is 
waged against an ‘enemy’ that is no longer identifiable with a ‘state’ or ‘territory’ 
(Derrida, 2003b, 46).115 Derrida has suggested that this scenario cannot be called a 
‘war’ (ibid, 47). War involves the sovereign right to confront a sovereign alter ego ad 
mortem as Nancy put it (Nancy, 2000c, 106). According to Derrida the so-called 
campaign against “rogue states'” such as Afghanistan and Iraq is an attempted 
‘rationalisation’ for the absence of a ‘traditional’ sovereign against whom the 
‘sovereign right to war’ can be exercised (Derrida, 2003b, 46-8). At the same time 
the absolute character of sovereignty, its ‘indivisibility’, is being challenged by the 
‘universality’ of human rights and the International Criminal Court (ibid, 48-9). The 
‘im-possible’ ‘indivisibility’ of sovereignty has also been challenged, as we will see 
below, by the Court of Appeals in Gherebi (2003). How, then, can the sovereign 
exception (which has so regularly been characterised (particularly through Schmitt) as 
the decision to preserve a ‘particular’ order and thus remains within the framework of 
the juristic, be explained when the exception is universalised, made ‘indefinite’ and 
infinite (see epigraph from Butler above)? Or is it the case, as Fitzpatrick has argued, 
that this neo-imperial ‘globalism’ is yet another imperial ‘extra-version’ of ‘nation’ 
(Fitzpatrick, 2001a, 146)? These are some of the questions that will be posed by 
examining the habeas corpus cases. There is indeed a crisis of an international 
system of sovereigns whose death is announced by one of their number. As Jean-Luc
in Saudi Arabia. Bush stated: “This murder ... shows the extreme nature of the enemy we face. These 
are barbaric people”. Blair, who also referred to the act as an instance of ‘barbarism’ stated that: “This 
shows the nature of the people we are fighting day in, day out, around the world”, The Independent, 19 
June, 2004. This implicit invocation of a ‘clash of civilisations’ has been challenged by Nancy who 
contends that the ‘West’ as a finite and delimited place and enterprise in the ‘world’ must be rethought 
(Nancy, 2003b, 37). A similar thematic has recently been taken up by Jacques Derrida (see Derrida, 
2003b). I will return to this point in Chapter Four.
115 Derrida, “The ‘World’ of the Enlightenment to Come (Exception, Calculation, Sovereignty”, 2003b, 
has recently been published as Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (2004).
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Nancy has put it: “I am convinced that the war we are in is the lot of a civilisation that 
is coming up against its own limit” (Nancy, 2003d, “The War of Monotheism”, 52). 
This emphasises the need to identify and consider the current crisis of sovereignty -  a 
‘globalised’ sovereignty in a “world” that, as Nancy tells us, can no longer be 
delimited between the ‘West’ and the “elsewhere” viewed through the prism of 
‘orientalism’ or ‘primitivism’ (Nancy, 2003c, 37). What is to be made of sovereignty 
in a “globalisation” (democracy, technology etc) where “[tjhere no longer is an 
elsewhere” (Nancy, ibid)? No ‘elsewhere’, no ‘outside’ -  is this the ‘end’ of the 
‘sovereign place’ that I heralded through Nancy in Chapter One? Is it premature and 
misleading to speak of a ‘global’ sovereign, or the ‘end of sovereignty’? These are 
questions that I will open in this Chapter and take up in the one that follows. I shall 
now consider the habeas corpus cases in more detail.
3.1.1 Rasul v Bush: The (other) Essence o f  Sovereignty
Rasul v Bush (2002) was the first habeas corpus application to be brought on 
behalf of the Guantanamo detainees in a U.S Federal Court. This application to the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia involved two actions. The 
first consisted of petitions for the writ of habeas corpus by two British and one 
Australian national. In the second, Odah v United States, twelve Kuwaiti nationals 
sought a permanent injunction prohibiting the Government from refusing to allow 
them to meet with their families, be informed of the charges against them, consult 
with counsel of their choice and have access to impartial courts or tribunals. The U.S 
Government moved the Court to dismiss both actions on jurisdictional grounds.
The Federal Courts’ decisions in the habeas corpus applications on behalf of 
those detained in Guantanamo Bay have involved considerable discussion of the 
phrases ‘territorial jurisdiction’ and ‘sovereign territory’. Sovereignty is deployed as 
the a priori condition of jurisdiction. On the one hand sovereignty is allocated a 
‘position’ that is discrete and separate -  it is finite and independent of territory, 
history, or jurisdiction. On the other hand it is tied or placed in ‘relation’ with the 
territory that belongs to a ‘nation’. The question of jurisdiction is ultimately tied to 
which ‘nation’ has de jure sovereignty over a territory. In determining whether the 
U.S has sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay these cases reify the notion of 
‘sovereignty’. Sovereignty is treated as if it is a ‘thing’ with a ‘presence’. However, 
this is not a ‘presence’ that is ascertainable ‘in itself, one that is present unto itself or 
graspable by the courts. That is, it is only with reference to ‘territory’ and the de jure 
dominion of a ‘nation’ that sovereignty is given some ‘substance’. Sovereignty is also 
placed in ‘relation’ with the juridical -  the latter is made a concomitant of the former. 
The co-presence of sovereignty and jurisdiction is placed in a causative relationship 
whereby the latter is the effect of the former.
In formulating the condition for granting the writ the Court in Rasul applied 
the Supreme Court decision in Johnson v Eisentrager (1950).116 The Supreme Court 
in Johnson had held that although aliens, whether friendly or enemy, may be extended 
the privilege of litigation when they were in the U.S because their presence in the 
country implies protection, no such basis can be invoked when “prisoners at no
116 Johnson v Eisentrager (1950) involved a petition to the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia for the writ of habeas corpus by twenty-one German nationals. The Germans had been 
captured in China, after the surrender of Germany. They were accused of engaging in espionage on 
behalf of the Japanese at a time when the United States was still at war with the Japanese Empire. The 
Germans were tried and convicted by a United States military commission sitting in China and then 
repatriated to Germany to serve their sentences in a prison controlled by the United States occupying 
forces in Germany.
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relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and 
the sentence for their offence, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all 
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States” (Johnson v 
Eisentrager, (1950), 777-78, emphasis added).117 The District Court in Rasul, citing 
Johnson as authority, declared that a court was unable to extend the writ of habeas 
corpus to “aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States” (Rasul, 12- 
73, emphasis added). This formulation gains considerable significance in light of the 
Lease Agreement for Guantanamo Bay between the United States and Cuba. Article 
III of this Agreement states:
While on the one hand the United States recognises the continuance o f the 
ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over [the military base and 
Guantanamo Bay], on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that 
during the period of occupation by the United States of said areas under the 
terms of this agreement the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction 
and control over and within said areas with the right to acquire ... for the 
public purposes of the United States any land or other property therein by 
purchase or by exercise o f eminent domain with full compensation to the 
owner thereof. (Rasul, 59)
The Court in Rasul asserted that “as is clear from this agreement, the United States 
does not have sovereignty over the military base at Guantanamo Bay” (ibid). The 
assertion is by no means convincing. It is belied by the discussion of different 
interpretations of the phrase “jurisdiction and control” in Rasul itself. For instance, 
the petitioners asserted that Guantanamo Bay was under the de facto sovereignty of
117 It is worth highlighting here that Johnson contained a powerful dissent that drew on models of 
“justice over violence” inspired by Tacitus, and the separation of powers embodied in the U.S 
Constitution that gives the judicial branch the power to set aside void actions by government officials 
(Johnson v Eisentrager, 791-98). The dissenting decision affirmed the Court of Appeals in Eisentrager 
v Forrestal (1948, at 963-5).
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the United States. This argument was rejected after the Court considered and 
discussed Court of Appeals decisions in Ralpho v Bell (1977) and Cuban American 
Bar Association v Christopher (1995) (Rasul (2002), 69-71). These cases assert 
(rather than reason in any convincing way) that “jurisdiction and control” is distinct 
from ‘sovereignty’. ‘Jurisdiction and control’, according to Ralpho and Cuban 
American Bar Association, does not mean ‘territorial jurisdiction’. ‘Territorial 
jurisdiction’ is made an essential prerequisite for the judicial scrutiny of executive 
action. While the United States may have ‘jurisdiction and control’ over Guantanamo 
Bay (according to the Lease Agreement), this does not enliven the Court’s jurisdiction 
to grant the writ of habeas corpus. The reach of civilian courts will only flow from 
‘jurisdiction’ being supplemented by what ever it is that is added by jurisdiction being 
‘territorial’.
The “performative” decision of the court grants ‘territorial jurisdiction’ a 
privileged status over ‘jurisdiction and control’.118 As we will observe below, another 
court reached the opposite conclusion. I am setting out the reasoning of these courts 
in order to make the point that jurisdiction is not a self-evident concomitant of a 
‘thing’ called sovereignty. Neither sovereignty nor jurisdiction has a readily 
ascertainable or graspable ‘presence’. The incidence of each is performatively 
inscribed by the courts. What we have observed thus far is that the condition of 
jurisdiction is ‘sovereignty of a nation over a territory’. Sovereignty over territory is 
not graspable other than through the identification of territory with a ‘nation’.
118 ‘Performativity ’ characterises the undecidability between whether a declaration/decision asserts a 
constative or whether it is the declaration/decision itself that performs and thus produces the 
event/object of declaration/decision. It is unnecessary at this point to elaborate ‘performativity’ or 
‘undecidability’ further, but see: Jacques Derrida (1986). For a discussion of undecidability in relation 
to the ‘sovereign event’ and for an elaboration of Derrida’s theory of the future-anterior foundation of 
law, see Stewart Motha (2002).
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Sovereignty is thus not a discrete, finite phenomenon but one that is tied to some 
other essence. This other essence of sovereignty, in this case, is a quintessentially 
‘political’ and historically specific notion, the ‘nation’. Sovereignty is only disclosed 
through its status as ‘symbol’ of a political community in the form of the ‘nation- 
state’. Jurisdiction is also a function of whether one is a ‘citizen’ or ‘alien’. 
Membership in a ‘political community’ as a factor that influences whether one will be 
afforded the protection of civil law courts is more explicitly articulated in Johnson}19 
It also operates with some variability given being an ‘insider’ is no absolute guarantee 
that constitutional protections will apply (e.g Padilla (2003); Hamdi (2002), (2004) -  
I discuss these cases below).
The decision of the District Court in Rasul was appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (Khaled A.F. Al Odah v United States 
o f America., (2003)).120 The two principal arguments on appeal were, first, that the 
Supreme Court decision in Johnson applied only to “enemy aliens” and that the 
petitioners in Rasul have not been charged or convicted by a military commission and 
thus adjudicated “enemies” of the United States (Khaled A.F. Al Odah, 7-13); and,
second, that the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay is in essence a ‘territory’ of the
121United States and the Government exercises sovereignty over it (ibid, 13-16). The 
Court of Appeals accepted that “none of the Guantanamo detainees are within the 
category of ‘enemy aliens’” (ibid, 9). An alien ‘friend’ can become an ‘enemy alien’ 
by “taking up arms against the United States”, but the present cases were decided on
1191 will return to consider Johnson v Eisentrager (1950) below.
120 Appeals from Federal District Courts are taken to the Court of Appeals of the respective Federal 
District, and thence to the Supreme Court of the United States.
121 The detainees also sought relief under the Alien Tort Act, 28 USC 1350, but the Court of Appeals 
decided, again applying Johnson, that “[t]hey cannot seek release based on violations of the 
Constitution or treaties or federal law; the courts are not open to them”, p. 17.
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the pleadings which denied that the detainees had engaged in anti-American hostilities 
(ibid). This conclusion should have served to remove the scenario of detention in 
Guantanamo Bay from the scenario of the Germans that were the subject of Johnson v 
Eisentrager (1950). The detainees in that case had been tried and found guilty of 
spying on behalf of an enemy (Japan) with whom the United States was then at war. 
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held that Rasul, Hicks, Odah et al. (the petitioners) 
have much in common with the German prisoners in Johnson: “they are aliens 
captured during military operations in a foreign country, are now abroad in the 
custody of the American military* and have never had any presence in the United 
States” (ibid). It then applied the majority reasoning of the Supreme Court in Johnson 
which reversed the Court of Appeal view that the Fifth Amendment (due process) 
application to “any person” should be interpreted as applying to ‘all the world’ 
{Eisentrager v Forrestal (1948)), that is, aliens or citizens with or without their 
presence in the United States: “constitutional rights mentioned are not held by aliens 
outside the sovereign territory of the United States, regardless of whether they are 
enemy aliens. That is how later Supreme Court cases have viewed [Johnson v] 
Eisentrager” {Khaled A.F. Al Odah (2003), 10-11). It was further held that the 
constitution does not entitle the detainees to due process and they cannot invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court to test the constitutionality or legality of restraint (ibid, 12). 
This reasoning was tied to the statement in Johnson that it was the ‘presence’ of the 
alien, whether friendly or enemy, within the United States that entitles the alien to 
procedural or constitutional protection.
In their argument to the Court of Appeals in Khaled A.F. Al Odah (2003) the 
detainees disputed the District Court’s conclusion in Rasul that the Naval Base in
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Guantanamo Bay was beyond the ‘sovereign territory’ of the United States. They 
argued that it was essentially a territory of the United States, that the Government 
exercises sovereignty over it and that Johnson does not turn on “technical definitions 
of sovereignty or territory” (Khaled A.F. Al Odah, 2003, 13). It is true that Johnson 
did not set out to provide a thoroughgoing analysis of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territory’. 
At issue was the reach of law, determined it seems, by the apparently self-evident 
notions of ‘territorial jurisdiction’ and ‘sovereignty’. The Court of Appeals disagreed 
with the petitioners’ argument that the Supreme Court in Johnson interchanged 
‘territorial jurisdiction’ and ‘sovereignty’. ‘Territorial jurisdiction’ is said to delimit 
the reach of the U.S Courts. ‘Sovereignty’ apparently means “supreme dominion 
exercised by a nation” (ibid, 15). Refusing the detainees’ argument that the U.S 
exercises ‘de facto sovereignty’ over Guantanamo Bay, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that no court of the U.S can “assert habeas corpus jurisdiction at the behest 
of an alien held at a military base leased from another nation, a military base outside 
the sovereignty of the United States” (ibid, 16). As with Rasul, the court deployed a 
finite conception of sovereign, one that can be identified and delimited through the 
‘territory’ of a nation-state. The ‘substance’ allocated to sovereignty comes via the 
‘dominion of nation’ and not something that can be attributed to a ‘thing’ called 
sovereignty as such. Finite sovereignty as such turns out to be impossible without 
being given its content through another ‘essence’, that of ‘nation’.
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3.1.2 Gherebi v Bush: *Divided9 Sovereignty?
Gherebi v Bush (2003a) is the other significant petition for the writ of habeas 
corpus in relation to detainees at Guantanamo Bay.122 The petition was dismissed for
1 93lack of jurisdiction but was successfully appealed in Gherebi v Bush (2003b). The 
Appeals Court decision was the first to deny the U.S Government’s assertion that 
Guantanamo Bay is beyond the jurisdiction of U.S District Courts. The Court of 
Appeals concluded that Johnson does not preclude the District Court’s jurisdiction 
and that it has “jurisdiction to hear the writ because the custodians of the prisoners are 
within the jurisdiction of the court” (Gherebi, 7). The Court of Appeals reasoned that 
“even in times of national emergency -  indeed, particularly in such times -  it is the 
obligation of the Judicial Branch to ensure the preservation of our constitutional 
values and to prevent the Executive Branch from running roughshod over the rights of 
citizens and aliens alike” (ibid, 8). It refused the Government’s argument that:
the Executive Branch possesses the unchecked authority to imprison 
indefinitely any persons, foreign citizens included, on territory under the sole 
jurisdiction and control o f the United States, without permitting any recourse 
of any kind to any judicial forum .. . .  (ibid, emphasis added)
The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion after identifying the dispositive issue as 
the “legal status of Guantanamo” (ibid, 13). In contrast to Rasul (2002) and Khaled 
A.F. Al Odah (2003), the Court of Appeals in Gherebi separated the question of
122 This petition was a next-friend petition filed following the court’s dismissal of a petition for habeas 
corpus by a coalition of journalists, lawyers, professors and clergy in Coalition o f Clergy v Bush (2002) 
for want of ‘next friend’ standing. The amended petition in Gherebi was filed by Belaid Gherebi on 
behalf of his brother Falen Gherebi (the detainee), and thus the question of standing was not present.
123 Reference henceforth to ‘ GherebV will be to the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeals, 
Circuit Judge Reinhardt and Senior District Judge Shadur.
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“territorial jurisdiction” from the question of whether the U.S has ‘sovereignty’ over 
Guantanamo Bay (Gherebi, see discussion of ‘territorial jurisdiction’, 14-24; and 
‘Sovereignty in the 1903 Lease and Continuing Treaty of 1934, 24-33). Despite the 
welcome result in Gherebi, the reasoning in relation to the nature of ‘territorial 
jurisdiction’ and the nature of ‘sovereignty’ misconceives the ‘position’ of 
sovereignty in relation to ‘jurisdiction’. It is the nature of the relation between 
sovereignty and jurisdiction that I wish to elaborate once I have set out the 
problematic as it has emerged in these U.S decisions.
In Gherebi the U.S Government argued that notwithstanding what the 1903 
Lease Agreement with Cuba, and the 1934 Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, may 
say about the “jurisdiction and control” vested in the U.S, Guantanamo Bay falls 
outside U.S “sovereign territory” (ibid, 15-16). The question was thus whether, 
according to the Supreme Court authority of Johnson, it is “sovereignty” rather than 
“territorial jurisdiction” that is the prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction (ibid, 
16-17).124 There was no discussion of what qualities distinguish ‘territorial 
jurisdiction’ from ‘sovereignty’. It was simply assumed that the two are 
distinguishable. The majority in Gherebi read Johnson as indicating that ‘territorial 
jurisdiction’ is the requisite element for supporting the habeas jurisdiction of U.S 
courts and not ‘sovereignty’ (ibid, 19-20). The (obvious) circularity of the claim that 
jurisdiction should follow from a state having ‘jurisdiction and control’ is evident in 
the Court’s reasoning: ‘“Territorial jurisdiction’ exists as to ‘territory over which a
i
government or subdivision thereof, or court, has jurisdiction’” (ibid, 21).
Additionally the Court states that “Where a nation exercises ‘exclusive jurisdiction’
124The phrase ‘jurisdiction and control’ which is used in the U.S-Cuba Lease agreement is used 
interchangeably with ‘territorial jurisdiction’ by the Court of Appeals in Gherebi, see p. 16.
125 The source for this assertion in Gherebi is Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed., 1990).
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over a territory, territorial jurisdiction lies” (ibid). Thus, by virtue of the “United 
States’ exercise of territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo, habeas jurisdiction lies in 
the present case” (ibid, 23). Though this conclusion disposed of the issue before it, in 
the event that the alternative were the case and Johnson required ‘sovereignty’ as a 
requisite for jurisdiction, the Court went onto consider whether the U.S exercises 
‘sovereignty’ over Guantanamo Bay,
The U.S-Cuba Lease Agreement of 1903 states that Cuba retains “ultimate 
sovereignty” over Guantanamo Bay (ibid, 16). The discussion of the concept of 
‘sovereignty’ in Gherebi thus turned on the meaning of the term ‘ultimate’ rather than 
on ‘sovereignty’ as such. If ‘ultimate’ is the key “modifier” of sovereignty in the 
Lease Agreement, as the majority put it, should it be construed as a “temporal” or 
“qualitative” modifier? (ibid, 25-6). ‘Ultimate sovereignty’ in the ‘temporal’ sense 
would suggest that Cuba’s sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay is a “residual” interest, 
akin to a reversionary interest that substantively vests in Cuba once the U.S 
“abandons its physical and absolute control of the territory” (ibid, 26). The 
‘qualitative’ meaning of ‘ultimate’ sovereignty connotes “basic, fundamental or 
maximum” sovereignty (ibid). The majority conclude that ‘ultimate sovereignty’ as 
used in the Lease “can only mean temporal and not qualitative sovereignty” (ibid, 26- 
7)126:
Under the preferred constmction of “ultimate”, the use of the term in the Lease
establishes the temporal and contingent nature of Cuba’s sovereignty,
specifying that it comes into being only in the event that the United States
abandons Guantanamo: in such case, Guantanamo reverts to Cuba and to
126 The key source for this conclusion is the trusty7 Black’s Law Dictionary which defines ‘ultimate’ to 
mean: “At last, finally, at the end. The last in the train of progression or sequence tended toward by all 
that precedes; arrived at as the last result; final”.
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Cuban sovereignty rather than being subject to some other actual or attempted 
disposition. Most important, under the preferred temporal construction, Cuba 
does not retain any substantive sovereignty during the term of the U.S 
occupation, with the result that, during such period, sovereignty vests in the 
United States, (ibid, 29, emphasis added)
There are here a variety of meanings attributed to sovereignty. Sovereignty is at once 
divisible, temporal, and contingent. It is capable of being divided and held by an 
‘occupying power’. Sovereignty is also capable of being abandoned or disavowed.127 
The reference to the U.S ‘occupation’ is also significant in that it points to the 
‘exceptional’ character of U.S sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay. However, the 
reference to ‘occupation’ is also capable of undermining the rather flimsy metaphor of 
the landlord/tenant relationship by which sovereignty is regarded as a temporal 
phenomenon -  for if Guantanamo is under ‘occupation’ then it is wholly artificial to 
be characterising the U.S-Cuba relationship in relation to Guantanamo through the 
notion of a ‘land disposition’. The fact that the Lease refers to the “continuance of 
the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba” (emphasis added) is dealt with by 
treating the Lease as if it were a “standard land disposition” where “bundles of rights” 
are partitioned into present and future interests (ibid, 31). Thus what ‘continues’ as 
the ‘ultimate sovereignty’ of Cuba is sovereignty as a “reversionary interest” which 
must await the discontinuance of the substantive sovereignty currently indefinitely 
vested in the United States (ibid). Notably, the Court supports its conclusion by 
stating that the “division or sharing of sovereignty is commonplace. Sovereignty is 
not an indivisible whole” (ibid).
127 This is a far from careful use of the term ‘abandon’ by the Court -  an issue to which I will return 
below.
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The ‘division’ of sovereignty through the Court’s characterisation of 
‘ultimate’ sovereignty as a ‘temporal’ or ‘qualitative’ phenomenon is a decision that 
enunciates the parameters of the juridical. The courts’ jurisdiction is made a function 
of a ‘finite’, divisible, and thus graspable ‘substance’ -  a divisible ‘thing’ which can 
be possessed by one ‘nation’ or another, or ‘one-at-a-time’ in relation to an other. 
The court thus attributes a ‘finite’ quality to sovereignty when it characterises 
sovereignty as divisible in space and time. This attempt to render sovereignty finite 
by regarding it as analogous to a ‘standard land disposition’ is called into question by 
a variety of other discourses on sovereignty which associate it with the exceptional 
decision that lies before or certainly outside the law. If the ‘sharing’ of sovereignty is 
‘commonplace’, as the Court asserted in Gherebi, then what should be made of the 
regular assertion that sovereignty is singular, monistic, constitutive of the juridical 
order, and the unregulated power that determines when to suspend the normal legal 
order? The ‘division’ or ‘sharing’ of sovereignty is only sustained by associating 
sovereignty with ‘territory’. It is ‘territory’ (as ‘space’, ‘land disposition’ etc) that 
permits or enables the divisibility of sovereignty. Jurisdiction is extended to 
Guantanamo Bay by equating sovereignty with territory -  by turning ‘ultimate 
sovereignty’ into a temporal interest in a land disposition. Though this produces a 
welcome result, it is a far from adequate account of the relationship between 
sovereignty and jurisdiction. Sovereignty continues to be conceived, as with Rasul 
(2002) and Khaled A.F Al Odah (2003), through another essence - dominion of a 
nation over territory or the temporal divisibility of dominion over that territory.
1281 will return to consider the ‘division’ of sovereignty through Derrida below.
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3.1.3 Rasul and Hamdi: Jurisdiction in a Time o f  War
On 28th June, 2004 the Supreme Court of the United States decided Rasul v 
Bush (2004), Hamdi v Rumsfeld (2004), and Rumsfeld v Padilla (2004).129 The 
question in Rasul was whether U.S Federal Courts have jurisdiction to consider the 
legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad and being held in the 
U.S Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Court decided this question on the 
very narrow basis that Congress has granted Federal Courts jurisdiction in a Statute 
(28 U.S.C §§ 2241 (a), (c) (3)) to hear applications for habeas corpus “within their 
respective jurisdictions” by persons who claim to be “in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”. The majority conveniently 
avoid quoting the full text of the statute as it discloses some ambiguity about the 
limits of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction. Scalia J who dissented was unrestrained in 
this regard:
Even a cursory reading of the habeas statute shows that it presupposes a 
federal district court with territorial jurisdiction over the detainee: Section 
2241 (a) states:
“writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any 
justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their 
respective jurisdictions'” (Scalia J, 2) (emphasis added)
It is not evident from this portion of the statute that the ‘detainee’ must be within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Court as Scalia J claimed. ‘Territory’, however, is 
significant for determining the jurisdiction of a court. The question that emerges in 
interpreting this habeas statute is the meaning of “within their respective 
jurisdictions”. The majority resolved this question on the basis that it is adequate for
129 These were all appeals from the Court o f Appeals of Federal Districts.
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the ‘custodian’ of the prisoner to be within the Court’s jurisdiction. By reaching this 
conclusion they indirectly sustain at least one part of Scalia J’s objection, that ‘within 
jurisdiction’ must mean ‘territorial jurisdiction’.
Previous decisions in Ahrens v Clark (1948) and Johnson v Eisentrager (1950) 
had interpreted this statute and its words “within their respective jurisdictions” as 
requiring the petitioner’s presence within the district court’s “territorial jurisdiction” 
{Rasul, 8-11, especially 8). This interpretation created a “statutory gap” whereby if 
the petitioner was not present within the court’s territorial jurisdiction, the court 
would not be able to grant the writ. The decision in Rasul has elected to follow the 
authority of Braden v 30th Judicial Circuit Court o f Ky (1973, 495), which held 
contrary to Ahrens, that the prisoner’s presence within the territorial jurisdiction is not 
necessary because the writ of habeas corpus “does not act upon the prisoner who 
seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful 
custody” (.Braden, 494-5; Rasul, 10). The “custodian can be reached by service of 
process” (ibid).
The Court thus answered the question of whether the Federal District Court’s 
jurisdiction extended to Guantanamo Bay in the following way: the prisoners are in 
federal custody and alleging the violation of the laws of the United States. As no one 
disputes that the District Court has jurisdiction over the petitioners’ custodians the 
Court held that “§ 2241 confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ 
habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the Guantanamo Bay
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1 mnaval base” {Rasul, 15-16). While this is a welcome result I would urge very 
strongly that it cannot be assumed that the prisoners are likely to have their detention 
reviewed by courts that will apply the normal processes demanded by due process. 
The Supreme Court’s lengthy and complex decision in Hamdi would sustain my 
contention. Before I turn to Hamdi let me draw attention to the alarm raised by Scalia 
J.
According to Scalia J the majority decision in Rasul creates the danger that 
“jurisdiction and control” which flows from a lease over a military base may also 
extend to ‘jurisdiction and control’ that arises out of occupation by “lawful force of 
arms” such as in Afghanistan or Iraq {Rasul, Scalia J, 14). Should all persons held in 
U.S custody in Afghanistan, Iraq or in countless other U.S military bases logically be 
regarded now as subject to the domestic laws of the U.S? It is this possibility that the 
Supreme Court has attempted to limit in Hamdi.
Hamdi involved the detention of a U.S citizen who was captured during 
military operations in Afghanistan. The question addressed by the court was whether 
the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who are “enemy combatants”. The 
Court agreed that Congress has authorised Hamdi’s detention in its Authorisation for 
Use of Military Force (AUMF) granted to the President. Following the attacks on the 
World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, Congress 
authorised the President of the United States to use all “appropriate force” against 
nations, organisations, or persons who may have planned, authorised or committed the
130 This was the line of argument in the Court of Appeals decision in Gherebi, 9th Circuit, Dec. 2003 -  
but the more complex issues o f ‘territorial jurisdiction’ discussed in Gherebi were not canvassed in the 
Supreme Court decision in Rasul.
131 Hamdi (2004).The following in-text references are to the Supreme Court decision in Hamdi.
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attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001 (Authorisation for use of Military 
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). The Court confirmed that Hamdi is 
validly detained under this authorisation:
We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we 
are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were 
captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident of war as to be an 
exercise of the “necessary and appropriate force” Congress has authorised the 
President to use. {Hamdi, (2004), 10)
The capture of lawful and ‘unlawful combatants’ is an important incident of war 
(ibid). Detention is fundamental to waging war and thus falls within the AUMF as 
‘necessary and appropriate force’ (12). Can detention be ‘indefinite’ or ‘perpetual’? 
The Court recognises that the “war on terror” is “unconventional” and may be 
prosecuted for several generations (12-13). But indefinite detention for interrogation 
is not authorised by AUMF (13). However, and this is the key element that will 
impact on the future judicial assessment of detention in Guantanamo, the AUMF is 
interpreted as including the “authority to detain for the duration of the relevant 
conflict, and this is based on long-standing law-of-war principles” (13). The Court 
recognises that the conflict is ongoing in Afghanistan (13-14).
Detention for the duration of the conflict is only permissible once it is 
established that the detainee is in fact an “enemy combatant” -  “whether this is 
established by concession or by some other process that verifies this fact with 
sufficient certainty seems beside the point” (16). In relation to the duration of 
detention Hamdi contended that Congress had not authorised indefinite detention.
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The Geneva Convention132 requires that those detained be released and repatriated on 
the cessation of hostilities. The Court recognised that the “war on terror” underpins 
national security in ways that are “broad and malleable” (12). The Government 
conceded that the current conflict is unconventional and is not likely to end with a 
formal ceasefire (12). The Court recognised that the Government’s consistent 
position was that this “unconventional war” may not be “won for two generations” 
(12). Hamdi’s detention could thus last for the rest of his life (12). As long as the 
U.S is engaged in active combat in Afghanistan detention is recognised to be part of
1 o'q
the “necessary and appropriate force” authorised by Congress (14).
If Hamdi is entitled to ‘due process’ while he is detained under the AUMF, 
what should this involve? In deciding this the Court balances Hamdi’s private interest 
to liberty with the “governmental interest” of ensuring that the enemy does not return 
to the battlefield (the reasoning now slipping back to the scenario of a conventional 
war) (17-24). The Court recognised that strategic matters in “warmaking” are in the 
hands of the Executive. In arriving at what it thought the content of due process 
ought to be the Court drew particular attention to the fact that Hamdi has the 
“privilege” of American citizenship (25). With these elements in mind, particularly 
that the Government was prosecuting ongoing military operations and that Hamdi is a 
citizen, the court set out the following elements of due process:
■ A “citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy 
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a
132 Article 118 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment o f  Prisoners o f War, August 12, 1949 
[1955] 6 U.S.T 3316, 3406, T.I.A.S. No. 3364.
133 Hamdi’s capture relates to the conflict in Afghanistan and so the Court referred to this particular 
front of conflict. But the ambit of the ‘war on terror’ is wider and detention may continue for the 
duration of this wider ‘war without end’.
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fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker”. (26, emphasis added)
■ A ‘properly constituted military tribunal’ could meet this requirement of a 
neutral decision-maker. (31)
■ Aside from the first core element of knowing the factual basis of detention in a 
timely fashion, “enemy-combatant” proceedings can be tailored to alleviate 
the potential to burden the Executive at a time of military conflict.
■ Hearsay may have to be accepted as the most reliable form of evidence in 
proceedings that determine the factual basis of detention. (27)
■ The Constitution will not be offended by a presumption in favour of the 
Government’s evidence -  that is once the Government puts forward its 
evidence, the onus will shift to the alleged ‘enemy combatant’ to prove that 
she/he is not an ‘enemy combatant’. (27)
■ The Court emphasises, several times, that it is dealing here with the citizen’s 
core right to challenge the government’s case (24, 25, 26, 30).
Although Rasul (2004, 12-13) extends access to U.S courts to citizens and aliens, 
what this actually amounts to for the non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo is far from 
certain. The detainees in Guantanamo will now have the right to ask a District Court 
to grant the writ of habeas corpus. But it remains uncertain what ‘due process’ 
concessions will be made to those whom the Government insists are ‘unlawful 
combatants’. The distinction between ‘lawful/unlawful combatants’ and ‘enemy 
combatants’ has not been determined. The military tribunals which will now consider 
the factual basis of detention will also determine the nature and status of the prisoner. 
Jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts remains territorially specific and the 
detention of (un)lawful combatants will continue for the duration of a conflict which
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the Court in Hamdi acknowledged may be for the rest of Hamdi’s life (two 
generations).
There are several strands of ‘relation’ between sovereignty and law that are 
discemable through how a subject is brought before the law in these habeas corpus 
cases. The first is the significance of membership in the ‘political community’ of the 
nation-state. The emphasis on ‘citizenship’ clearly discloses the significance of 
membership in ‘political community’ for a life mediated by law. The authorities 
determined very early in the piece that Hamdi, a U.S citizen, would not be detained in 
Guantanamo Bay. While his detention still gave rise to questions of ‘due process’ and 
the legalities of indefinite detention, his status as the ‘enemy within’ clearly 
distinguished him from the thousands of other detainees imprisoned in military bases 
in Guantanamo Bay, Diego Garcia and Bagram Air Base, Kabul. The ‘position’ of 
the sovereign in relation to law disclosed in the determination of jurisdiction is thus 
conditioned by a subject’s membership in a political community. But being 
inside/outside the ‘nation’ is not in itself adequate to explain the character of 
jurisdiction, and thus the relation between sovereignty and law, discemable from the 
habeas corpus cases. As we observed above in the discussion of Nancy’s 
“Jurisdiction of the Hegelian Monarch” (1993c; see Chapter Two at 2.3), it is 
impossible to determine what comes first: the ‘unity’ re-presented and symbolised by 
the sovereign, the ‘people’ who are its constituent element, or a law that recognises 
and responds to the call of a juridical being. It is thus important to explore two other 
strands of relation between sovereignty and law disclosed by the cases: the 
‘exceptional’ decision of a sovereign, and the ‘governmental’ character of the court’s 
decision to grant the writ.
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The ancient writ of habeas corpus is famously supposed to protect the liberty 
of the individual from the abuse of state power. Where a person is detained, so the 
mythic story goes, the state authorities can be compelled to produce the prisoner’s 
body in court. But the story of the writ of habeas corpus is more complicated. In The 
Jurisprudence o f Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule o f Law (2003), Nasser 
Hussain provides a stunning demystification of the celebrated writ by arguing that:
whether in its origin as a facilitation of sovereign power or its subsequent and 
modem guise as a check on the executive, whether used to intern or to free, 
habeas corpus is a mode of binding subjects to the law and to its economies of 
power. (Hussain, 2003, 70)
As Hussain emphasises, “Capias enforces the writ (Latin: “that you take”) by literally 
capturing the body and bringing it into the law” (Hussain, 69). As Hussain points out, 
this is an irony regarding the “Writ of Liberty” (Blackstone’s grand embellishment) 
that was realised with embarrassment by Edward Jenks: “whatever may have been its 
ultimate use, the writ of Habeas Corpus was originally intended not to get people out 
of prison but to put people in it” (Jenks, 1902, 65, cited in Hussain, 69) As we will 
see when we consider the habeas corpus cases in relation to Guantanamo Bay, it is 
the ‘custodian’ rather than the detainee that is ultimately made subject to the law (see 
Rasul v Bush (2004)). The availability of the writ to the detainees in Guantanamo 
Bay in fact consolidates the sovereign’s power by determining where the sovereign’s 
writ runs. The province of law is determined by the extent of a court’s ‘jurisdiction’ 
and which ‘subject’ will be governed by law. The relevant ‘subject-of-law’ over 
whom jurisdiction is ultimately asserted is not the detainee in the ‘camp’ but the 
‘official’ who imprisons him. Moreover, and this reinforces the point about the writ
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facilitating sovereign power, the U.S courts remain heavily deferential to the 
exigencies of a sovereign at war when determining the extent of ‘due process’ 
available to the detainee. In what follows I will consider, through a discussion of the 
habeas corpus cases, how a particular kind of ‘abandonment’ in the ‘camp’ discloses 
the nature of the relationship between sovereignty and jurisdiction.
To summarise, then, the three strands of the relation between sovereignty and 
law that I will explore in discussing these cases in Part B of this Chapter are these:
i. The ‘governmental’ character of the decision on jurisdiction, explored through 
Foucault;
ii. The character of the sovereign exception in relation to jurisdiction explored 
through a discussion of Carl Schmitt;
iii. The question of how ‘abandoned being’ constitutes the political and juridical 
order explored through Agamben and Nancy.
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PART B
3.2 ‘Relation of Jurisdiction’ and ‘Relation of Exception’
Let me begin by considering why sovereignty and jurisdiction cannot merely 
be delimited through ‘space, land, or territory’. The enunciations of jurisdiction in the 
habeas corpus cases, as we have observed, are varied and contradictory. My enquiry 
de-positions any substantial ‘presence’ attributed to sovereignty by critiquing the ‘in­
finitude’ or limit-lessness attributed to it. The insistence of a finite notion of 
sovereignty through the opposition of inside/outside (territory, nation, people) is an 
impossibility. Such finitude always already implies a relation, a co-appearance (com- 
parution) of each finite (sovereign) ‘position’ (discussed in Chapter One). The 
infinite quality attributed to sovereignty, as we observed through Nancy, involves 
asserting ‘completeness’ of ‘position’ and ‘relation’. Recall Nancy’s point that war is 
the ‘technology’ of sovereignty not only as the means to sovereign ends but as 
sovereignty’s “mode of accomplishment”, its “finish” (Nancy, 2000c, 120). By 
‘finish’ Nancy meant the ‘limit’ of a sovereign logic to determine and accomplish its 
own sense of the good, carrying itself to the “extremity of its own Being” (Nancy, 
ibid, 118). Nancy sets out to undo the apparent completeness of ‘position’ attributed 
to sovereignty by disclosing the ‘singular plural spacing’ of all position, being, ends 
(ibid, 136-139; and Nancy, 2000a, 36). The examination of the habeas corpus cases 
demonstrated how the positioning and re-positioning of sovereignty is articulated by 
courts in the process of determining their jurisdiction. The cases also demonstrate 
that the nature of sovereignty is often disclosed through some other ‘essence’ such as 
territory and ‘people’. They also provide an opportunity to critically examine a range
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of theoretical approaches to sovereignty which regard sovereignty as having the 
‘infinite’ potential to remove a particular factual instance from the ambit of law 
(Schmitt); regard sovereignty as an anachronism (Foucault)134; or as occupying an 
indeterminate place at the threshold between inside and outside a juridical and
I O C
political order (Agamben).
As we observed in the habeas corpus cases considered above, jurisdiction is 
exercised within a delimited, territorialised ‘zone’ of authority. The question of the 
‘limit’, in particular the limits of law, must be explored further. Moreover, how does 
the sovereign exception relate to the delimitation of law? Nancy considers 
jurisdiction to be a question of ‘what actualises the law’ (Nancy, 1993c, 110). The 
actualisation of the law involves a ‘decision’ that makes the law effective (ibid). This 
decision is itself an ‘act of law’ that particularises, actualises, or ‘institutes’ a juridical 
order by bringing the factual within its purview. The law’s actualisation in relation 
to a case is a performative event which Nancy recently explained in the following 
way:
the relation of law to case -  the relation o f jurisdiction -  means that no case is 
a law and that a case only falls under the law once the law speaks of it. The 
accident -  what happens -  has to be struck by the seal of the law (of its 
utterance) in order to be not simply judged but constituted as an instance or 
case of right, modelled or sculpted (fictum) in terms of right. Juris-diction is 
or makes up juris-fiction. Law and case come before right only if they are
134 Although, as we will observe below, Foucault also insists that sovereignty persists.
135 This is a necessarily simplified account of each of these theorists whose work is more nuanced. I 
will elaborate their thought below.
136 ‘Perview’, originally ‘purveu\ etymologically, the “body of a statute, following the preamble, and 
beginning ‘be it enacted”’, OED.
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modelled, shaped, fashioned -  fictioned -  in and through one another. (Nancy, 
2003a, 156-7, emphasis added)
Bringing fact within law is an infinite task of fashioning the case to bring it within an 
order of right (Nancy, 2003, 161). This ‘fashioning’ not only brings the ‘fact’ within 
‘right’ -  the decision to include the factual situation constitutes the law at each 
instance of legal decision.137 It is in this way that ‘juris-diction’, for Nancy, is ‘juris- 
fiction’.138 This account by Nancy emphasises how the fact is brought within right in 
a process that is mutually constitutive of fact and right and the ‘limit’ between the 
two. Let me explain this account of the ‘relation of jurisdiction’ through Derrida 
(2002) and Fitzpatrick’s (2001a) account of the nature of the legal decision.
Recall the discussion of Fitzpatrick’s characterisation of the ‘position’ of law 
as a persistent condition of being in ‘apposition’ (in movement between position and 
what is beyond ‘it’) (Fitzpatrick, 2001a, 60, 62, 100). I argued in Chapter One that 
Fitzpatrick’s conception of law corresponded to Nancy’s critique of finitude. Through 
Nancy we observed how the ‘limit’ does not absolutely ‘separate’ what is enclosed. 
Through Foucault we examined how the ‘limit’ is not absolutely uncrossable 
(Foucault, 1977, 34; Fitzpatrick, 2001a, 60, 62). Any ‘position’ unceasingly 
transgresses the ‘limit’ that sets it apart from that which is beside it. Bringing this
137 Nancy’s argument is very close, here, to Derrida’s account of the legal decision and its relationship 
to the origin of law, (Derrida, 2002).
138 Nancy’s critique of the finitude of being also asserts the inpossibility of ‘pure’ ‘position’ or 
separation. The relation that upsets One sovereignty manifests the problematic of ‘limits’ that 
constantly face the fact of their imminent disappearance in the relation to which they are exposed. 
This is a dynamic that Foucault splendidly explained in his “Preface to Transgression” (1977). As 
Foucault put it:
Transgression is an action which involves the limit, that narrow zone of a line where it 
displays the flash of its passage, but perhaps also its entire trajectory, even its origin; it is 
likely that transgression has its entire space in the line it crosses, (ibid, 33-4)
Whatever the ‘density’ o f limit or transgression, each could not exist without the other. “A limit could 
not exist if it was absolutely uncrossable” for this would amount to an unfathomable stasis (ibid, 34). 
And “transgression would be pointless if the limits it faced were illusions and shadows” (ibid). Every 
time transgression crosses the limit it effaces the condition of its own existence (Ibid, 35).
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analysis to bear on law Fitzpatrick argues that law is not entirely independent or 
autonomous for it has to respond to what lies beyond the rule (Fitzpatrick, 2001a, 70). 
For Fitzpatrick the line contiguous to what is inside and outside a legal order, 
community or society is occupied by law. Even though this “condition of being in 
law is always unresolved” the prospect of resolution arises from the dimensions of 
inside and outside being “integral to each other” (Fitzpatrick, ibid, 73). Law 
occupies the limit but is itself irresolute and indeterminate. Though completeness of 
position and responsiveness to a beyond are antithetical, Fitzpatrick places law “in- 
between” these mutually necessary exigencies (ibid). The movement between 
determinant position and responsiveness to a beyond are manifest in the legal 
decision, which, as Derrida remarks, in order to be ‘just’ must be regulated by a pre­
existing rule and be without regulation (Derrida, 2002, 251). The decision must not 
be arbitrary -  but no rule can sufficiently encompass the ‘incalculable’ and infinite 
demand of justice. The just decision must preserve the rule and destroy it -  the 
‘limit’ of the law must be re-invented by the judge in each case (Ibid). Though the 
factual situation is what lies beyond law, beyond the ‘limits’ of jurisdiction, the 
‘position’ of law/jurisdiction must be in constant movement across the ‘limit’ that 
marks its ‘outside’ -  thus forming and re-forming the ‘outside’ and the limit that 
marks it.
How does this ‘relation of jurisdiction’ which Derrida, Fitzpatrick, and Nancy 
articulate -  the relation of rule/right to fact - relate to the refusal to apply the law to a 
‘territorialised’ beyond controlled by the ‘infinite’ power of a sovereign at ‘war’ -  the
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1‘sovereign exception’? The ‘shaping’ and ‘modelling’ of law to the case, the 
“relation of jurisdiction”, when brought to bear on the context of Guantanamo Bay 
raises the question of the relation between jurisdiction and the ‘sovereign exception’ - 
the decision to remove the factual from the purview of law. That is, the refusal of 
courts to admit jurisdiction over the ‘space’ of Guantanamo Bay either because it is 
beyond a reified notion of ‘sovereign territory’ or due to the exigencies of ‘war’ 
determined by a sovereign power that exceeds law, raises the question of the court’s 
role in ‘fashioning’ the exception (law’s excess), and its consequence, the condition of 
‘life’ unmediated by civil law. Is the ‘sovereign exception’ an instance, as Nancy has 
put it, of ‘juris-fiction’? To put it another way, how is ‘jurisdiction’ constituted 
through the ‘abandonment’ of the life in the camp? I will take up these questions by 
comparing Nancy’s account of ‘jurisdiction’ with Agamben’s treatment of the 
‘sovereign exception’. What is the relationship between ‘juris-fiction’ (the ‘relation 
of jurisdiction’) which Nancy describes, and the sovereign decision on the exception 
(the ‘relation of exception’) which Agamben (Agamben, 1998, 18) describes?
By addressing these questions in the context of the habeas corpus cases I 
wish to advance my enquiry into the nature of the relationship between sovereignty 
and law by discussing a very explicit instance of how membership in ‘political 
community’ lies in-between sovereignty and law and thus constitutes the ‘limit’ 
between the two. Although Rasul (2004) gave aliens access to U.S Courts, the 
indeterminacy of the status of ‘unlawful combatants’, the limited/altered application 
of due-process, and the emphasis on the rights of the “citizen-detainee” suggest that 
citizenship and membership in a political community will continue to ground
139 This is a question that resists the all too common announcement of a ‘deterritorialised’ world that 
accompanies ‘globalised’ sovereignty -  arguments which I will address in the next Chapter.
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differential treatment. By examining the notion of ‘abandonment’ -  the condition of a 
being placed outside the reach of a nation-state’s normal legal order - 1 wish to make 
the argument that a being placed ‘outside’ the juridical order constitutes the ‘limit’ 
between sovereignty and law. Being abandoned from/by ‘political community’ thus 
lies in-between sovereignty and law. This remains the case with respect to the 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay whose detention for the ‘indefinite’ time of war, subject 
to review of its factual basis, was implicitly endorsed in Hamdi (2004).
The decision to ‘abandon’ life, to place it beyond the calculations of law, has 
been characterised as the decision on the exception which constitutes the law 
(Agamben, 1998, 18). Butler deploys Agamben’s analysis in order to explain the 
phenomenon of ‘indefinite’ detention in Guantanamo Bay (Butler, 2004). Is 
‘indefinite detention’ the condition of being ‘abandoned’ by law? Is ‘abandonment’ 
the necessary concomitant of the ‘relation of exception’ -  the event that marks the 
originary decision that constitutes sovereignty? I will consider these questions by 
comparing Agamben’s treatment of the notion of ‘abandonment’ with Nancy’s 
articulation of the concept. According to Agamben the ‘relation of exception’ 
involves the ‘inclusive exclusion’ of that which is ‘taken outside’ the normal juridical 
order (Agamben, 1998, 18). The question of whether a person is inside or outside the 
law is not only a question of law’s ‘application’ but a more complex case of being 
‘abandoned’, ‘inclusively excluded’ by the law. For Agamben, it is not the decision 
to ‘apply’ the law but the decision to ‘abandon’ life that constitutes the juridical order: 
“The originary relation o f law to life is not application but Abandonment” (Agamben, 
1998, 29, original emphasis). What/who determines whether ‘life’ is mediated by 
law? Is law’s jurisdiction a decision of a sovereign or of courts, of fact or of right?
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Jurisdiction, the province of law, the condition of being a juridical subject, cannot be 
explained through a crude decisionism or, as is the case with Rasul, Odah, and 
Gherebi, by the assertion of the ‘presence’ of something called ‘territorial 
jurisdiction’ or ‘sovereign territory’. The following questions are addressed in the 
discussion that follows: does the ‘sovereign’ decision on the political (Schmitt) which 
places ‘life’ beyond law constitute the juridical order; is the decision on ‘jurisdiction’ 
an event by which law institutes itself ‘reflexively’; does law ‘in-form’ itself through 
the decision on jurisdiction (Fitzpatrick, 2001a, 73-9) (what Nancy has called ‘juris- 
fiction’)? I shall consider these questions through Butler and the theorists on whom 
she draws: Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben.
3.3 Governing the Exception
The President of the United States, by Executive Military Order, determines 
the conditions under which a military trial may take place in Guantanamo Bay. Under 
this authorisation the Department of Defence and the Department of Justice have 
issued Guidelines for the conduct of Military Tribunals in Guantanamo Bay. Butler 
describes this scenario as “the executive branch assuming the power of the judiciary” 
(Butler, 2004, 54). As we observed above, Hamdi (2004) has endorsed this process. 
According to Butler a sovereign power has usurped the role of the judicial branch. 
The Military Order which governs the ‘indefinite detention’ of those captured during 
the ‘war on terror’ is characterised as marking the return of a unitary, “indivisible” 
sovereign (Butler, 54) - a monistic sovereign elevated ‘beyond law’. Taking up the 
Benjaminian mantle as critic, Butler examines the ‘constellation’ formed between this 
era’s sovereignty and an earlier one (ibid, 53). The history of sovereignty as a
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continuum is, through this mode of critical engagement, “blasted out” of its 
“homogenous course” (Butler, ibid; Benjamin, 1968). According to Butler, the 
sovereign decision to suspend the application of normal judicial processes is 
“anachronistic” (Butler, 62), marking the return of an archaic sovereign. However, 
this is not the return of a ‘purely’ indivisible and ‘singular’ sovereign. The ‘power’ 
exercised by the state to suspend the law invests “governmental bureaucrat[s] with an 
extraordinary power over life and death” (ibid, 59). The Government official with the 
power to make the decision to “deem” someone “dangerous and constitute them as 
such, is a sovereign power, a ghostly and forceful resurgence of sovereignty in the 
midst of govemmentality” (ibid).140 But these ‘officials’ are also not “true 
sovereigns” (ibid, 62) -  that is to say, their power is not finite and singular but diffuse. 
The officials’ power is delegated to them and they do not fully control the aims of 
their actions: “Power precedes them, and constitutes them as “sovereigns”, a fact that 
already gives the lie to sovereignty” (ibid). These ‘petty’ sovereigns are thus not 
absolute but part of a larger distribution of power. On the other hand, there is, in the 
terms of my analysis, a sovereign with a purportedly ‘infinite’ character in the form of 
the state which declares an emergency that is “not limited in time and space” (ibid, 
64). This ‘infinite’ state power is capable of restructuring “temporality itself, since 
the problem of terrorism is no longer a historically or geographically limited problem: 
it is limitless and without end, and ... the prospect of an exercise of state power in its 
lawlessness structures the future indefinitely” (ibid, 65).
Butler’s analysis of the juridical status of detainees and the nature of the 
sovereign exception in Guantanamo Bay deploys Foucault’s notion of
140 I will return to elaborate Foucault’s notion of ‘govemmentality’ below.
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‘govemmentality’ and Agamben’s conception of the ‘relation of exception’ (see ibid, 
60-3).141 As I have indicated, Butler also captures the finite and infinite qualities that 
are regularly attached to sovereign power. Officials exercise power that is part of a 
diffuse governmental network of power distinct from the absolute sovereign of old, 
but the ‘permanent exception’ also heralds the arrival of an infinite sovereign that is 
not delimited in space and time. Butler’s analysis assumes both finite and infinite 
sovereignty as what conditions the juridico-political problems raised in relation to 
Guantanamo Bay. Her analysis usefully deploys Foucault and Agamben in analysing 
the status of the figure in the camp. The figure ‘abandoned’ in the camp is 
‘inclusively excluded’. To what extent does this ‘inclusive exclusion’ explain the 
constitution of the juridical order? Butler underplays this aspect of Agamben’s 
thought. The notion of ‘abandonment’ is quite central to explaining the constitution 
of the juridical order. Finite and infinite conceptions of sovereignty alone are not 
adequate to explain the relationship between law and sovereignty.
Let us first consider the two influential though vastly disparate conceptions of
sovereign power that Butler and Agamben draw on -  that of Foucault and Schmitt.
Why consider these two thinkers together? Foucault and Schmitt are the joint
provocations for Agamben’s theorisation of the ‘life’ in the camp and what it tells us
about the nature of sovereign power. The distinct contribution made by Agamben for
the study of modem power and sovereignty is to bring Schmitt’s thought on the
sovereign exception to bear on Foucault’s genealogy of modem power and
‘biopolitics’ (see Gregory, 2004, 62-3 and footnote 43, pp. 282-3). Agamben’s
thought on the ‘life’ of the ‘camp’ has attracted considerable and influential attention
141 Her account is probably the most theoretically informed engagement with the logic of indefinite 
detention without trial -  drawing on Agamben, Foucault, Schmitt and Derrida to explain the nature of 
sovereign power as it ‘operates’ in relation to Guantanamo Bay.
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(as I have just demonstrated through Butler). It is thus apposite to set out the salient 
elements of Foucault and Schmitt’s thought by way of setting the scene for a 
discussion of Nancy and Agamben on the notion of ‘abandonment’.
3.4 De-Positioning Sovereignty: Foucault
Butler (2004) and Agamben (1998) rely on Foucault’s attempt to displace the 
conception of sovereignty as the absolute power over life and death. Both Butler and 
Agamben underplay the nuanced insights which Foucault offers.142 We observed that 
Butler relies on Foucault’s notion of ‘govemmentality’ to explain the character of 
‘power’ as it operates in relation to indefinite detention in Guantanamo Bay. I wish to 
examine what Foucault meant when he introduced this notion to the study of ‘power’ 
in modem government. How do ‘govemmentality’ and ‘biopower’ (the other notion 
by which Foucault displaced the centrality of sovereignty) contribute to an 
understanding of how techniques of subjection operate in what Butler terms the 
‘extra-legal’ zone of the ‘camp’ (Butler, 2004, 64)? This discussion will serve as a 
precursor to examining Agamben’s account of the constitutive role, for the juridical 
and the political, of the figure ‘abandoned’ in the ‘camp’.
Foucault provided an account of ‘govemmentality’ in his lecture to the 
College de France in 1978 (Foucault, [1978] 1991, 87-104). There is a co-presence of 
the ‘archaic’ sovereign and the emergence of ‘governmental’ power in Foucault’s 
account. ‘Govemmentality’ is:
142 Admittedly there is Butler’s more lengthy work on Foucault in (Butler, 1997, Ch. 3). I acknowledge 
that Butler (2004) is a more polemic engagement and there is thus less space for a treatment of the 
more nuanced aspects of Foucault’s thought on sovereign power.
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The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit 
complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal 
form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means 
apparatuses of security, (ibid, 102)
In the lecture Foucault examined theories of sovereignty and government from 
Machiavelli’s The Prince, for instance, but drew attention to the emergence of a 
literature in the sixteenth century which defined “an art of government” (Foucault, 
ibid, 89). The ‘art of government’ brought questions of the ‘economy’ within the 
explicit calculation and management of the state, rather than being consigned to the 
private sphere (ibid, 92). The fundamental ‘objects’ of government in the 
Machiavellian Principality were “territory” and its “inhabitants” (ibid, 93). The 
sixteenth century texts on the art of government do not oppose men to ‘things’ but 
show that “what government has to do with is not territory but rather a sort of 
complex composed of men and things” (ibid). The ‘things’ are ‘men’, “but men in 
their relations, their links, their imbrications with those other things which are wealth, 
resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, 
irrigation, fertility, etc” (ibid). In the archaic mode of sovereignty the ‘end’ of 
sovereignty is circular: “the end of sovereignty is the exercise of sovereignty” (ibid, 
95). With the ‘art of government’ a new kind of finality, new ‘ends’ and ‘limits’, 
determined by “tactics” to achieve a plurality of aims is introduced (ibid). Foucault 
emphasises that this does not mean that sovereignty ceases to play a role. What 
changed with the emergence of the ‘art of government’ was that sovereignty was 
given a foundation in and through juridical and institutional forms, that is, through 
law (ibid, 101). So in fact the “problem of sovereignty is made more acute than ever”
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(ibid). Thus it is by no means correct to assume that Foucault displaced the 
significance of sovereignty in the study of power.
Foucault did, however, attempt to shift the focus from power exercised by a 
central sovereign authority to the locus of power as operating in disparate sites of 
domination. The formation of the subject and its subjection by instruments of power is 
de-coupled from the juridical problematic of sovereignty in Foucault’s paradigmatic 
interventions on power, subjectification, and juridical forms (Foucault, 1997). 
According to Foucault, since the Middle Ages the task of theories of right has been to 
establish the legitimacy of power, and “the major or central problem around which the 
theory of right is organised is the problem of sovereignty” (Foucault, 2003, 26). 
Foucault refutes these ‘legitimation theories’ because they:
divert us from considering the terms in which modem government confers 
rationality, and thus possible acceptability, on its activity and practice. This is 
the main reason why he argues political analysis is still immature, having still 
not cut off the king’s head. (Gordon, 1997, xxxi)
The attention of political philosophers like Hobbes and Rousseau was on accounting 
for the juridical limits of a centralised sovereign power. Foucault’s project is the 
opposite:
We have to bypass or get around the problem of sovereignty -  which is central 
to the theory of right -  and the obedience of individuals who submit to it, and 
to reveal the problem of domination and subjugation instead of sovereignty 
and subjugation. (Foucault, 2003, 27) (emphasis added)
For Foucault this is only possible with a focus on power at its extremities. The 
individual is a ‘power effect’, a ‘relay for power’: “power passes through the
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individuals it. has constituted”; “Power is exercised, circulates, and forms networks” 
(ibid, 30). What is asserted here is a type of power that Foucault terms “nonsovereign 
power” or “disciplinary power” (ibid, 36).143 The right of sovereignty and the 
mechanics of discipline go together (ibid, 37). There is a convergence of theories of 
sovereignty (mechanisms of totalisation144) and techniques of disciplining the subject, 
implementing mechanisms of surveillance and control (panopticism), and producing 
what Foucault in The History o f Sexuality, Vol. I  termed ‘bio-power’ (Foucault, 1984, 
258-274).
‘Bio-power’ is the term Foucault gives to the emergence of techniques in 
which power-knowledge converge in institutions such as the army, schools, hospitals, 
the clinic etc. to regulate, manage and control, through discourses of normalisation, 
the ‘performances of the body’ and the ‘processes of life’ (Foucault, 1984, 262). Bio­
power is contrasted to the power of the sovereign, derived from the ancient patria 
potestas, the power granted to “the father of the Roman family to ‘dispose’ of the life 
of his children and slaves” (ibid, 258). This power was considerably diminished by 
classical theoreticians and by early modem thinkers like Hobbes who framed the 
power of the sovereign over the life of his subjects with the concomitant right of the 
subjects to resist. Nonetheless, an asymmetric right to decide over life and death was 
vested in the juridical figure of the sovereign (ibid). The implication of the 
emergence of ‘bio-power’ for Foucault is that the place of the “enemy” in the 
calculations of the sovereign diminishes. Indeed, once regulation and control are
143 See also Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms ” (1997) for an elaboration of the emergence of 
“disciplinary society” in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, pp. 52-70. In “Truth and 
Juridical Forms ”, Foucault also elaborates a historical development related to the “disciplinary 
society”, the emergence of the Benthamite notion of “panopticism”, pp. 70-87.
144 See Giorgio Agamben (1998), pp. 5-9. I discuss Agamben below.
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dispersed in multiple institutions and sites of power-domination, a singular and 
monistic conception of the right of the sovereign becomes an archaism:
[i]t is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, 
but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Such a power 
has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in 
its murderous splendour; it does not have to draw the line that separates the 
enemies o f the sovereign from his obedient subjects:; it effects distributions 
around the norm, (ibid, 266, emphasis added)
It is this claim that Agamben purportedly ‘corrects’ with his attempt to bring the 
significance of the Schmittian ‘exception’ to bear on Foucault’s account of 
‘govemmentality’ and ‘biopower’ (Agamben, 1998, 5-6). I will expand on this view 
shortly. For my purposes what is relevant is the extent to which Foucault sets out an 
account of power that might be applied to the context of Guantanamo Bay -  an 
approach that is adopted by Butler. The modest point to be made from my brief 
excurses on Foucault’s thought is that an ‘archaic sovereign’, far from needing to be 
imported in from the ‘past’ to sit alongside governmental forms of power (Butler’s 
argument), is actually co-present with that power in Foucault’s thought.
What is the place of law in Foucault’s thought? Is the sovereign and the 
juridical structure it maintains only a fa9ade for deploying mechanisms of 
‘normalisation’? An examination of Foucault and Blanchot, in their address to each 
other, is a useful means of responding to this question (Foucault and Blanchot, 1987). 
Foucault, under the title ‘Where is the law, and What Does it Do?’ (ibid, 33), 
characterises law as manifesting a ‘withdrawal’ with which it ‘conceals itself. The 
law is not ‘self-evident’ or ‘in the heart’, for then it would permeate and infuse the
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“sweet interiority of consciousness” (ibid). Nor does it have the ‘solidity’ of a line in 
a text that can be readily consulted and deciphered. Where then is its power and with 
“what force and prestige would it command respect?” (ibid). Foucault’s answer is 
that the law must be provoked with transgression before it shows itself (ibid, 34). The 
essence of law, then, as we observed through Fitzpatrick above, is to be found in- 
between a limit and its transgression. The “presence of law is its concealment” (ibid, 
33). It is the “outside that envelops conduct, thereby removing it from all interiority” 
(ibid, 34). Transgression, by attracting the law to it, is an attempt to make the law 
which is in withdrawal appear: “[t]he law is the shadow toward which every gesture 
necessarily advances; it is itself the shadow of the advancing gesture” (ibid, 35). 
There is a relation, then, between law and transgression, but one that is always in 
movement towards and through the other. The subject, her action, is the ‘inside’ 
shadowed by law:
[t]hat is why transgression endeavours to overstep prohibition in an attempt to 
attract the law to itself; it always surrenders to the attraction of the essential 
withdrawal of the law; it obstinately advances into the opening of an 
invisibility over which it will never triumph; insanely, it endeavours to make 
the law appear in order to be able to venerate it and dazzle it with its own 
luminous face; all it ends up doing is reinforcing the law in its weakness... 
(ibid).
This ‘presence’ of law ‘outside’ the subject, law as elusive, in ‘withdrawal’ and 
‘concealment’, is the essence of law in a ‘disciplinary society’. Sovereignty, in 
Foucault’s formulation, now via the insight Blanchot offers, is an archaism that harks 
back to a “society of blood” (Blanchot, ibid, 83-6, 95-7). Power and the ‘political’, 
after Discipline and Punish, is opposed to the configurations of the “symbolics of
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blood” (ibid, 86), the crudity by which the power of sovereignty as an organising 
principle manifests itself But what of the decision to exclude a ‘subject’ from a 
juridical and political order? Is the society of ‘blood and soil’ an ‘anachronism’?
As Agamben puts it, and as we have observed in the preceding discussion, 
Foucault attempts to de-emphasise the questions “what legitimates power?” and “what 
is the state?” (Agamben, 1998, 5). But if this theoretical privileging of sovereignty is 
removed, what explains the point of intersection between “techniques of 
individualization” and “totalizing procedures”? (ibid, 6). Agamben attempts to 
address the nature of power as it is manifested at the point of intersection between 
“juridico-institutional” and “biopolitical” models of power (ibid). This is the question 
that Butler also attempts to address in relation to the detainees in Guantanamo Bay by 
exploring the convergence of Foucault and Agamben’s thought in relation to the 
production of the ‘biopolitical’ figure of the detainee in the camp. Before moving to 
consider whether the ‘original activity of sovereign power is the production of the 
biopolitical body’ (ibid) and its implications for understanding the relationship 
between sovereignty and law, the juridical order and its exception, I wish to briefly 
consider Carl Schmitt’s thought on the exception. The ‘exception’ -  its complex 
position inside/outside the juridical order, is central to attempts by courts to position 
the actions of the ‘sovereign at war’ beyond the purview of law. As we observed in 
the assertions of the U.S Government with respect to the status of those captured 
during the ‘war on terror’, the ‘emergency’ and ‘state of war’ are relied on as the 
ground for claiming that the judicial branch of government cannot interfere with the 
actions of the ‘sovereign at war’. Although the question of jurisdiction has been 
‘territorialised’ -  that is, jurisdiction is determined on the basis of whether the
186
custodian/detainee is within the ‘territorial’ jurisdiction of a court - the U.S 
Government’s rationalisation for ‘indefinite’ detention, and the possibility of the 
death penalty being administered by officials who are part of the Executive arm of 
government, continues to rely on the exceptionality of war asserted by the sovereign 
and acknowledged by the courts.
3.5 De-Positioning the Limit of the Juridical Order: Schmitt
It is not my objective to provide a full and thorough account of Schmitt’s 
thought in this section. I merely wish to draw from Schmitt an account of the ‘limit’ 
between sovereignty/law. Schmitt’s account of this limit, as I will go onto argue, 
harbours a paradox whereby a sovereign power to determine the exception which is 
regularly regarded as illimitable is in fact de-limited. This is the im-possibility of 
illimitable or ‘infinite’ sovereignty. It is this ‘limit’ of sovereignty/law that is at stake 
in the habeas corpus cases, and for the purposes of my argument in this Chapter, the 
‘limit’ that I wish to de-position through Nancy’s notion of ‘abandonment’ which I 
will consider below.
Schmitt’s influential contributions on the nature of sovereignty and its position 
in relation to the legal order are crucial interventions in the secular drive of modernity 
(Norris, 2000, 3). The fundamental challenge for secularisation is the replacement of 
the source of morality and authority: what will take the place of a defunct deity or 
state-based religion in order to avoid the nihilism of an alienating unrestrained 
individualism? Secularisation is intimately connected with modem accounts of 
sovereignty because of this stmggle to find a replacement for the authority of an
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%Immortal God: “secularisation for Schmitt is the attempt to cover over the moment of 
decision, a moment that his own analysis of the secular aims to lay bare” (ibid, 4). 
According to Schmitt, all “significant concepts of the modem theory of the state are 
secularised theological concepts” (Schmitt, [1922] 1985, 36). The theological persists 
in modernity in the form of the structural place allocated to the sovereign as the 
‘omnipotent lawgiver’ (Norris, 2000,4-5).
In the Preface to the 1934 Second Edition of Concept o f the Political, 
Schmitt emphasised that the decision on the ‘political’ is a decision on the ‘totality’ 
(ibid, 5). The political decision on friend/enemy and the decision on the exception 
are both decisions on the ‘totality’ of a ‘normalised’ social order and thus a decision 
on the ‘limit’. The sovereign occupies the place of the ‘borderline’ that constitutes 
the social order and law:
Sovereignty operates at the outermost sphere; it is here, at the borderline, that 
it establishes and violates limits in the same way that we saw the Preface [to 
the Concept o f the Politicalf] establish the political decision as being able to 
decide that something lies without its purview. The question of the sovereign 
is the question of the limit. If sovereignty decides upon its own limits, its 
decision cannot be bound by those limits. As politics is total in the Preface, so 
the sovereign, ... “must necessarily be unlimited”. The sovereign is the 
unlimited power that makes limits -  or, in other words, the ungrounded ground 
of law. (ibid, 6)
It is in this sense that the sovereign event is far from ‘chaos’ -  it is ‘the unlimited 
power that makes limits’. However, is it true to say, as Norris asserts, that 
‘sovereignty decides upon its own limits’, that it is absolutely illimitable? How does
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such a limit ‘take place’? The sovereign, for Schmitt, demarcates ‘law’ and the 
‘political’. The illimitable production of a limit may have the ‘appearance’ of a 
border, but then it must be in relation to that which it ‘effectively’ delimits - Taw’, or 
the ‘political’. This ‘taking place’ of sovereignty would thus be returned to the 
sovereign as a limit on its illimitability. It is through this paradox that the 
impossibility of an illimitable sovereignty is revealed.
Not every emergency or decree is necessarily an exception: “the exception is 
different from anarchy and chaos, order in the juristic sense still prevails even if it is 
not of the ordinary kind” (Schmitt, 1985, 12). Not only does order in the juristic 
sense prevail, the potential for the exception can be pre-figured or anticipated by the 
law that recedes. This is evidenced by the possibility of such a ‘withdrawal’: “the 
legal system itself can anticipate the exception and can ‘suspend itself” (ibid, 14). 
Indeed, this is assumed by liberal constitutional models that attempt to regulate the 
exception by enumerating the conditions or criteria by which law would suspend itself 
(ibid). However, this capacity of law to suspend itself troubles Schmitt who asks, 
without providing any clear response: “[f]rom where does law obtain this force, and 
how is it logically possible that a norm is valid except for one concrete case that it 
cannot factually determine in any definitive manner?” (ibid). The fact or instance of 
the exception, according to this Schmittian account, cannot be determined by law. 
However, law can anticipate the exception and suspend itself or withdraw. A 
‘dividable’ juridical order in which law and sovereignty is co-present is an 
‘impossible possibility’. The juridical is (always already) divided by law’s potential 
to withdraw and the sovereign’s capacity to declare an exception. Let me elaborate 
this through Derrida.
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What has been disclosed so far is that for Schmitt sovereignty is a divided 
concept. Sovereignty determines limits, but is in movement within and without a 
frame. In constituting a legal order, sovereignty is in movement towards a frame of 
reference, a normalised political condition. The illimitable thus moves towards and 
by way of a limit. It could also be said that the illimitable exists in and through a 
limit. As Derrida puts it, once the indivisible is divided, and the illimitable has been 
limited, sovereignty as the ‘undivided’ and ‘unshared’ becomes an impossible 
possibility. The singular plenitude of sovereignty is often asserted:
is it not the very essence of the principle of sovereignty everywhere and in 
every case, precisely its exceptional indivisibility, its illimitation, its integral 
integrity? Sovereignty is undivided, unshared, or it is not. The division of the 
indivisible, the sharing of what cannot be shared: that is the possibility of the 
impossible. (Derrida, 2003a, xx)
What is crucial here is the insight that whatever divides - and the sovereign limit 
divides - also “shares itself’ in this partition (ibid). The singular plenitude of the 
sovereign decision thus deconstructs itself at the “frontier” of the division it cuts 
(ibid).
This ‘sharing’ of the limit belies the claim that sovereignty is beyond law. 
However, according to Norris, Schmitt persists with a ‘metaphysical conviction’ in 
identifying the place of the sovereign ‘outside’ or beyond law (Norris, 2000, 6). The 
role of the sovereign in determining the ‘political’ might similarly be rendered as a 
metaphysical gesture, though Norris does not explicitly do so. In both cases, what is 
metaphysical about the sovereign’s position ‘outside’ law or as the figure who
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determines the ‘political’ is that this sovereign occupies the structural place of God. 
This demonstrates, according to Norris, the persistence of theological structures in 
secularisation:
what is decisive here is the fact that “God” is the name of a structural position, 
one that cannot be done away with. Human beings must regard something as 
“the ultimate, absolute authority”. Secularization names a change in the 
dominant cultural understanding of what that authority is. But by the same 
token it names the continuity of authority as such. ... Schmitt argues here not 
that God is inescapable, but the metaphysical position of authority that He 
occupies is. We might say that in the end Schmitt’s political theology reveals 
itself to be a political metaphysics, one that insists upon the authority of the 
metaphysical and the metaphysics of authority, (ibid, 8, original emphasis) 
However, it is difficult to square Schmitt’s deployment of metaphysical structures 
with a conceptualisation of a sovereign who occupies an indeterminate position both 
inside and outside the legal order. Additionally, sovereignty pervades the totality of 
the political in a sense that is concrete and factual. The sovereign decides the 
‘political’ by the decision on ‘friend/enemy’ and is infused in all instances of the 
juridical, even when the existing legal order is suspended in its entirety (Schmitt, 
1985, 12). In one sense the sovereign is the limit, but sovereignty also oversteps all 
limits. Sovereignty “carries the limit with it in its movement as it carries itself’ 
(Norris, 2003, 10). The relational character of an indeterminate sovereign who 
constitutes and occupies the place of a ‘border’, whose sharing divides and whose 
division renders it an impossible possibility, as Derrida put it, takes us towards a far 
more ample critique of sovereignty than to decry it as metaphysical.
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The discussion of the ‘limit’ as it manifests in the exception has, thus far, been 
discussed in rather abstract terms. A more concrete treatment of the sovereign 
exception can be observed in Schmitt’s discourse on the decision on the ‘political’. I 
will briefly set this out here and bring it to bear on the habeas corpus cases. 
According to Schmitt, the “specific political distinction to which political actions and 
motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” (Schmitt, 1996, 26). The 
‘enemy’, the limit figure of the political for Schmitt, is:
the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a 
specially intense way, existentially something different, an alien, so that in the 
extreme case conflicts with him are possible. These can neither be decided by 
a previously determined general norm nor by the judgment of a disinterested 
and therefore neutral third party, (ibid, 27)
The extreme possibility Schmitt is referring to is war -  for a world in which ‘war’ is 
eliminated is, for Schmitt, a world without politics (ibid, 35). The centrality of the 
figure of the enemy is expressed thus:
[wjords such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, 
constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or 
total State, and so on, are incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who 
is to be affected, combated, refuted, or negated by such a term, (ibid, 31) 
Consider, for instance, the principal authority being discussed in the U.S habeas 
corpus cases in relation to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Johnson v Eisentrager 
(1950). Justice Jackson who delivered the opinion of the majority stated:
citizenship as a head of jurisdiction and a ground of protection was old when 
Paul invoked it in his appeal to Caesar. The years have not destroyed or
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diminished the importance of citizenship nor have they sapped the vitality of a 
citizen’s claims upon his government for protection.(769)
It is the “duty of loyal support inherent in the citizen’s allegiance” that makes the 
Government’s obligation of protection a correlative (770). The dissenting judgment 
also drew comparisons with Saint Paul, but now to emphasise the extent of the ascent 
of civilisation rather than to assert a timeless nexus between protection of the subject 
and membership in a particular political community:
as the Court does point out, Paul was fortunate enough to be a Roman citizen 
when he was made the victim of prejudicial charges; that privileged status 
afforded him an appeal to Rome, with a right to meet his ‘accusers face to 
face’. Acts 25:16. But other martyrized disciples were not so fortunate. Our 
constitution has led people everywhere to hope and believe that wherever our 
laws control, all people, whether our citizens or not, would have an equal 
chance before the bar of criminal justice.(798)
Though the majority wanted to distinguish ‘modem American law’ from the “time 
when outbreak of war made every enemy national an outlaw subject to both public 
and private slaughter, cruelty and plunder”, they maintained that:
our law does not abolish inherent distinctions recognized throughout the 
civilized world between citizens and aliens, nor between aliens of friendly and 
of enemy allegiance, nor between resident enemy aliens who have submitted 
themselves to our laws and nonresident enemy aliens who at all times have 
remained with, and adhered to enemy governments. (769)
In a footnote the Court defined an ‘alien enemy’ as “the subject of a foreign state at 
war with the United States” (ibid). However, “enemies” can also be found ‘within’ 
the political community (as is the case with Hamdi (2002) and (2004)). Citizenship
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does not preclude an individual from being treated as an ‘enemy’ or ‘unlawful 
combatant’, and thus subject to capture, detention, trial and punishment by military 
tribunals: Ex Parte Quirin (1942, 37), Hamdi (2004).
Time has not dimmed the significance of membership in a particular political 
community. The nationality-centred qualifier for being a subject of law would not be 
all that surprising if it were not for the rhetoric of universal human rights that is 
propounded by the governments of the U.K and the United States. The subject-of- 
rights is universal, a concomitant of the triumph of liberal democracy. But being a 
subject whose life is mediated by law is conditioned on being a member of a 
particular ‘nation’. It is within the limit of being included as a member of a ‘nation’, 
and within law’s jurisdiction, that the sovereign excess is apparently checked. The 
poverty of this discourse is that it conceives of sovereignty and law through the 
metaphor of inside/outside. I critiqued this approach in Chapter One (see discussion 
of Bartelson, Chapter One).
The discourses on the limits of law emerging from the habeas corpus cases 
treat sovereignty as an infinite power when it acts beyond the boundaries of law, 
beyond the limits of jurisdiction. But as we observed through Schmitt, the exception 
is in relation with the norm -  the illimitable sovereign exists in and through a ‘limit’. 
What of the subject, the detainee, caught in the production and movement of this 
limit? Many characterisations are offered to describe the subject whose life is 
exposed to sovereign power -  ‘bare life’ (Agamben), ‘abandoned being’ (Nancy), and 
‘precarious life’ (Butler). As Foucault emphasised, the sovereign power over life and 
death must be considered in light of the emergence of modem techniques of discipline
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and govemmentality which enforce a ‘norm’ on a population. But there continues to 
be a sovereign exception that purportedly exceeds these norms of governance and 
regulation. I will now draw together the analysis of the limit examined through 
Foucault and Schmitt by considering Agamben and Nancy’s treatment of the 
‘biopolitical’ body as it is exposed to a sovereign will at the time of the exception. 
Agamben in particular has drawn heavily on Foucault and Schmitt. His thought is 
also an application of Nancy’s work on ‘abandonment’. It is thus convenient to 
consider Agamben and Nancy together.
3.6 Constituting the Limit: ‘Abandoned Being’
The limit that separates a sovereign at war and the law of a particular political 
community is wrought through a being whose ‘life’ is ‘abandoned’ in the camp. 
‘Abandonment’ is not the condition of being utterly beyond law. The juridical 
structure of ‘abandonment’, I argue, discloses that to be abandoned is to be 
inclusively-excluded from a ‘political community’ and juridical order. I have amply 
reviewed the habeas corpus cases {Rasul and Odah (2002); Gherebi (2003); and 
Rasul (2004)) in Part A. Recall the significance accorded to membership in political 
community, to being a citizen of the United States for instance (Hamdi, 2004). Recall 
also the contorted formulations of jurisdiction in the Federal Court decisions where 
sovereignty over a territory was reified in order to render it graspable as a segment of 
territory or as a temporal phenomenon {Gherebi, 2003). Here I will argue that the 
figure in the ‘camp’ is not merely ‘outside’ the juridical order or political community. 
The figure ‘abandoned’ in the camp is central to determining the limits of a juridical 
order and political community. The account of the significance of ‘abandoned being’
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as the figure that forms and occupies the limit of the juridical and political order is, in 
my view, most persuasively developed by Nancy (1993b). I will come to Nancy’s 
treatment of ‘abandonment’ in the latter part of this section. However, it is worth 
approaching the significance of ‘abandoned being’ for thinking about the limit 
between sovereignty, law and a political community through Agamben’s explicit 
treatment of this issue.
Agamben’s thought on the sovereign decision engages with both the
Foucauldian project of techniques of individualisation, the way power penetrates
subjects’ bodies, and the ‘totalising structures of modem power’ described by both
Foucault and Schmitt (Agamben, 1998, 5-9, 11). It is an approach that is consistent
with Agamben’s general project in Homo Sacer to set out “the hidden point of
intersection between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power”
(ibid, 6). He states at the outset that the conclusion of his work is that the two
analyses of the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical:
cannot be separated and that the inclusion of bare life in the political realm
constitutes the original -  if concealed -  nucleus of sovereign power. It can
even be said that the production o f a biopolitical body is the original activity
o f sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign
exception. Placing biological life at the center of its calculations, the modem
state does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and
bare life, thereby reaffirming the bond ... between modem power and the most
$
immemorial of the arcana imperii, (ibid, original emphasis)
There are immediate difficulties with this formulation. Fitzpatrick has drawn 
attention to the conundrum here of sovereignty being constituted by what sovereignty
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produces (Fitzpatrick, 2001b, 2). Agamben explains that the production of ‘bare life’ 
as follows. The exclusion that founds Western politics is the suppression of ‘bare 
life’ (biological life or zoe). Drawing on the Aristotelian distinction between mere 
life (zen) and the good life (eu zeri) (life in the polis), the suppression of mere life is 
an exclusion which is simultaneously an inclusion. This corresponds with the 
metaphysical task of distinguishing humans from animals on the basis that humans 
have the capacity not only to distinguish between pleasure and pain (voice {phone)), 
but also have language {logos) enabling them to ponder and decide what is fitting, 
proper and just (Agamben, 1998, 7-8). For Agamben the suppression of phone by 
logos in the politicisation of life is “the metaphysical task par excellence” (ibid, 8). 
From this analysis of the emergence of ‘political life’ through the suppression/burial 
of the biological or animal life of the ‘self,’ Agamben derives his central argument in 
Homo Sacer.
the fundamental categorical pair in Western politics is not that of friend/enemy
but that of bare life/political existence, zoe!bios, exclusion/inclusion. There is
politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and
opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself
in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion, (ibid)145
This is where Agamben fundamentally departs from Schmitt’s account of the
emergence of the juridical order and concept of the political as being based on the
sovereign decision to exclude or destroy the enemy. This sovereign decision, for
Agamben, is not a thorough or complete exclusion. Instead, the juridical order and
the subject as a political animal emerge through the dynamic of the ‘relation of
exception’, where any exclusion is simultaneously an inclusion.
145 For Agamben, the central distinction informing western political discourse from the time of the 
Greeks is that between ‘bare life’ (natural life) and ‘political life’, zoe/bios. Agamben argues that the 
decisive event in modernity is the politicisation of bare life (Agamben, 1998, 4).
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The ‘relation of exception’ is the core insight of Agamben’s theory on the 
structure of sovereignty, and the constitution of the political. The relation of 
exception demonstrates the potentiality of law to maintain itself as an absence:
If the exception is the structure of sovereignty, then sovereignty is not an 
exclusive political concept, an exclusive juridical category, a power external to 
law (Schmitt), or the supreme rule of the juridical order (Hans Kelsen): it is 
the originary structure in which law refers to life and includes it in itself by 
suspending it. Taking Jean-Luc Nancy’s suggestion we shall give the name 
ban (from the old Germanic term that designates both exclusion from the 
community and the command and insignia of the sovereign) to this potentiality 
(in the proper sense of the Aristotelian dynamis, which is also always dynamis 
me energein, the potentiality not to pass into actuality) of the law to maintain 
itself in its own privation, to apply in no longer applying, (ibid, 28)
The ‘life’ exposed to the sovereign ‘ban’ is ‘homo Sacer’ or ‘bare life’. This is the 
life that can be ‘killed with impunity’ but cannot be sacrificed -  that is, it is beyond 
the calculations of profane law and divine law (ibid, 72, 82-3). Though law is not 
utterly absent in this formulation, its presence, if this formulation can be strained, is as 
an absence. As Strachan-Davidson puts it, homo sacer is no ordinary offender or 
criminal -  he is ‘cut off from human society’.146 There is therefore ‘a double
146 James L. Strachan-Davidson (1912), 7. However, Strachan-Davidson makes the point in Volume II 
that the killing without judicial proceeding and with impunity of a banished man caught on Roman 
ground was rather more likely in theory than in practice as it is irreconcilable with the mle of law: ibid., 
Vol: II, 33-4. However, the possibility of the rule of law and killing with impunity coexisting need not 
be discounted in light of Schmitt’s account that the exception does after all take itself outside the mle 
without descending to chaos. It should also be noted that there is a literature examining the plausibility 
of homo sacer as a figure of Roman law which takes issue with Strachan-Davidson and others: see 
Harold Bennett (1930) 5-18. Bennett calls into question the interpretations of Roman law by Strachan- 
Davidson, ibid, pp. 7-8. Bennett also questions the status of ‘sacer’ proposed by W. Warde Fowler 
(1920) 15-24; Bennett, ibid, 8. For a critique of Agamben’s deployment of this archaic Roman figure, 
see Fitzpatrick (2001b, 4-8).
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exclusion’ that constitutes the zone inhabited by ‘bare life’. It is neither sacralised life 
mediated by divine law, nor is it regulated by profane law in the form of the 
prohibition of homicide -  that is, he can be killed with impunity but not sacrificed:
[t]he sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without 
committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life -  that 
is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed -  is the life that has been captured 
in this sphere. (Agamben, 1998, 83)
Why is the ‘life that can be killed and not sacrificed’ nonetheless ‘sacred life’? The 
answer to this, for Agamben, also offers the parallel between the originary 
politicisation of life and the structure of the exception:
[j]ust as the law, in the sovereign exception, applies to the exceptional case in 
no longer applying and in withdrawing from it, so homo sacer belongs to God 
in the form of unsacrificeability and is included in the community in the form 
of being able to be killed. Life that cannot be sacrificed and yet may be killed 
is sacred life, (ibid, 82)
The plausibility of Agamben’s deployment of the antiquarian figure of homo sacer is
r
not the subject of my study and so I do not intend to investigate whether it carries the 
weight of conclusions that Agamben proposes. What it does offer, however, is a 
means of characterising a range of figures, of ‘life’ distinct from ‘political being’, 
inclusively excluded from a juridical order and a political community.
What is useful for my purposes (and Butler, (2004) and Gregory (2004) have 
made similar use of Agamben) is that the figure of homo sacer is a symbol of the 
irresolution of the ‘limit’ between sovereignty and law. It is a figure through which 
the ‘limit’ can be understood as a relation -  the relation of ‘inclusive exclusion’. It is
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in this way that the detainee in the ‘camp’, the ‘unlawful combatant’ captured during 
the indefinite ‘war on terror’, can be regarded as inhabiting a zone of indistinction 
inside and outside the calculations of the sovereign and the juridical order. For 
instance in Hamdi (2004) we observed that the Supreme Court was more than willing 
to be cognisant of the ‘exception’ -  the fact that the Executive is prosecuting a war, 
and that any intervention made by the judicial branch of government must not overly 
hinder the exigencies of this war. The formulation of ‘due process’ in the limited 
terms that they were characterised marks the limit between sovereignty and law. This 
limit is wrought through the ‘positioning’, treatment and condition of the life of the 
‘enemy combatant’. The ‘enemy combatant’ whose life is differentially mediated by 
civil law marks the ‘limit’ of jurisdiction. The ‘abandonment’ of the detainee -  which 
is always already an inclusive exclusion -  demonstrates the link between the ‘relation 
of jurisdiction’ and the ‘relation of exception’ discussed above. This argument can 
be developed further by considering Nancy’s conception of ‘abandoned being’ more 
fully.
The relation between law, sovereignty and the figure banished from the 
political community can be taken up through the concept of abandonment. The figure 
of ‘abandoned’ life harbours the antinomies of sovereignty and law. The 
etymological root of ‘abandon’ is ‘bandon’ (<a-bandon) - and ‘bandon’ means 
“jurisdiction and control” (OED). To be abandoned is to be taken ‘beyond’, cast 
‘outside’ jurisdiction. But to be abandoned is also to be free from constraint or 
convention, to relinquish to the control of another, or to desert, that is, to leave behind 
or leave without help. To abandon, then, is to be relieved of certain modes of control 
and protection. Another way of putting it is to say that abandonment involves being
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banished from a particular jurisdiction. But to be cast outside a certain order is in 
another sense to be subject to an order. Abandonment is a point of ambivalent inter­
relation that takes the form of an inclusive-exclusion which Agamben has explored in 
Homo Sacer (1998, 28-9). Abandonment manifests what Agamben terms the 
‘relation of exception’ (of being inside and outside the law) and characterises the 
structure of sovereignty: “the relation of exception is a relation of ban” (ibid, 28). 
This is why abandonment cannot be conceived as an instance of absolute sovereignty 
(sovereignty as One, as monistic) or as the condition of a being entirely unmediated 
by law. As Agamben argues, it is not possible to say whether abandoned being is 
inside or outside the juridical order. The ‘limit’ of law is fashioned on the body (that 
may not be) brought before it. For Agamben “the originary juridico-political relation 
is the ban” (ibid, 109). This is a thesis not only “concerning the formal structure of 
sovereignty but also has a substantial character, since what the ban holds together is 
bare life and sovereign power” (ibid). Proposing this argument as a counter to the 
‘social contract’ accounts of the origins of the state in Hobbes and Rousseau, 
Agamben argues that:
What has been banned is delivered over to its own separateness and, at the 
same time, consigned to the mercy of the one who abandons it -  at once 
excluded and included, removed and at the same time captured.
The ban is the force of simultaneous attraction and repulsion that ties together 
the two poles of the sovereign exception: bare life and power, homo sacer and 
the sovereign. Because of this alone can the ban signify both the insignia of 
sovereignty ... and expulsion from the community, (ibid, 110-111)
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This is what qualifies abandoned being as the figure who lies at the foundation of the 
political and the juridical:
The banishment of sacred life is the sovereign nomos that conditions every 
rule, the originary spatialization that governs and makes possible every 
localisation and every territorialization. (ibid, 111)
Abandoned life thus lies at the limit-point of jurisdiction. Thus the courts 
administering the ‘rule of law’ of a particular political community cannot exempt 
themselves from responsibility for the figure of the abandoned detainee because the 
detainees’ abandonment defines the limits of the ‘rule of law’. There is nothing more 
proximate to ‘jurisdiction’ than the figure ‘abandoned’ in the camp. Let me develop 
this assertion of a link between ‘abandonment’ and the limits of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction.
To be abandoned from law is (as we have seen in the cases examined above) 
also to be abandoned by law. That is, the condition of a life ‘unmediated’ by civilian 
courts is a function of variable judicial constructions of the notions of ‘territorial 
jurisdiction’, ‘ultimate sovereignty’, ‘within jurisdiction’ and ‘jurisdiction and 
control’ (these are the determinants of jurisdiction in the habeas cases examined 
above). But to be abandoned by law, understood through Nancy’s extensive 
exploration of the question, is to be abandoned to a law: “one always abandons to a 
law” (Nancy, 1993b, 44). But what is this law that one abandons to? It is not the 
posited law of prescription or norms derived through convention - Nancy is quite 
explicit about this. This ‘other law’ is a reference to the sovereign-as-law, the law of 
the sovereign that “borders and upholds a legal universe” (ibid). In his essay 
“Abandoned Being” Nancy names ‘sovereignty’ as this ‘other law’:
202
[t]he origin of “abandonment” is a putting at bandon. Bandon (bandum, band, 
banned) is an order, a prescription, a decree, a permission, and the power that 
holds these freely at its disposal. To abandon is to remit, entrust, or turn over 
to such a sovereign power, and to remit, entrust, or turn over to its ban, that is, 
to its proclaiming, to its convening, and to its sentence, (ibid) (underlined 
emphasis added)
To abandon to the law of a sovereign power is also to abandon to the law of a 
community -  to the ‘juris-fiction’ that I discussed above. That is, to be abandoned is 
not to be entirely alone at the mercy of a ‘singular’ sovereign. As Nancy writes in 
The Inoperative Community, finite being always presents itself “at a hearing and 
before the judgment of the law of community, or, more originarily, before the 
judgment of community as law” (Nancy, 1991, 28). Being banished does not amount 
to coming under a particular provision of the law. Abandonment constitutes the legal 
order:
[tjumed over to the absolute of the law, the banished one is thereby abandoned 
completely outside its jurisdiction. The law o f abandonment requires that the 
law be applied through its withdrawal. The law o f abandonment is the other 
o f the law, which constitutes the law.
Abandoned being finds itself deserted to the degree that it finds itself 
remitted, entrusted or thrown to this law that constitutes the law, this other and 
same, to this other side o f all law that borders and upholds a legal universe: 
an absolute, solemn order, which prescribes nothing but abandonment. Being 
is not entrusted to a cause, to a motor, to a principle; it is not left to its own 
substance, or even to its own subsistence. It is-in abandonment. (Nancy, 
1993b, 44) (emphasis added)
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Abandoned ‘life’ produces the law. It is in this way that the abandoned subject is 
before the law (and the political) in the starkest possible way. It is not possible to 
determine whether the condition of abandonment is one of fact or right. It is always 
already both. Jurisdiction is, as I argued above through Nancy, ‘juris-fiction’. 
Abandoned being marks the ‘limit’ of sovereignty and law -  but the limit as an 
ambivalent phenomenon. It is for this reason that the ‘relation of jurisdiction’ and the 
‘relation of exception’ must be considered together.
* * *
In this Chapter I have considered the question of the ‘limit’ which separates 
sovereignty and law through the notion of jurisdiction as it has been variously 
considered in the habeas corpus cases in relation to the detainees in Guantanamo Bay. 
These cases disclosed, in a setting where sovereign power is deployed beyond the 
confines of the nation-state and formal conceptions of ‘sovereign territory, that the 
finitude of sovereignty is both conceptually and actually delimited through its relation 
with law. Despite the assertion that a sovereign at war is beyond law, the concept of 
‘jurisdiction’ and law’s account of its limits, reveals the relation between sovereignty, 
law and the political. The ‘political’ figured in the habeas corpus cases in at least two 
senses. The sovereign goes to war in the name of defending and protecting the 
‘political’ against the ‘global threat of terrorism’. The courts when determining the 
limits of ‘due process’ were heavily deferential so as to not to hamper the sovereign at 
war with onerous standards in relation to how detainees should be treated (Hamdi 
(2004)). Moreover, the Supreme Court, though acknowledging that the writ of
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habeas corpus should be available to citizens and aliens {Rasul, 2004), addressed its 
decision on ‘due process’ to the ‘citizen detainee’ {Hamdi, 2004).
The treatment of the habeas corpus cases also revealed that an infinite notion 
of sovereignty cannot be sustained. Even when sovereign power registers its greatest 
excess, asserting the prerogative to torture and/or summarily execute the detainee in 
the name of defending the polity, the question of jurisdiction, the question of whether 
the detainees ‘life’ will be mediated by civil law, must at the very least be addressed. 
Sovereign violence comes ‘before the law’ in both senses of that phrase. That is not 
to say that law has been effective in limiting sovereign excesses (for details of 
systematic torture in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, Baghdad, see Hersh 2004a 
and 2004b). It has been disclosed in this Chapter that the ‘presence’ of sovereignty is 
sustained in and through ‘jurisdiction’. And the figure whose ‘life’ discloses this is 
the being ‘abandoned’ from the juridical order and political community. To that 
extent, membership in political community, and its concomitant, the extent to which 
one’s life is mediated by law, determines the ‘limit’ of sovereign power.
I characterised the decisions on jurisdiction as instances of ‘juris-fiction’ -  the 
courts’ performative positioning of the limit of what is within and beyond their 
purview. The finite and infinite character attributed to sovereignty in these decisions 
was identified. The notion of the ‘limit’ associated with the sovereign exception was 
considered through the thought of Schmitt and Agamben and I argued that the ‘limit’ 
is the space of an ‘inclusive exclusion’. There is an attempt to ‘capture’ the detainee 
through the binaries of civilisation/barbarism, Christianity/Islam, sacred and profane 
law. But the separation between each of these oppositions is not a crude constitutive
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exclusion. The exclusion takes the form of the original suppression of ‘bare life’ in 
political community. The ‘subject’ of the camp is neither inside nor outside the 
juridical order or political community. For example the ‘barbarism’ of the ‘Muslim 
fundamentalist’ is not at the margins or ‘outside’ a ‘civilisation’ that promotes 
democracy and human rights. The Taliban and al-Qaeda are central to the neo­
imperial enterprise. This was disclosed through the ambivalent position of the 
‘abandoned’ detainee both inside and outside the juridical order.
The detainees currently being held at the U.S Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay 
bear the sovereign ban of a neo-imperial nation-state. Though they have now been 
given access to U.S courts, their detention will be subject to the exigencies of a war 
that may be ‘without end’. Such an illimitable sovereign power, I argued, is an im­
possibility. The courts, by varied and contradictory pronouncements on the fmitude 
of jurisdiction have placed ‘enemy combatants’ at the mercy of diminished 
requirements of ‘due process’. In the face of what is claimed to be an illimitable 
sovereign war, the courts are indeed in a ‘withdrawal’ anticipated by Schmitt. This 
withdrawal paradoxically delimits the plenitude of the illimitable sovereign. The 
detainees’ shackled bodies and the cages within which they are contained and 
tortured, manifest a reassertion of a sovereign power that Foucault regarded as in 
decline with the emergence of ‘govemmentality’ and ‘biopower’. That is not to say 
that Foucault’s insights are diminished. As Butler has rightly pointed out, the 
administration of the ‘exception’ is undertaken by a myriad of officials.
The ‘limit’ between sovereignty and law may be discerned through the 
detainee. The detainee is produced by a combination of a sovereign power that
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prosecutes a ‘war without end’ and the extra-judicial identification of those who 
threaten the national interests of the United States. Detention camps and military 
tribunals are an ‘outside’ at the centre of a new imperial project. The line that 
separates what is ‘inside’ the juridical order from what is ‘outside’ it, a ‘limit’ I 
examined through the notion of jurisdiction, is linked to a ‘finite’ conception of 
sovereignty that is nowhere to be found. The finitude of sovereignty, as I argued in 
the preceding Chapters, and now in relation to the ‘limit’ that separates sovereignty 
from law, is always already in relation with law, territory, community, ‘nation’. The 
conceptual ‘limit’ that is said to separate sovereignty never succeeds in containing it. 
Sovereignty marked-out as territory, ‘people’ or what is ‘outside’ law reaches beyond 
its ‘finitude’ precisely at the moment when it is regarded as a containable ‘essence’. 
The significance of ‘abandonment’ for understanding the in-finitude of sovereignty is 
that it reveals how membership in a political community marks the limit between 
sovereignty and law. The juridical cipher of this dynamic is ‘jurisdiction’.
Looking ahead now - I began this Chapter by asserting a link between the 
colonial gestures that are part of the ‘postcolonial’ enterprise in Australia, and the 
colonial attributes of a neo-imperial power in the form of the United States. We 
observed that what is common to the colonial and neo-imperial instantiations of 
sovereignty is the attempt to conceive of sovereignty through an ‘essence’ or as a 
monistic phenomenon. Sovereignty in both contexts is regarded as finite and infinite. 
The sovereign at war, despite claims to transcend spatial and temporal limits, is 
always already in relation with law and a political community. This resonates with 
the relation between sovereignty and law examined in the first two Chapters. 
Notwithstanding this evidence of the contingent and ‘relational’ nature of what is
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regarded as universal, ungraspable and infinite, a plethora of claims are made about a 
deterritorialised ‘global’ sovereignty, a condition without an ‘outside’ or elsewhere. 
Legal theorists and political philosophers have been claiming that ‘sovereignty’ is in 
decline in a new era of ‘deterritorialised global empire’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000; 
Walker 2003; and more nuanced claims about the possibility of ‘world’ and universal 
law by Nancy, 2003c, 2003d; and Derrida, 2003b). At the same time, political and 
sociological discourses are replete with claims of an epochal clash between 
‘civilisation and barbarism’, the ‘West’ and the ‘Muslim World’ (Ignatieff, 2003a and 
2003b; Dallmayr, 2002; Sassen, 2002; Urry, 2002). Sovereignty is, then, at once 
universal and particular. It is deterritorialised, without finite existence or an ‘outside’, 
and simultaneously marked by an epochal clash which is nothing but contingent on 
the imperial expansions of an extravagant and rapacious sovereign. These claims 
mark the ‘outer-limits’ of thinking on sovereignty. In the next Chapter I will draw 
together the colonial, ‘postcolonial’ and neo-imperial modes of sovereign power 
examined in the preceding Chapters by considering the concept of sovereignty in a 
‘world’ that is apparently without ‘limit’.
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CHAPTER 4
De-Positioning Imperial Sovereignty
The world is at war again, but things are different this time. 
Traditionally war has been conceived as the armed conflict 
between sovereign political entities, that is, during the 
modem period, between nation-states. ... [T]he sovereign 
authority of nation-states, even the most dominant nation­
states, is declining and there is instead emerging a new 
supra-national form of sovereignty, a global Empire... . 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and 
Democracy in the Age o f Empire (2004), 3.
An event or an invention is possible only as im-possible. 
The im-possible never appears or announces itself as such. 
Jacques Derrida, “The “World” of the Enlightenment to 
Come (Exception, Calculation, Sovereignty)” (2003b, 35).
Throughout this thesis I have been examining the ‘position’ of imperial 
sovereignty in relation to law. We observed that the general problematic posed by 
this relation is that sovereignty is a power that is required to be at once ‘finite’ and 
‘infinite’. In the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context for instance, an ‘infinite’ 
(illimitable, non-justiciable) sovereign power was necessary to ground ‘past’ and 
‘present’ law and society. We observed that this ‘infinite’ sovereign power also had 
to be capable of being rendered ‘finite’ (an event that took place ‘back then’) so that 
the imperial sovereign excesses could be disavowed by an emergent ‘postcolonial’ 
law and society. This concept of ‘in-finite’ sovereignty (at once finite and infinite) 
initially extracted from the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context was later generalised 
through a more current instance of law’s attempt to grapple with a sovereign ‘excess’ 
at a time of imperial expansion. I argued that the U.S Courts’ attempts to delimit their 
capacity to assess the legality of indefinitely detaining persons captured during the 
‘war on terror’, the decisions on ‘jurisdiction’, also involve an in-finite conception of 
sovereignty. The question of jurisdiction, I argued, is a question of the ‘limit’ of
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sovereignty. The finitude of sovereignty is marked by it relation to jurisdiction - 
law’s inscription of its own limit. In both the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context and 
the U.S courts’ decisions on jurisdiction, a Taw of the land’, a law o f community and 
‘nation’ was invoked in order to ‘set’ the ‘limit’ between sovereignty and law. Thus 
we observed a variety of ways in which sovereignty is tied to the particularity of a 
nation-state. It is the stability of ‘nation’ (in Mabo (No 2)) or the exigencies of 
‘national security’ (in relation to the ‘war on terror’) that are invoked to sustain a limit 
between sovereignty and law. In short, I have elaborated a concept of in-finite 
sovereignty which is sustained in and through the ‘limits’ of political community in 
the form of the nation-state. It is thus appropriate to direct attention in this final 
Chapter of my enquiry, to the claim that sovereignty and political community have 
now surpassed being delimited by the nation-state in an era of ‘globalisation’.
The significance of the nation-state as the locus and symbol of sovereignty, 
the entity in whose name sovereign power is made present, is being challenged (see 
epigraph from Hardt and Negri, 2004, above). Contemporary discourses on the 
process called ‘globalisation’ are awash with assertions about the exhaustion of the 
sovereignty of the nation-state. Juridical authority is apparently ‘deterritorialised’, the 
imperial ‘frontier’ is without limits (Hardt and Negri, 2000, xii). Others argue that 
“global space” assumes the character of a “frontierland” and “we are all inside with 
nothing left outside” (Bauman, 2003, 83-4). These millennial claims apparently 
herald an epochal shift marked by the emergence of ‘global’ or ‘supra-national’ 
authority in the aftermath of the Cold War. Sovereignty without limits, an infinite 
sovereign reign and a borderless ‘world’ is supposedly evidenced by a dissipating 
nation-state, pre-emptive military intervention, purportedly universal values of
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democracy and human rights, and borderless flows of capital and communication 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000 and 2004).147 Such a borderless ‘world’ is premised on the 
demise of the world system of sovereigns which was conceptually sustained by the
1ARdistmction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ sovereign authority and capacity. In 
this Chapter I will consider whether sovereignty has indeed moved beyond the 
delimited bounds of the nation-state.149 The bulk of my engagement with the claim 
that the sovereignty of the nation-state is coming to an end, that a new, ‘worldwide’ 
imperial sovereignty has emerged, will be through a discussion of Hardt and Negri’s 
Empire (2000).
Why investigate Hardt and Negri’s instantiation of ‘imperial sovereignty’ 
instead of others, and why at this stage of the argument? The principal reasons are 
two-fold and they both relate to the substance of how I have conceptualised 
sovereignty thus far.150 First, and as I have already indicated in passing, Hardt and 
Negri fail to grasp the infinite-finitude of sovereignty. Reducing their argument to the 
terms of my enquiry for the time being, their assertion is that sovereignty is no longer 
‘finite’ -  that is, associated with territory, ‘people’, ‘nation’, coloniser, the Occident 
or the state. On their account, the sovereignty of the nation-state is coming to an end. 
Indeed, any attempt to grapple with particular ‘postcolonial’ instances of sovereignty 
is to remain steeped in the dialectics of colonial sovereignty (Hardt and Negri, 2000,
147 A useful collection of the literature in which these claims abound can also be found in Aronowitz 
and Gautney (eds.) (2003), Implicating Empire: Globalisation and Resistance in the 21st Century 
World Order.
148 For a review of this literature on internal/external sovereignty and a critique of spatial metaphors in 
conceptualising state power and trans-national authority, see Bratsis (2003), “Over, Under, Sideways, 
Down: Globalisation, Spatial Metaphors and the Question of State Power”.
149 My discussion of Hardt and Negri’s arguments in relation to the'emergence of the juridical concept 
o f ‘Empire’ is not intended to be exhaustive. I will confine my explication of their arguments to what 
is necessary to call into question the idea of ‘worldwide’ sovereignty.
150 In this paragraph I am only providing a broad characterisation of Hardt and Negri’s argument. I will 
return to deal with these assertions in considerable detail below.
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114, 137). I will pay particular attention to this aspect of Hardt and Negri’s argument 
as it directly pertains to the thesis I have been advancing. Instead of discrete 
sovereign entities which re-present a particular political community and its law, they 
herald an infinite form of sovereignty called ‘Empire’. Their thesis directly 
contradicts my account of the infinite-fmitude of sovereignty -  my argument being 
that the existence of sovereignty is a process of its being-delimited in relation to law 
and with respect to a particular political community -  an infinite experience of 
sovereign finitude. I have argued that sovereignty^ a singularity which is always 
already plural (Nancy, 2000b and 2000c; recall the exposition in Chapter One). The 
shorthand mode of expressing this is as the infinite-finitude of sovereignty. Given 
Hardt and Negri’s thesis contradicts the core idea in my argument (they assert the end 
of a delimited concept of sovereignty), and for that reason alone, their arguments must 
be carefully considered and addressed.
But there is also a second, more affirmative reason for considering imperial 
sovereignty through Hardt and Negri’s articulation of it. I wish to use Hardt and 
Negri’s account of ‘Empire’ as a point of departure in order to chart the im-possibility 
of ‘globalised’ imperial sovereignty. This is the task of de-positioning ‘imperial 
sovereignty’ which I will take up in this Chapter. I will consider whether 
‘globalisation’ is accompanied by a new form of imperial sovereignty which, in 
Nancy’s terms, is a case of authority becoming ‘worldwide’ (Nancy, 1997, 3). Has a 
mode of ‘worldwide’ sovereignty emerged? Is ‘worldwide’ authority an instance of 
the ‘end of sovereignty’ or sovereignty as ‘Nothing’? In Chapter One I argued, along 
with Nancy and Lefort, that sovereignty should be ‘Nothing’. The ‘becoming 
worldwide’ of sovereign authority marks the outer limits of thinking on sovereignty.
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Nancy sees “the philosophical problem of becoming-worldwide as an antidote to a 
globalization merely based on capital” (Devisch, 2002, 386). Recall for instance that 
Nancy has argued that the plural spacing of the world “is itself the empty place of 
sovereignty” (Nancy, 2000c, 137 (original emphasis); see my discussion in Chapter 
One). Comparing Nancy’s account of authority becoming ‘worldwide’ with Hardt 
and Negri’s account of ‘Empire’ will enable us to explore what it means for 
sovereignty to be ‘Nothing’, for sovereignty to occupy a ‘non-place’ (Nancy, 2000c, 
137).
The difference between Nancy and Hardt and Negri’s approach to the ‘end of 
sovereignty’ must be stressed at the outset. Nancy seeks an end to sovereignty as a 
mode of encompassing, delimiting, re-presenting the being-together of beings. For 
Nancy, ‘community’ should not be delimited by the being-in-common represented 
through sovereignty. Sovereignty should be ‘Nothing’, a ‘non-place’ (Nancy, 2000c, 
139; and generally 2000b). Hardt and Negri in contrast announce the end of the 
sovereignty of the nation-state, only to herald the emergence of a new ‘global’ mode 
of sovereignty they call ‘Empire’. Empire encompasses all modes of social, economic 
and political being -  sovereign power expands its boundaries to “envelop the entire 
globe” (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 189). What is proclaimed as a ‘new’ imperial logic of 
global rule has implications for enterprises which seek a ‘postcolonial’ or anti­
imperial juridical order. As Hardt and Negri claim that the “end of history” has 
ushered in “the reign of peace”, and that imperial, inter-imperial and anti-imperialist 
wars are over (ibid), it is apt to question what bearing these claims may have on 
‘postcolonial’ and anti-imperial enterprises that are concerned with resisting ongoing 
forms of imperial domination. This questioning will return us to the problem posed at
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the beginning of this enquiry -  how might the ‘position’ of sovereignty in relation to 
law be conceived in order that it facilitates a ‘postcolonial’ and anti-imperial 
enterprise. In the latter part of this Chapter I will address how an account of in-finite 
sovereignty can inform a ‘postcolonial’ and anti-imperial project.
The questions addressed in this Chapter, then, are these: has sovereignty, 
which thus far I have asserted is both finite and infinite (in-finite), surpassed its 
delimitation in relation to a particular ‘political community’, namely the nation-state? 
In the idiom of my analysis, has ‘imperial sovereignty’ so thoroughly encompassed 
the ‘world’ that it now takes the ‘form’ (if this is still possible) of a 1finite-made- 
infinite'I151 Unsurprisingly, I will contend that imperial sovereignty remains in-finite 
-  both finite and infinite. The proliferation of claims that a new ‘imperial 
sovereignty’ has surpassed the nation-state, that it is an infinite sovereignty with ‘no 
outside’, a finite-made-infinite, results from the failure to grasp the infinite-finitude of 
sovereignty.
4.1 ‘Worldwide’ Sovereignty ?
According to Hardt and Negri the decline of the modem concept of 
sovereignty (a transcendent sovereign) can be explained by Capital’s demand for new 
mechanisms of control (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 325-339).152 While ‘modem’ 
sovereignty operates through the creation and maintenance of “fixed boundaries
1511 deploy this phrase because it captures Hardt and Negri’s assertion that ‘Empire’ is in fact a 
particular juridical order (the American Republic), and a particular mode of production (capitalism) 
that has become thoroughly ‘global’. Hence a ‘finite-made-infinite’. Their assertion is accompanied 
by the claim that the ‘political’ is also made ‘infinite’ through the notion of the ‘multitude’. I will 
shortly elaborate each of these elements in their assertion of ‘Empire’.
152 Future in-text page references will be to Hardt and Negri, Empire (2000).
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among territories, populations, social functions and so forth”, Capital now “tends 
toward a smooth space defined by uncoded flows, flexibility, continual modulation, 
and tendential equalization” (325, 327).153 The character of modem sovereignty as a 
delimited entity (the nation-state) thus clashes with Capital’s demand for 
decentralisation and deterritorialisation (326-327). The ‘decentralised’ mle demanded 
by the immanent flows of capital are expressed through Foucault’s notion of 
‘govemmentality’ (327-8). When modem sovereignty transforms into 
govemmentality, power is ‘immanent’, and regimes of control “flatten differences to a 
common plane” (ibid, 339).154 In sum, for Hardt and Negri the emergence of Empire 
is marked by the decline of transcendent sovereign authority embodied in the nation­
state. Empire is marked by the emergence of immanent authority driven by the 
“axiomatic” of Capital (326). It is this ‘becoming worldwide’ of sovereign authority, 
the character of power when it encompasses the ‘world’, that I wish to interrogate
1531 do not wish to take up the political economy of ‘Empire’ as it is beyond the scope of my analysis. 
Here I am solely interested in drawing out from Hardt and Negri’s thought the juridical character of 
‘global sovereign authority’ at a time of ‘Empire’. For an excellent account of the centrality of the 
‘nation-state’ for capitalism, see Ellen Meiksins Wood, Empire o f  Capital (2003). Wood explicitly 
rejects Hardt and Negri’s argument about the ‘smooth world’ called into being by capitalism. I will 
consider Wood’s argument in more detail below.
154 Recall here my extensive discussion of Foucault and ‘govemmentality’ in the previous Chapter. I 
made the point that the emergence of diffuse sites of power (authority exercised through modes of 
‘normalisation’), does not do away with the juridical problematic of the ‘archaic’ sovereign, the 
sovereign of ‘blood and soil’. Hardt and Negri’s account of Foucault’s thought, like much else, is 
crude and reductive. The key philosophical influences on Hardt and Negri’s thought are Spinoza and 
Deleuze. It is beyond the scope of my enquiry to give more detail on Spinoza and Deleuze. But see 
Negri, 1993, for an elaboration of the Spinozist aspects of Negri’s thought. Inspired by these 
philosophers, Hardt and Negri seek to overcome the opposition between transcendent and immanent 
sources and expressions of power. In the case of ‘Empire’, where previously the ‘nation-state’ was the 
‘transcendent’ expression of the ‘immanent’ will of the ‘people’, the scenario now is that the 
place/source of power is decentred, ‘globalised’ through the notion of the ‘multitude’, and thus 
incapable of being captured in a transcendent form of Power/Sovereignty. Though ‘Empire’ includes 
the overwhelming military Power (Potestas) of the ‘one’ super-power, the United States, this is one 
among several loci of diffuse modes power (potentia). This is a basic summary of Hardt and Negri’s 
notion of ‘Empire’. More detail will be given, as it becomes necessary for the purposes of my 
argument.
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through the thought of Nancy. As we will shortly see, Nancy expressly addresses the 
nature of ‘authority’ (what he calls ‘sense’) in a time of ‘empire’.155
What does it mean to claim that authority has become ‘worldwide’? In 
Nancy’s elaboration of the notions of ‘sense’ and ‘world’ we will find a nuanced 
account of how ‘authority’ is becoming ‘worldwide’. This account is informed by 
Nancy’s urge to think sovereignty as ‘Nothing’ -  a concern I highlighted in Chapter 
One and to which I will return at the conclusion of this Chapter. An account of 
authority becoming worldwide’ will sustain a discussion, later in this Chapter, of how 
‘imperial sovereignty’, far from being an illimitable force with no ‘outside’, is in fact 
still delimited in the form of a nation-state’s sovereignty that is extended beyond its 
ever-present ‘limits’. This is not to deny that imperial extensions of power and a 
decentralisation of authority are taking place. Rather, my intention is to emphasise 
that ‘imperial sovereignty’ or ‘empire’ must be understood as the (infinite) plurality of 
finitudes, what I call infinite-finitude. This is the opposite of what is asserted by 
Hardt and Negri, whose notion of ‘Empire’ is always already ‘infinite’ (an ‘open 
frontier’ where there is no ‘outside’). Nancy has developed his thinking on the 
‘becoming worldwide’ of authority through an account of what he terms the ‘sense’ of 
the ‘world’. It is thus apt to begin with a brief elaboration of what Nancy means by 
the ‘sense’ and ‘world’.
155 Note the different notation here of ‘empire’ and ‘Empire’. The former refers to Nancy’s account of 
authority becoming ‘worldwide’, and the latter to Hardt and Negri’s assertion of a new form of 
sovereignty and juridical order that encompasses the world.
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4.1.1 ‘Sense o f  the World’
What Nancy means by ‘sense’ is value (Librett, 1997, ix). The current crisis 
of ‘sense’ lies in the fact that ‘sense’ now inhabits the ‘border’ between two expended 
poles from which authority was derived - ‘absolute value’ (myth) and ‘relative value’ 
(the absolute absence of value -  nihilism) (ibid). In modernity the ‘theological’ as an 
absolute source of value is replaced with the ‘theologicopolitical’, another ‘absolute’ 
source of sense.156 The ‘theologicopolitical’ is a “laicized theology” symbolized 
through notions such as people, history, humanity, nation (Nancy, 1997, 105). Value 
or authority in the ‘theologicopolitical’ era is derived from a category that transcends 
the ‘singular plural’ exposure of beings -  such as the ‘subject of history’, 
‘membership’ through belonging to people, nation, humanity and so on. ‘Nation’, 
‘property’, ‘people’, ‘production’ become the ‘absolute sense’ of a ‘subject’ whose 
history becomes politics (ibid).157 The ‘West’, a category that Nancy seeks to 
problematise, saw itself as the “keeper of a world view or a sense of the world” that 
was expressed through ‘humanity’, ‘nation’, property and their proprieties (Nancy, 
2003c, 37). The West believed that ‘humanism’ was “its humanism” (ibid). But 
representations of the source of value as “‘man’, ‘reason’, ‘right’, ‘science’, ‘God’, 
‘history’ etc” are exhausted (Nancy, 2003d, 53). This exhaustion of the 
‘theologicopolitical’ accounts of the sense of the world also results from the 
dissipation of the opposition between Occident and its others -  a conclusion that 
requires more elaboration given the current wars in the name of ‘humanity’ and 
‘democracy’ which suggest the persistence of ‘world authority’ concentrated in the
156 This is articulated early in the twentieth century by Carl Schmitt, see: Schmitt, 1922 and my 
discussion of his thought in Chapter Three.
157 Recall the delimiting role of nation, property, ‘native’ and traditional community in Mabo (No 2) 
discussed in the Chapters 1 and 2.
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geopolitical ‘centre’ of the ‘West’. Nancy, in particular, calls such oppositions of a 
geopolitical centre/margin into question.
Is the ‘end’ of a ‘sense of the world’ which is based on ‘theologicopolitical’ 
accounts a speculation greatly removed from the reality of wars currently being 
prosecuted against ‘bad leaders’ and ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, and in the name of 
‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ and ‘civilization’? Not according to Nancy who argues 
that what is represented as a ‘war of civilisations’ in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq 
signifies a “Western world ... in a permanent state of internal war, which is no longer 
the old war of sovereign States” (ibid, 51). For Nancy these wars manifest a 
civilisation “coming up against its own limit” (ibid, 52). A civilization which comes 
up against its limit will lead to a change of civilization which may have three forms: 
the shifting of poles of civilization where Asia, Africa or Latin America may emerge 
as other poles; the aggravation of ethno-nationalist identity-claims throughout the 
Euro-Mediterranean world; or the invention of a “new way of relating to ‘value’, to 
the ‘absolute’, to ‘truth’” (ibid, 53). If the occidental ‘view of the world’ is being 
surpassed in an era of ‘globalisation’ because the ‘West’ is no longer the pole of 
power, then this presents a crisis of ‘sense’ -  a question of what will be the ‘sense of 
the world’. But as we will see, the crisis of sense is itself a result of the ‘becoming 
worldwide’ of a particular view of the world. The ‘becoming worldwide’ of 
authority, in the terms I expressed it earlier, manifests the ‘infinite-finitude’ of 
sovereignty. I will now explain this further.
What is crucial to understanding how authority or sovereignty is becoming 
‘worldwide’ is the relation between ‘sense’ (as source of value) and ‘world’. The
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source of ‘sense’ is situated in a trajectory, a history, that Nancy calls the history of 
the ‘West’. The West’s sources o f ‘sense’ in humanity, ‘nation’, ‘people’, and reason 
have become exhausted partly because of their ‘becoming worldwide’ -  that is, the 
“West can no longer call itself the West from the moment it witnesses the spread, 
across the entire world, of the form that could once have seemed to constitute its 
distinguishing feature” (Nancy, 2003c, 37). The West is no longer the ‘centre of 
civilization’, reason, humanity etc. Nancy is describing the becoming infinite of 
finitude - the dissipation and dispersal of sovereignty, particularity, identity, and 
‘nation’. Does this conform to the claim that ‘empire’ is the juridical category that 
accurately reflects the new ‘sense of the world’? In order to address this question, I 
will dwell a little longer on what Nancy means by ‘world’. This is quite central to 
distinguishing Nancy’s claim about ‘worldwide’ authority from Hardt and Negri’s 
account of ‘Empire ’.
Nancy opens his characterisation of ‘world’ with a deconstruction of the
Christian source of ‘sense’ as ‘beyond this world’. Such an account of sense is to be
found in a transcendent source of authority such as the Christian God (Nancy, 1997,
54-5). The thought of a ‘world’ beyond the binary of ‘inside/outside the world’
begins with Spinoza for whom God has an equivalence with Nature -  the ‘outside is
on the inside’ or at least is expressed as immanent to the world (see the discussion of
Spinoza in these terms of inside/outside, ibid, 54). The main thrust of this approach is
1 ^8to get rid of a notion of authonty as having a transcendent source. With this
158 Spinoza opens a thinking of God, and thus of authority and power, as capable of having an 
immanent cause. For Spinoza, as with Descartes, God was a ‘cause of itself. The paradox of this 
concept of ‘cause’ is that the thing would have to ‘exist before it exists’ (Spinoza, 2000, Introduction, 
27-9, Part I, propositions 11 and 16). But Spinoza meets this with the explanation that ‘cause must also 
be regarded as reason -  “cause or reason” (ibid). The explanation of how God might be a ‘cause of 
itself is one of ‘logical relationship’ -  it is not that “God first exists and then brings about his own
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possibility of an immanent cause of the world the centrality of a “beyond of the 
world” is dissipated (ibid, 55). The source of sense “opens itself up within the world” 
(ibid, original emphasis). Sense is then what might be called the ‘transcendence’ of 
the ‘immanence’ of the world -  or better still, what Nancy terms “transimmanence”, 
or more simply, the world’s existence and exposition (ibid).
The notion of ‘transimmanence’ is Nancy’s expression of the source of the 
‘sense’ of the ‘world’.159 The ‘world’ for Nancy is much more than simply a relation 
between ‘humans’ and what is beyond them (‘outside’ or ‘beside’ humanity). It is 
precisely the impossibility of an absolute ‘beyond’ that Nancy’s preoccupation with 
‘finitude’ reveals (finitude as an infinite proliferation of singularities being 
exposed).160 Consistent with all aspects of his thought, Nancy’s preoccupation is with 
thinking the ‘being-with' of existence. Being-in-the-world, existence (Dasein), is the 
“spatial totality of the sense of existence, a totality that is itself existent...” (ibid, 56). 
The ‘sense of the world’ is the ‘world’ as the place of existence. ‘Transimmanence’ 
expresses the sense of this world in a manner that shatters the regular “confines” by 
which the ‘world’ was previously given expression (ibid, “Space: Confines”, 37-41, at 
40). For instance, ‘transcendence’ or ‘immanent’ sources of authority were reputed to 
disclose the sense of the world by placing the source of sense either ‘inside or 
outside’ the world (ibid). Borders and limits thus expressed the finitude of being
existence; it is to say that God’s existence follows logically from the concept of God” (ibid). Hardt and 
Negri also rely on Spinoza’s concept of cause when explaining the immanent cause of the ‘multitude’ 
of Empire. I will consider this below.
159 Nancy explicitly seeks to depart from Heidegger’s concept of Dasein (the German noun for 
existence). It is beyond the scope of my enquiry to elaborate Heidegger at length here. I merely wish 
to point out the intellectual antecedents to Nancy’s sense of ‘being in the world’. Through the notion 
of ‘transimmanence’ Nancy calls into question Heidegger’s expression of the relation between 
‘humanity’ and the ‘world’ as a relation between subject and object (Nancy, 1997, 55-6). For Nancy 
the human being should not be regarded as the centre or ‘end’ of nature. This is implied in Heidegger’s 
articulation of ‘humanity’ as “world forming” in contrast to the ‘stone’ which is “without world” and 
the animal which is “poor of world” (ibid).
160 Recall the discussion of ‘Of Being Singular Plural’ (Nancy, 2000b) in Chapter One.
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(ibid, 40). But as we observed in Chapter One, the limit of finitude is an ‘infinite’ 
exposure, a sharing which takes place across the ‘limits’. The ‘world’, as with the 
finitude of being, is a spacing. The ‘space’ of the world involves ‘limits’. But limits 
are always also the surpassing of limits (ibid). Put simply, the ‘world’, for Nancy, is 
the trace of ever transgressed limits.161 Let me articulate this relatively abstract 
discussion of ‘world’ more explicitly in terms of sovereignty.
4.1.2 Sovereignty and the \Sense o f  the World9
The concept of sovereignty which conforms to the ‘becoming worldwide’ of 
‘authority’ (the becoming infinite of finite spacing) is “sovereignty without 
sovereignty” (Nancy, 2000c, 134, 136-140). In Chapter One I made the point, 
through Nancy and Lefort, that sovereignty cannot be a discrete, monistic entity. In 
Lefort’s terms, the ‘nonsovereign’ place or the ‘empty place of power’ results from 
the lack of a positive determination of society (the ‘common’, sovereignty and so
1 fOon). Sovereignty, society or community cannot be given a positive determination 
from ‘outside’ or ‘inside’, from a transcendent or immanent source of 
determination. To recall the character of ‘sovereignty without sovereignty’ 
discussed in Chapter One - it should have nothing to ‘attain, achieve, accomplish, or 
finish’ (Nancy, 2000c, 139; Chapter One, 37-8). It is precisely such an accomplished, 
‘finished’ sovereignty that Hardt and Negri proclaim through their infinite notion of 
sovereignty as ‘Empire’. It is their version of sovereignty as ‘finite-made-infinite’
161 Nancy’s attempt to ‘retreat’ the ‘sense of the world’ is an attempt to ‘re-trace’ the forms and 
grounds by which ‘world’ has been understood: see Nancy, (2003c, 306).
62 See the discussion of Nancy and Lefort in Chapter One, 37-8, 40-3.
163 This is the ‘end of sovereignty’ that Nancy identified in 1991 in his discussion of sovereignty in 
relation to the Gulf War (Nancy, 2000c).
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that I will shortly go on to critique. But first let us look at how Nancy elaborates 
sovereignty as ‘worldwide’ authority.
The ‘spacing’ of the world at the end of sovereignty can only be explained, 
according to Nancy, through what he terms “ecotechnics” (ibid, 133, 135). Though 
what is termed the ‘global order’ has no ‘supranational’ figure, reason, or end that can 
be identified, it has the “effectiveness” of “planetary technology” and “world 
economy”: “If the world is a world today, then it is primarily a world according to this 
double sign. Let us call this ecotechnics” (ibid, 133 (original emphasis)).164 The 
United States is the nation-state that Nancy identifies as the symbol of “triumphant 
ecotechnics” (ibid).165 The figure of the “sovereign State” persists in a world of 
ecotechnics (ibid). ‘War’ as police action symbolizes the demise of the sovereign 
state to the extent that wars are no longer conducted to protect, affirm or expand 
‘nation-state’ boundaries but to protect the multiple “presence” or interests of states 
which span the world (ibid, 129). The difference between the world as a collection of 
delimited sovereign states and the ‘world’ of ecotechnics is this: the ‘world’ must be 
conceived as a ‘spacing’, not dominated by sovereign ‘finishing’ (ibid, 140). This is 
the key distinction between the era of ‘sovereignty without sovereignty’ and the 
previous era marked by sovereign ‘brilliance’: it is the difference between a ‘world’ 
which manifests the “intersection of singularities” (multiple ‘presences’ of 
sovereignty), and one where the source and instrument that determines ‘ends’ of
1641 will not recount the entirety of the convincing account that Nancy gives of ‘ecotechnics’, but see 
Nancy, 2000c, 129-141 for the fullest account in Nancy’s writings. An account of ‘technology’ quite 
central to Nancy’s notion of ‘ecotechnics’ can be found in: Nancy, 1997, 41.
165 The reference to the United States is not explicit, but intimated through a reference to a sovereign 
State based on the ‘arche-law’ of its foundation and its current hegemony. The United States must be 
the nation-state Nancy is referring to given its the only current hegemonic state that can be counter­
posed to the now surpassed revolutionary project of the Soviet Union to which Nancy refers in the 
following sentence.
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individuals, nations and ‘masses’ is a sovereign excess.166 The latter, sovereignty as 
excess, a ‘brilliance’ that is made ‘present’ by exceeding the limits of finite ‘territory’ 
or the ‘normal situation’ is, according to Nancy, in decline. This is why it is 
necessary to think more rigorously how sovereignty is in the ‘world’. The multiple 
presences of sovereignty, the infinite-jinitude of sovereign presences, is the mode that 
Nancy suggests for adequately thinking sovereignty in this ‘world’.
The term ‘world’ indicates a “gathering or being-together that arises from an 
art -  a techne” (Nancy, 1997, 41, original emphasis). ‘Techne’ indicates that the 
‘world’ is always a ‘creation’ (ibid). The world has no principle, end or material 
other than itself (ibid). Nancy is explicit that as ‘techne’, ecotechnics is yet to be 
liberated from technology, economy and sovereignty (Nancy, 2000c, 140). What 
would this liberation entail? It would, in brief, entail “sovereignty as nothing” (ibid, 
141). ‘Sovereignty as nothing’ involves jettisoning modem symbolizations of 
sovereignty in “people” -  the demand of a “sovereign distinction” for everyone 
(ibid).167 The ‘nothing of sovereignty’ would involve law without foundation -  
thinking and acting without a model. Nancy acknowledges that all of this is not easily 
conceived:
It is not for us, nor for our thinking, modeled as it is on the sovereign model; it
is not for our warlike thinking. But this is certain: there is nothing on the
horizon except for an unheard-of, inconceivable task -  or war. All thinking
166 Compare the discussion in Nancy, 2000c, 108, the account of the persistence of ‘sovereign 
brilliance’, with the examination of ‘technology’ at 140-141 where Nancy presents the argument of a 
future where sovereignty is ‘Nothing’.
167 It is precisely such sovereign distinctions that we observed being invoked in the habeas corpus 
cases which considered whether U.S Courts’ jurisdiction extended to Guantanamo Bay. Jurisdiction, in 
the Federal Courts’ decisions was tied to membership in ‘political community’ or, as with the Supreme 
Court decisions, to the presence of a subject (the Custodian of the detainees) within the delimited 
territory of a Federal District Court. It is precisely this delimitation of law that Nancy seeks to 
overcome.
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that still wants to conceive of an “order”, a “world”, a “communication”, a 
“peace” is absolutely naive -  when it is not simply hypocritical. ... But 
everyone can clearly see that it is time: the disaster of sovereignty is 
sufficiently spread out, and sufficiently common, to steal everyone’s 
innocence, (ibid, 141-2)
To open a thinking of what it would mean for sovereignty to be ‘nothing’ manifests 
the outer limits of thinking on sovereignty, world, and globalisation. In Nancy’s 
thought on the ‘sense of the world’ there is clearly a call to think beyond the model of 
. sovereignty -  and indeed beyond the authority of law that is modeled on the finitude 
of such sovereignties. In the latter part of this Chapter I will return to consider how 
Nancy’s call for sovereignty as ‘Nothing’ impacts on efforts to imagine and 
implement a ‘postcolonial’ juridical order.
The possibility of a ‘postcolonial’, ‘post-imperialist’ political subject and 
juridical order beyond the model of modem sovereignty (territorially delimited by the 
nation-state and its ‘people’) has been heralded by several millennial texts. None has 
been more widely discussed than Hardt and Negri’s Empire (2000) which I will 
shortly consider. The arguments in Empire and in Negri’s previous writings appear to 
take up several of the themes that Nancy has raised. If there is to be a thinking of 
‘sovereignty without sovereignty’, and a law that is not premised on the model of a 
transcendent mode of sovereignty, then ‘Empire’, which is supposed to supercede the 
sovereignty of the ‘nation-state’ is a useful place to start.
I should stress again that the comparison of Nancy’s call for ‘sovereignty 
without sovereignty’ (sovereignty as ‘Nothing’), and Hardt and Negri’s ‘Empire’, is
224
not a comparison of like with like. There is a significant difference between a world 
‘without sovereignty’ called for by Nancy, and the persistence of a “single power that 
overdetermines” all power, which structures previous imperial competitions in a 
“unitary way”, and treats them all as “one common notion of right” -  the “new 
sovereignty” heralded by Hardt and Negri (2000, 9). This new sovereignty is a 
“supranational world power”, an imperial notion of right, which is the “framework” 
for “totalizing social processes of Empire” (ibid, 10). Rather than sovereignty as 
‘Nothing’, Hardt and Negri’s conception of ‘Empire’ characterises a world which is 
encompassed by an all-pervasive sovereign totalisation. Thus it is apt to express 
Hardt and Negri’s conception of sovereignty as the ‘finite-made-infinite’. We will see 
when we discuss the detail of their argument that ‘Empire’ is aptly described as the 
‘fmite-made-infmite’ because they assert the end of ‘limits’, enclosing frontiers or 
delimited juridical orders. This is distinct from the always singular-plural, infinite- 
finitude of sovereignty described by Nancy. Hardt and Negri’s conception of 
sovereignty, I want to argue, will not sustain an emancipatory, ‘postcolonial’ or post­
imperialist enterprise. Even though Hardt and Negri claim that ‘Empire’ is co-present 
with a social subject called the ‘multitude’ -  a global ‘collective’ which has the
capacity to launch a ‘counter-Empire’ - this formulation of ‘post-sovereign’ social
1agency fails to address the persistence of a delimited, fragmented ‘global order’. 
There is much that stands in the way of imagining a ‘post-sovereign’, post-imperial 
world. I will return below to consider the implications of sovereignty as ‘Nothing’. 
But first let us continue to figure how sovereignty may be becoming ‘worldwide’. 
This task is aided by a sustained consideration of Hardt and Negri’s assertion that 
‘Empire’ is the juridical form of global sovereignty.
168 As Derrida has pointed out, one cannot combat “head on” all sovereignty without at the same time 
threatening freedom and self-determination (Derrida, 2003b, 49). I will return to Derrida’s argument 
below.
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4.2 Enumerations of Empire
According to Hardt and Negri the decline of ‘national constitutional systems’ 
is replaced by a ‘global’ juridical category called ‘Empire’ with the U.S as a 
superpower at the pinnacle of the “pyramid” of a mixed constitution (ibid, 309). 
While the nation-state is not entirely extinct as a form of political power, it is only one 
among an emerging triumvirate of “unified global command” which includes the G7 
countries (now G8), the United Nations General Assembly, and NGOs (ibid, 309- 
314). They claim that the new imperialism of Empire is different to the colonialisms 
of old (ibid, 180, 199-200). While colonial expansion and rule deployed fixed 
ideological categories of difference, such as ‘race’, as the basis of exclusion, 
domination and destruction, the new imperialism manages and modulates difference 
in a “universal republic” which has a “boundless and inclusive architecture” (ibid, 
166). This new sovereignty of ‘Empire’ as a ‘boundless’ juridical form is only 
conceptually sustainable if the ‘limits’ which demarcate the international system of 
sovereign states is surpassed. The spatial terrain of ‘Empire’ would have to be ‘open’ 
and boundless. Moreover, ‘Empire’ as ‘worldwide’ sovereignty grossly 
underestimates the continuing significance of the nation-state as a juridical and 
political form. I will begin by giving a brief overview of the concept of ‘Empire’ and 
then consider whether ‘Empire’ reflects a model of ‘worldwide authority’. The 
critique I level at ‘Empire’ will be focused on how Hardt and Negri fail to sustain 
what they claim is its ‘postcolonial’ and ‘postimperial’ character. I will conclude my 
treatment of the concept of ‘Empire’ by arguing that the nation-state continues to be 
the principal and pervasive mode of sovereign authority, and that it is my account of
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the ‘infinite finitude’ of sovereignty that accurately discloses the character of imperial 
sovereignty.
‘Empire’ is more than a characterisation of a new imperial mode of 
sovereignty. It also invokes a new mode of ‘political community’ expressed through 
the notion of the ‘multitude’. The social body governed by Empire is no longer the 
‘people’, ‘masses’ or ‘working class’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004, xiv). It is the 
‘multitude’ which is simultaneously a constituent element of Empire and the agent 
that resists its domination.169 ‘Empire’ embodies various constituent subjectivities, 
represented through the virtual figure of the ‘multitude’ which constitutes a “mixed 
constitution” (see Hardt and Negri, 2000, 309-314; and Hardt and Negri, 2004, 219- 
227, 331-340). The multitude, as Hardt and Negri would have it, are “capable of 
autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political organisation of 
global flows and exchanges”; “the multitude will have to invent new democratic 
forms and a new constituent power that will one day take us through and beyond 
Empire” (Hardt and Negri, 2000, xv). There are then, at once, two aspects within and 
of Empire.
First, Empire is the juridical embodiment of sovereignty. It is the ‘form’ 
which ‘transcends’ and ‘represents’ its multiple constituent parts. This, to put it
169 The ‘multitude’ is a notion that Negri has developed by drawing on Spinoza’s thought. The 
‘multitude’ (multitudo) is the ‘living reality’ that is “contained within determined limits” (Negri, The 
Savage Anomaly, 187). The multitude is constitutive of these limits and always also exceeds them. 
This is manifested in the opposition between power (potentia) and Power (potestas):
potentia and potestas, power against Power. Potentia as the dynamic and constitutive inherence 
of the single in the multiplicity, of mind in the body, of freedom in necessity -  power against 
Power -  where postestas is presented as the subordination of the multiplicity, of the mind, of 
freedom, and of potentia. (ibid, 190-91)
The conundrum raised by the notion of the ‘multitude’, one that is beyond the scope of my analysis to 
resolve, is how a ‘multitude’ which is ‘yet to come’ or only emerging can constitute an Empire which 
is already a form of sovereign power that governs the world.
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crudely, is the ‘undesirable’ part of ‘Empire’ which must be overcome. Second, 
Empire also embodies the constituent power of the ‘multitude’. Empire is thus an 
‘immanent’ expression of the power of the ‘multitude’:
The plane of immanence is the one on which the powers of singularity are 
realised and the one on which the truth of the new humanity is determined 
historically, technically, and politically. For this very fact, because there 
cannot be any external mediation, the singular is presented as the multitude. 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000, 73)
The ‘multitude’ is a collection of singularities whose ‘desire’ is thwarted when it is 
mediated by a form of power as sovereignty (as Empire). But this unmediated 
immanent power of the multitude must be expressed, be re-presented, if it is to take 
some political form other than ‘Empire’. Hardt and Negri do not offer an alternative 
expression of the multitude’s immanent power.170 As Rasch points out, the multitude 
(immanent power) appeal to Empire (transcendent power) when the multitude claim 
‘rights’ of global citizenship, a ‘social wage’, freedom of movement, and 
reappropriation of the fruits of production (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 400, 403, 405-6; 
Rasch, 2004, 115). There are then several conceptual and political difficulties with 
imagining the ‘multitude’ as at once constitutive of Empire, against a sovereign 
‘form’ which transcends its immanent power, and nonetheless making claims that can 
only be expressed or guaranteed by a transcendent sovereign entity.
In their recent book, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age o f Empire 
(2004), Hardt and Negri attempt to address the criticisms levelled at Empire, and 
more specifically the criticisms that the ‘multitude’ is a concept that cannot be given
170 See Rasch, 2004, 113-116, for a critique of the opposition of ‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent’ forms 
of sovereignty in Hardt and Negri’s Empire.
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any sustained content. They retort by explaining that the ‘multitude’ can be 
conceived in two different (temporal) ways -  the first ‘ontological’ and the second 
‘historical’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004, 221). The ‘multitude’ is thus “always-already 
and not yet” (ibid, 222) -  a rejoinder that seems to repeat the problem rather than 
address it. The multitude at once manifests the ontology of ‘Empire’ and is also a 
historical notion of the global ‘common’ which is still emerging. The ‘ontological’ 
notion of multitude is informed by Spinoza’s conception of freedom, derived from 
reason and passion, which is absolute. This absolute expression of freedom is the 
human propensity to refuse authority -  a “faculty of freedom” which has driven 
innumerable revolts and revolutions (ibid). The ‘multitude’ which is ‘not yet’, 
already exists as a “real potential” (ibid, 222). This ‘multitude’ needs a ‘political 
project’ to bring it into being (ibid, 221). In this formulation of the multitude as 
‘historical’ it is possible to see the distinction between power as potentia and potestas 
referred to above. The relationship between the multitude (potentia) and Empire 
(potestas) is such that the former both constitutes and seeks to overcome the latter. 
For Hardt and Negri, the multitude is thus both ontological, always already a 
singularity that seeks freedom and refuses authority, and historical, a teleological 
project that is yet to be realised.
What I have just set out are the basic tenets of Hardt and Negri’s thesis on 
‘Empire’ and the ‘multitude’. As my task in this Chapter is to examine the character 
of imperial sovereignty, I will confine the rest of the engagement with Hardt and 
Negri’s account of ‘Empire’ to the question of whether sovereignty has indeed 
become ‘worldwide’. That is, I will address whether sovereignty has surpassed its 
(ever uncertain) ‘ground’ in the nation-state. Moreover, I will continue to compare
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Nancy’s account of authority becoming ‘worldwide’ with the assertion that ‘Empire’ 
marks the end of the nation-state. This discussion, as I highlighted earlier, is a 
precursor to considering how sovereignty can indeed be ‘Nothing’, and what it would 
mean for the place of power to be ‘empty’.
4.2.1 ‘Empire’ as ‘Worldwide’ Authority?
Nancy has explicitly considered whether sovereignty is currently in transition
171 • •to ‘empire’. Here I will consider Nancy’s treatment of ‘empire’ and distinguish it 
from Hardt and Negri’s claims. In “Of Being Singular Plural”, Nancy cites Antonio 
Negri with approval (Nancy, 2000b, 36, n. 42). With Negri, Nancy identifies the 
“present transformation in “political space” as a transition toward “empire” (ibid, 36). 
The notion of ‘empire’ signifies two things for Nancy:
(1) domination without sovereignty (without the elaboration of such a 
concept); and (2) the distancing, spacing, and plurality opposed to the 
concentration of interiority required by political sovereignty, (ibid)
Nancy’s focus on ‘political spacing’ as the approach to ‘empire’ is crucial. It is 
consistent with his conceptualisation of ‘political space’ as the place where being is 
exposed - where existence discloses its ontology as the singular plural spacing of 
beings.172 His concern has been to ‘retreat’ the political as a ‘spacing’, relation, 
sharing and exposure that reveals the ‘singular plural’ of being, the ‘being-with’, as 
the ontology of existence.173 He has elaborated this thought of Being in relation to the
171 The upper-case ‘Empire’ will only be used when referring to Hardt and Negri’s concept of 
sovereignty developed in Empire (2000).
172 Recall here the extensive discussion of Nancy in Chapter One -  and consider particularly Nancy, 
1991, 2000b, 2000c.
173 This was elaborated in Chapter One as Nancy’s call for a ‘non-sovereign’ spacing of the world 
where the archaism of sovereignty is jettisoned. What this involves, at the very least, is an end to the
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concept of ‘world’, and done so in a manner cognisant of sovereignty and ‘empire’. 
When Nancy claims that ‘empire’ involves ‘domination without sovereignty’ (in the 
passage quoted above) he is asserting the end of elaborations of sovereignty through 
the essences of ‘nation’, ‘people’, property, humanity, or community, where each of 
these is treated as a substance which symbolises or gives content to sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is becoming exhausted because it is no longer convincing to assert that it 
is a ‘totalisation’ that has a secure substance.
Nancy is asserting a ‘transition’ to ‘empire’ and not ‘empire’ as an 
accomplishment. However, is it possible to claim that the dominations of ‘empire’ 
are indeed without sovereignty? Has empire emerged as a ‘global’ spacing in the 
sense Nancy intended in his second attribute of ‘empire’ - the relation of plural 
singularities with no concentrated, discrete interiority? Empire still entails rule by 
multiple sovereign entities - ‘market states’ (Bobbitt, 2002) and particular ‘nations’ 
which, though positioned ‘within’ a particular territory, extend their rule beyond the 
‘limit’ of a particular nation-state. The carrier of this configuration of nation, as 
Fitzpatrick has argued, is imperialism (Fitzpatrick, 2001, 146).174 As we will see, 
Nancy also accepts that this ‘spacing’ of sovereignties is not surpassed. He insists 
that authority based on a notion of sovereignty which has some discrete ‘political 
interiority’ cannot be sustained (see quote above -  Nancy, 2000b, 36. n. 42). The end
conceptualisation of political space as an ‘attainment, accomplishment, achievement or finishing’ 
(Nancy, 2000c, 139). I will not repeat the exposition of Nancy here.
My discussion of Nancy in this Chapter should be read as an engagement with the nature of 
imperialism and empire as the primary focus. I will relate Nancy’s arguments to the extent that they 
relate to the nature of sovereignty in what is apparently a new epoch of imperialism and empire. 
Though I see Nancy’s arguments as particularly helpful for framing the question of sovereignty in 
empire, I should not be read as accepting them without question. I will raise my concerns with 
Nancy’s formulations below.
1741 will elaborate this argument through Fitzpatrick (2001) and Bobbitt (2002), below.
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of sovereignty and the emergence of ‘empire’ are to be observed through the sources 
of ‘sense’ or authority which are now ‘worldwide’.
The ‘spacing of empire’ is a problem which Nancy poses in light of the 
impossibility of delineating a source of ‘sense’ (authority) which is either clearly 
inside or outside a particular ‘political space’ (Nancy, 1997, 5-6). For instance, 
‘Occidental culture’ has for many centuries distinguished its source of ‘sense’, 
‘logos’, from those ‘others’ who configure their ‘sense of the world’ through ‘myth’ 
(ibid, 6). But Nancy argues that it is no longer possible to claim that the “we” of 
Occidental culture can access a ‘world’ (a spacing) which has been designated the 
“world of myth” (ibid). Nor is it possible to say what is anterior or exterior to the 
Occident (ibid). The ‘presence’, the finitude of “being-z'w, being-for, being-fey” (the 
various categories which delimit being-in-common through an essence) needs to be 
subverted by a thinking of ‘world’ as “being toward’ (ibid, 8, original emphasis).
Does Nancy’s thinking on ‘empire’ show the way to overcoming a world of 
‘political spacing’ delimited by fragmented sovereignties and dominant Sovereigns in 
the form of the nation-state? As Fitzpatrick has argued, it is too simplistic to claim 
that ‘nation’ is always and only the ‘nation of blood and soil’ (Fitzpatrick, 2001, 146). 
It cannot only ‘be’ this -  for ‘nation’ is also “oriented towards the universal” (ibid). 
But this “extraversion” of nation cannot be “unless it is particularly instantiated” 
(ibid). The extension beyond must come from a particular place. A singular 
sovereignty and its law is embodied in ‘nation’ -  but can only exist ‘in-between’ its 
particular and universal registers (ibid). Imperialism is the ‘carrier of this 
configuration’ (ibid). It is through imperialism that (occidental) sovereignty and law
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can be both particular and universal. As we will see, this configuration of law (and 
sovereignty) as ‘in-between’ a particular natipn and its ‘outside’ -  occupying the 
place of a now familiar ‘limit’ which contains what is within but also opens to its 
outside -  is refuted by Hardt and Negri’s when they assert the emergence of ‘Empire’. 
For Hardt and Negri, it is precisely the particularity of an imperialism grounded in a 
bounded place which has been surpassed by Empire. I will insist, along with 
Fitzpatrick, that an ‘open frontier’, rule without limits, is an impossibility.
To summarise, then, the significant difference between Nancy, and Hardt and
Negri in relation to the emergence of ‘empire/Empire’ is that Nancy seeks a ‘spacing’
of the ‘world’ which is not determined by this or that ‘essence’ of sovereignty as
‘people’, property, ‘nation’, the ‘human’ of human rights and so on. Hardt and Negri
assert the disillusion of limits. For them the ‘open frontier’ of ‘Empire’ (which I will
consider in more detail shortly) is devoid of what a ‘frontier’ would ordinarily exist to
maintain: some state or condition which is contained within. Nancy more rigorously
thinks the question of the ‘limit’. For him a juridical order and community must be
considered through a ‘limit’ (of sovereign power for instance) which cannot be
sustained as a delimited, finite entity because the limit is always an ‘exposure’ across
and beyond the limit.175 That is not to say that the ‘limit’ can be simply done away
with. The existence of a plurality of beings and the sovereignties which symbolise
their community, occupy the space of a limit. The ‘world’ is a spacing of ever-
transgressed limits. The ‘trace’ of this transgression of limits is what reveals the
singular-plural ‘world’, as I stressed above through Nancy (section 4.1.1, above).
Finitude persists in and through the infinite exposure and sharing which takes place at
175 This configuration of a ‘nation’ and its law contained within a ‘limit’ but ever open to its beyond, a 
configuration in-between particular and universal carried through imperialism, has been characterised 
by Fitzpatrick and discussed above.
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the transgression of limits. Existence is inflnite-flnitude.176 This thinking reveals the 
character of ‘worldwide’ authority where ‘sovereignty is without sovereignty’ -  
without the essences which apparently guaranteed the discreet delimitation of 
monistic conceptions of sovereignty. We observe the emergence of this ‘sovereignty 
without sovereignty’ in Nancy’s discussion of globalisation. The proliferation of 
‘ecotechnics’, Nancy’s mode of giving content to mondialisation (globalisation), 
requires the existence of a sovereign state. The sovereign nation-state is a particular 
singularity which is made present in and through the transgression of its limits.
By now we should be clear about the difference between the two approaches 
to the sovereignty of ‘empire/Empire’ - of Nancy on the one hand and Hardt and 
Negri on the other. The former seeks the ‘end of sovereignty’ but is cognisant of the 
persistence of sovereign limits (the infinite-finitude of sovereignty). The latter assert 
an overarching sovereignty that is without limits (sovereignty as the finite-made- 
infinite). Which of these thinkers equips us with the better approach to imagine a 
‘postcolonial’ or ‘postimperial’ sovereignty? Will sovereignty simply dissipate with 
the ‘becoming worldwide’ of authority? Can sovereignty as ‘nothing’ sustain a 
‘postcolonial’ and anti-imperial political and juridical order? I will approach these 
questions by first arguing that Hardt and Negri’s assertion that the ‘global 
sovereignty’ of ‘Empire’ is both ‘postcolonial’ and ‘postimperialist’ cannot be 
sustained. I will then consider whether an emancipatory, ‘postcolonial’, anti-imperial 
politics can be sustained or facilitated by Nancy’s call for an ‘end of sovereignty’.
176 The phrase ‘infinite-finitude’ captures the ‘relation’ and ‘exposure’ across limits of being(s). This 
was developed in Chapter One through Nancy’s notion of ‘being singular plural’.
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4.2.2 ‘Empire’ as ‘Postcolonial’ and ‘Post-imperialist’?
A central claim made by Hardt and Negri is that Empire is “postcolonial and 
postimperialist” (9). My focus here is on undermining their assertion that an 
imperialist notion of Empire manifests a new form of sovereignty which has 
surpassed the limit of the ‘nation-state’. How does their conceptualisation of the 
American colonial frontier as a “utopia of open spaces” (167, 169) condition and 
ultimately damage their claim that the new juridical category of ‘Empire’ has no 
outside or is without limits? For Hardt and Negri Empire is ‘postimperialist’ in the 
sense that it manifests the end of spatially delimited juridical limits and the projection 
of authority from a particular ‘place’ as was the case with colonialism and 
imperialism. As my enquiry has focussed consistently on the question of ‘limits’, on 
the finitude of sovereignty, the apparent emergence of a ‘postcolonial’ and 
‘postimperial’ juridical concept of sovereignty ‘without limits’ must be interrogated. 
The possibility of a ‘postcolonial’, ‘postimperial’ sovereignty and juridical order was 
the point of departure of this enquiry. An engagement with Hardt and Negri’s claim 
that ‘imperialism’ has been surpassed by ‘imperial sovereignty’, a distinction I shall 
shortly elaborate, will return us to the question of the im-possibility of ‘postcolonial 
sovereignty’.
At the heart of the foundation of the American Republic, the open society 
which Hardt and Negri claim is becoming worldwide, was the genocidal exclusion of 
native peoples. This is the foundational exclusion that Hardt and Negri underplay in 
their conception of the frontier as an “open space of democracy” (170). This 
foundational ‘division’, the usurpation of native peoples’ land and their genocidal 
exclusion from the ‘new republic’, I will argue, is the exclusion (the delimitation) that
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in-forms an ‘Empire’ founded on the American Republic. The colonial frontier and 
the new fronts of imperial expansion undermine the claim that the new imperial 
sovereignty of Empire has no ‘outside’. Though Hardt and Negri acknowledge that 
the “open terrain was limited” (172), that “power ran up against its spatial limits” 
(173), they insist on an alternative history of the republic which becomes the history 
of ‘Empire’ as a sovereign formation that is “imperial and not imperialist” (182). The 
key feature of the ‘imperial and not imperialist’ sovereign formation is that “in 
contrast to imperialism’s project to always spread its power linearly in closed spaces 
and invade, destroy, and subsume subject countries within its sovereignty” the U.S 
constitutional project rearticulates an open space “reinventing incessantly diverse and 
singular relations in networks across an unbounded terrain” (ibid).
According to Hardt and Negri, Empire is “altogether different from
‘imperialism’” (xii). They assert the “end of colonialism” and the “declining powers
of the nation” as indicative of the passage from the paradigm of modem sovereignty
to the paradigm of “imperial sovereignty” (137). While ‘old’ forms of imperialisms
were extensions of the sovereignty of the “European nation-states beyond their
boundaries”, Empire is “imperial” but not “imperialist” (xii, xiv). The character of
being ‘imperial’ but not ‘imperialist’ is explained by invoking the United States
Constitution, not only the formal Constitution reflected in the written document, but
*
the “material constitution” - that is, “the continuous formation and re-formation of the 
composition of social forces” (xiv). Such a widely defined “material constitution” 
immediately sounds like a rather amorphous and ungraspable reference to ‘everything 
there is’. Empire is something ‘new’, distinct from ‘old imperialisms, and a ‘rule 
without limits’ which encompasses a “spatial totality” (xiv). It is an order that
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“suspends history” and fixes the existing state for “eternity” (ibid). From the 
perspective of Empire, it emerges at the “end of history” or is a regime with “no 
temporal boundaries” (xiv-xv).
Hardt and Negri set their thesis against ‘postcolonial’ accounts which, on their 
assertion, still labour with an unsound account of the dialectical relation between an 
imperial Occidental sovereign and its others (114-115). Postcolonial theorists fail to 
grasp this new imperialist sovereignty because they are “combating the remnants of 
past forms of domination” (138, 146).177 Modes of being which are disclosed by 
‘postcolonial’ and ‘postmodern’ theorists through notions such as ‘hybridity’ and 
‘ambivalence’ point towards ‘Empire’ (138-139). The affirmation of fragmented 
social identities and the deconstruction of binary oppositions have the potential to
i
defy totalising forms of sovereign power (139). However, these theorists are 
apparently blind to the paradigmatic changes in sovereignty that their observations 
trace (139). The main flaw which Hardt and Negri attribute to ‘postcolonial’ and 
‘postmodern’ theorists is that they are wedded to overcoming the dialectical processes 
of identity formation by deconstructing the binary oppositions which are 
hierarchically arranged (139-146). As the ‘world market’ is apparently ‘anti- 
essential’ and ‘anti-foundational’ -  it must be seen as overwhelming binary division 
and promoting “infinite multiplicity” (150). In other words, ‘postcolonial’ and 
‘postmodern’ theorists are tackling an enemy, both epistemological and political, 
which no longer exists (137).
177 This is a blatant misreading of the multiple meanings of the term ‘postcolonial’ and the body of 
work it invokes -  see Ashcroft (2001, 7-13) for a corrective.
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The contribution of ‘postcolonial’ theorists to conceiving modes of resisting 
imperial domination is far more significant than the influence which Hardt and Negri 
grant them. By identifying the ‘ambivalence’ which ‘unsettles’ the assertions of 
sovereignty over the colonial territories of European colonial powers, for instance, 
‘postcolonial’ and ‘postmodern’ theorists are doing either or both of the following: 
indicating that the identity of a ‘people’ or ‘nation’ has no secure presence or 
substance, and thus no firm hierarchy between coloniser and colonised. The ‘title’ of 
the coloniser’s sovereignty over territory is deconstructed to reveal the ‘trace’ of 
founding exclusions which undermine the legitimacy and thus authority of the 
coloniser’s sovereign right to territory.178 Secondly, ‘postcolonial’ and ‘postmodern’ 
theorists are not merely opposing the binary opposite of a colonised ‘margin’ to its 
colonial centre. As Fitzpatrick has pointed out, what ‘postcolonial’ theory offers is an 
insight into what is resistant within the colonial:
The very force of the postcolonial comes from its integral yet resistant relation 
to the colonial, and from its thence revealing what is constituently of, and yet 
denied by, that selfsame colonial condition. This is not the revelation of some 
marginal matter but, rather, the disclosure of the very structuring ... of the 
colonial. (Fitzpatrick, 2004b, 3)
Postcolonial theory points to an ambivalence within colonial assertions and gestures, 
such as the usurpation of indigenous peoples’ territories and the establishment of a
• 170law that must later perfect an always imperfectable sovereign event. Pointing to 
what resists within the coloniser’s assertions unsettles the footing on which the 
colonial enterprise is grounded. A useful example to substantiate this point, in
1781 would situate my approach to de-positioning the colonial sovereign event in Australia among these 
‘postcolonial’ interventions. I will shortly provide yet another example by referring to Fitzpatrick’s 
discussion of the assertion of colonial sovereignty over the territory that later became the United States.
179 My treatment of Mabo (No 2) in Chapters One and Two extensively discussed such an instance.
238
addition to the Australian ‘postcolonial’ enterprise discussed extensively in the first 
two Chapters, can be found in the (not too) ‘open’ frontier of the United States from 
which Hardt and Negri draw so much inspiration.
As the U.S colonial frontier expanded, the Supreme Court of the U.S 
determined whether Indian Nations had the capacity to hold and alienate property, and
whether the territory of the United States was acquired by ‘discovery’ or
1 80‘conquest’. In Johnson v M ’Intosh, Marshall CJ recognised that native people had 
‘natural rights’ in their land ((1823) at 563; see discussion in Fitzpatrick (2001a, 166- 
170). But then the native people had to be derided, rendered beyond the pail of 
civilisation in order to ensure that the rights and privileges which go with being 
proprietors, the capacity to possess title and alienate land, were denied them. As 
Fitzpatrick explains, there is a “double ambivalence” -  the native people have natural 
rights to property but at the same time could not be included by recognition of their 
natural rights as they were savages who could not be assimilated (ibid, 168). This 
first ambivalence facilitates the denial of native peoples’ natural rights to property. 
But this denial haunts the ‘conquest’ that must be sustained in order to secure 
European sovereignty over the territory -  the same sovereignty later inherited by the 
United States. This results in the second ambivalence - there can be no conquest if 
the conquered people cannot be assimilated, or governed as a distinct people (ibid). 
There must and cannot be a conquest to secure sovereignty over a territory. The 
assertion that ‘imperial sovereignty’ exercised in the American frontier is ‘open’, that
180 Notable among these is the decision of Marshall CJ in Johnson v M ’Intosh (1823). See also 
Cherokee Nation v Georgia (1831). A thorough discussion of these cases is to be found in Fitzpatrick 
(2001, 166-175).
My reference to the Indian cases is in no way intended be an encapsulation of their many 
complexities. I refer to them here in order to refute Hardt and Negri’s assertion that the ‘ambivalence’ 
at the heart of imperial sovereignty which ‘postcolonial’ theorists have pointed to is superfluous for 
understanding empire.
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it is evidence of a Republican principle without an ‘outside’, is undermined by the 
‘ambivalence’ at the heart of imperial sovereignty which ‘postcolonial’ theorists like 
Fitzpatrick have identified.
The new dialectic which Hardt and Negri implicitly rely on, despite their 
Deleuze-inspired proclamation against such dialectical structures (which, remember, 
was the folly of ‘postcolonial’ theorists) is between a “principle of expansion” and 
‘limitation and control’ (165-66). ‘Empire’ is the universalisation of the expansionist 
republic. It is the imperial expansion that has “nothing to do with imperialism” or 
with state organisms designed for “conquest, pillage, genocide, colonization, and 
slavery”. (166-67). The genocide of Native Americans who were placed outside the 
Constitution is merely presented as an “internal contradiction” given African 
Americans were posed within it (170). Let’s look more closely, then, at the 
in/finitude of ‘imperial sovereignty’ which in my view insistently conditions any 
outward expansion.
The ‘new imperial sovereignty’ which Hardt and Negri assert to be different 
from the ‘European’ form of modem sovereignty is “radically democratic”, open and 
engaged in a “continuous process of expansion” (169). This “frontier of liberty”, the 
“utopia of open spaces” (ibid) must contend, however, with the subordination of 
Native Americans in the process of its formation. The account of this subordination is 
too readily posed in those dialectical terms that Hardt and Negri reserved for 
misguided ‘postcolonial’ theorists. And so the Native Americans were of a “different 
order of human beings”, “subhuman” and so treated like the flora and fauna (169- 
170). The “war” against the natural environment, its harsh winters, which had to be
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withstood, was also the approach to combating the native inhabitants (ibid). The 
paradox presented by this ‘utopia of open space’ is that it was constitutively closed to 
Native Americans. Hardt and Negri concede that Native Anericans:
had to be excluded from the terrain to open its spaces and make expansion 
possible. If they had been recognised there would have been no real frontier 
on the continent and no open spaces to fill. They existed outside the 
Constitution as its negative foundation. (170)
It is worth emphasising here that the ‘frontier of liberty’ and the ‘utopia of open 
space’ was not a condition to be achieved by perfecting the Constitution. The ‘radical 
democratic’ character of the ‘new imperial sovereignty’ is not a telos that was 
gradually achieved or remains to be accomplished. Hardt and Negri’s point is that the 
structure (if such is still permitted) of imperial sovereignty was always already ‘open’, 
infinite, expansive, and without borders. The U.S Constitution is imperial and not 
imperialist because:
in contrast to imperialism’s project always to spread its power linearly in 
closed spaces and invade, destroy, and subsume subject countries within its 
sovereignty ... the U.S constitutional project is constmcted on the model of 
rearticulating an open space and reinventing incessantly diverse and singular 
relations in networks across an unbounded terrain. (182)
This is what gives rise to the paradox in their account. The foundation of ‘Empire’ is 
at once produced by the familiar dialectical negation of the native ‘other’, and at the 
same time based on a multiplicity of singular relations which form networks in an 
unbounded terrain. The ‘frontier’ is at once ‘enclosed’ against its constitutive other 
and always‘open’.
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This new imperial sovereignty, then, like the sovereign variants observed in 
‘postcolonial’ Australia and in the context of indefinite detention of persons held in 
Guantanamo Bay, is at once finite and infinite. Imperial sovereignty cannot ‘be’ 
without its foundational negation. Imperial sovereignty is not only constituted by 
divisions within the Unites States. The new imperial sovereignty which Hardt and 
Negri stressed was distinct from ‘old’ colonialisms -  with their closed spaces, 
invasions, colonies etc -  also featured in U.S colonialism in the Philippines. A 
thorough account of U.S colonialism is beyond the scope of this analysis. But as 
Fitzpatrick notes, when the U.S Supreme Court came to consider whether inhabitants 
of the U.S colonies in Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico should be considered 
part of the United States, the colonised natives were, as usual, found to be “essentially 
different and as such in need of subordination and guidance” (Fitzpatrick, 2001, 176). 
These cases which are known as the Insular Cases recognised that Congress had 
powers over the colonial territories and that such powers were unrestrained by the 
Constitution (see discussion in Fitzpatrick, ibid). Far from manifesting a form of 
sovereignty which from the beginning was ‘open’ and without an ‘outside’ -  the 
United States and its Constitution, when confronted with the people of the colonised 
territories, resolved through its Supreme Court that the laws of the Constitution would 
not extend to people of these races with their ‘different’ habits, laws and customs 
(ibid, 177). Although U.S sovereignty was formed through expansion, commencing 
with the brutal frontier where it encountered and suppressed its native peoples, this 
expansion was never ‘open’ and without borders. Infinite openness was always 
already finite.
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Sovereign power is in constant movement across ‘limits’. The infinite 
extension of sovereign power, such as in the subordination of native peoples and the 
laws applicable in the colonial territories of the United States, is an ambivalent 
expansion where the finitude of the imperial ‘nation’ and its law continues to be 
delimited and differentiated from the colonised people encountered in such expansion. 
This ambivalence results from the infinite-finitude of imperial sovereignty. This 
ambivalence and the form in which the im-possible ‘limit’ persists can be observed by 
considering the persistence of the nation-state as a political and juridical form.
4.3 Empire and the End of the Nation-State?
The ‘nation-state’ is the carrier of ‘nationalism’ -  a nationalism that is 
expressed as a delimited sovereign entity. The persistence of a delimited sovereignty 
as the expression and symbolisation of a particular political community -  a 
community that more specifically takes the form of the ‘nation’ - has been observed in 
several contexts discussed in preceding Chapters. ‘Nation’ is an evasive notion that 
signifies a “radical variety” of “purposes, histories, ideologies and sustaining myths” 
(Fitzpatrick, 2001a, 112-113). In spite of this variation in content, and perhaps 
because of it, ‘nation’ also has a “universalist thrust” (ibid, 113). In numerous 
contexts such decolonisation, in the articulation of ‘postcolonial’ renewal in colonial 
settler societies (such as Australia), and in the ‘emerging’ nation-states of the former 
Soviet Union, it is ‘nation’ that offers a medium for expressing ‘self-determination’. 
The essences and unities by which the sovereignty of ‘nation’ is expressed, as a 
monistic sovereign or ‘one law of the land’ for instance, has been steadily undermined 
in much of this thesis. The focus here is on examining the persistence of the ‘nation­
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state’ in a time of ‘globalisation’ and the emergence of ‘Empire’. Understanding how 
and why the ‘nation-state’ persists as a ‘particular’ form of political and juridical 
structure will facilitate will a return to assessing the possibility of an ‘end of 
sovereignty’ proposed by Nancy.
What forms ‘nation’, “linking and mediating between its universal and 
particular dimensions” is “in various idioms a ‘state of law” ” (ibid, 111). In 
preceding Chapters, I have expressed the at once delimited and universally 
extraverted character of the sovereign nation-state. I have characterised this as the at 
once ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ character attributed to sovereignty by law. As we observed 
in the attempt in Australia to correct the excesses of an ‘old colonial’ sovereign in 
order to create a ‘postcolonial’ nation, and in the context of the warring expansions of 
a neo-imperial United States, it is ‘law’ that serves to express both the delimitedness 
and illimitability of a sovereign that thus cannot be solely particular or universal. The 
finite and infinite character of sovereignty has been challenged by Hardt and Negri 
who assert that the ‘new’ imperial sovereignty is one without limits -  ‘Empire’ is an 
‘open frontier’ with no ‘outside’. I have confronted this claim in the preceding 
discussion by pointing out the variety of ways in which the model for the ‘new’ 
sovereignty of ‘Empire’, the formal and material constitution of the United States, 
was from its colonial outset and imperial extraversions, constituted through the 
negation of the native peoples who occupied the territories that were subject to 
imperial rule. In this section I want to dispel the claim that the nation-state has been
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superseded (see for example MacCormick (1999), Ch. 8; Hardt and Negri (2000); 
Bauman (2002)).181
A “boundless imagination” may give content to ‘nation’ as a universal that is 
impossible to limit (Fitzpatrick, 2001a, 119, see generally 114-120). An infinite 
number of ties may be presented as the basis for the coherence of ‘nation’. On the 
other hand, adherence to ‘human rights’ is “by now the pervasive criteria by which a 
nation’s proximity to the horizon of the universal may be gauged” (ibid, 120).182 Any 
other instantiation is liable to be held in check, now with the sanction of a ‘pre­
emptive strike’, by the other universal that enables ‘nation’ -  the ‘international 
community’ of nations (ibid, 121). Indeed, military interventions in Kosovo in 1996 
and Iraq in 2003 were undertaken in the name of ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ by a 
‘global’ policing power usurped from the ‘community of nations’ by a nation-state, 
the remaining Super Power and its allies (see Gregory 2004). The finitude or 
particular delimitation of governable entities that Hardt and Negri claim has been 
surpassed is more palpable, then, if we consider how the ‘nation-state’ persists in an 
era of ‘globalisation’. For this purpose I will consider two perspectives that insist on 
the continuity of the ‘nation-state’ -  both cognisant of the tendencies which inform 
Hardt and Negri’s assertion that the ‘nation-state’ is superseded in ‘Empire’.
181 It is beyond the scope of my analysis to review the large literature on ‘nation’ , ‘nationalism’, and 
the relation of these to the ‘state’: see for instance, Gellner (1983); Anderson (1991); Kymlicka (1989) 
and Kymlicka (1995). This literature proliferated particularly after the liberal democratic nation-state 
embraced ‘multiculturalism’. The traditional content given to the ‘nation’ was that of ‘people’ unified 
by their ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’. The existence of a plurality of communities within a ‘nation’ was brought 
to light by the ‘new social movements’ in the 1960s and 1970s. These movements historicised notions 
of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ and challenged the essentialisms that gave content to these concepts. This led 
to a reassessment of the character of a ‘nation’ and the role of the state in the face of the plurality of 
identities. Much of this literature has been discussed and critiqued by Fitzpatrick (2001a, Ch 4). I rely 
here on Fitzpatrick’s critical engagement with this literature, and will more explicitly draw on his 
insights in what follows.
182 The attachment of the universal to the particular, of universal human rights to a ‘nation-state’ which 
guarantees them, was emphasised with the force of a detailed historical account by Hannah Arendt 
(1958), Ch. 9. In the next section I will consider how the persistence of this relation between (human 
rights) law and the ‘nation-state’ stands in the way of calling for an ‘end of sovereignty’.
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Ellen Meiksins Wood in Empire o f Capital (2003) challenges the conventional 
view propounded by critics of ‘globalisation’ who direct their opposition at 
transnational corporations such as Nike, McDonald’s and Monsanto (Wood, 2003, 
137-142). There is an assumption among these critics that the role performed by the 
nation-state for capital -  the provision of a Taw’ that regulates social, administrative 
and property relations for instance, is performed by a lex mercatoria (‘mercantile 
law’) that is not grounded in national law or in a system of international regulation.183 
It is certainly true that commercial transactions which transcend the boundaries of the 
nation-state are proliferating. These transactions are regulated by standardised 
contracts developed by ‘professional associations’ which are not necessarily rooted in 
any particular legal order (see Teubner 1997, 15, cited and critiqued by Fitzpatrick, 
2001a, 203-04). Wood argues that despite these modes of regularising corporate 
operations, “no transnational agency, has even begun to replace the nation state as an 
administrative and coercive guarantor of social order, property relations, stability or 
contractual predictability, or any of the other basic conditions required by capital in its 
everyday life” (Wood, 2003, 139). For Wood the essence of ‘globalisation’ is a 
global economy administered by ‘nation states’ (ibid, 141). ‘Globalisation’ is not 
accompanied by a “global state” or “global sovereignty”.
Wood’s view is confirmed by an ‘insider’ perspective from Phillip Bobbitt in 
his influential book The Shield o f Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History
183 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to canvass all the arguments of proponents of lex mercatoria. 
One influential proponent is Gunter Teubner (1997). For useful summation and critique of Teubner 
and other proponents of lex mercatoria as ‘global law’, see Fitzpatrick (2001a, 203-207).
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1 SA(2002). Bobbitt announces the emergence of the ‘new constitutional order’ of the 
‘market-state’ as a mode of governance that supersedes the nation-state (Bobbitt, 
xxvii, 228-242). While the function of law in the nation-state was “process oriented”, 
directed at generating impartial rules and regulations to promote desirable behaviour, 
the ‘market state’ uses “incentive structures” and “draconian penalties” to prevent the 
“social instability that threatens material well-being” (ibid, 229).185 Governance is 
easier in the ‘market state’ as its ambitions are smaller. Less is demanded by it and 
less can be asked of it. It features an indifference to ‘justice’ as there is an acceptance 
that there is no singular set of moral values that can condition it (ibid, 230). 
Moreover, there is an acceptance that there is no ‘polity’ or ‘people’ that adhere to 
fundamental values particular to them (ibid). The ‘market state’, then, is a mode of 
the state that can at once embrace ‘multiculturalism’ and be indifferent to whether a 
‘polity’ as a whole is able to exercise the ‘choice’ that the state sustains. Many of the 
characteristics of the ‘market state’ embrace the criticisms and proposals of critical 
legal theorists, feminism and other social movements. The indeterminacy of ‘justice’, 
the absence of a singular essence that can condition and regulate community, the 
impossible myths that sustained ‘nation’ -  all these can be acknowledged and 
encompassed in a mode of ‘governance’ where each ‘market state’ promises to 
maximise the opportunity of its members. Bobbitt’s arguments sustain the view that, 
far from withering away, the state is undergoing one of its many transformations.
I have elaborated the singular-plural (in-fmite) spacing of sovereignties by 
interrogating accounts of ‘worldwide’ sovereign authority which assert that ‘global’
184 For many years Phillip Bobbitt was adviser to the White House, U.S State Department, and held 
posts in the U.S National Security Council. He has also been the Senior Director of Strategic Planning 
in Democratic and Republican Administrations.
185 Examples o f this would be the “target” setting mode of the state, along with draconian penalties for 
petty offences ( ‘three strikes and you are in’).
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imperial sovereignty has no ‘outside’. My discussion of these assertions was pre­
figured by the discussion of Nancy’s nuanced account of transformations in the source 
of authority, and thus of ‘sense’ or ‘value’ in the ‘world’. The possibility of a 
transcendent ‘beyond’ as the source of authority has dissipated. This is an account of 
authority that challenges the ‘theologicopolitical’ structure of modem sovereignty. 
That is, the structure of political authority can no longer be sustained by a 
transcendent power that is either the source of authority - as the God-King, or as the 
‘people’ unified in the State. If authority now ‘opens itself up within the world’ 
(Nancy, 1997, 55), then an immanent or ‘transimmanent’ source of sovereign 
authority must also be possible. It is this possibility that I discussed through Nancy 
and Hardt and Negri. In their enumerations of ‘empire/Empire’ we observed a drive 
to think sovereignty without domination. Indeed for Nancy it was a case of thinking 
sovereignty without the elaboration of such a concept (Nancy, 2000b, 36). For 
Nancy, sovereignty needs to be thought as a ‘spacing’ or plurality rather than the 
current mode of political sovereignty as accomplished ‘interiority’ (ibid). The 
concept of ‘Empire’ described by Hardt and Negri, I argued, is exemplary of the claim 
that there is an end of sovereignty or post-sovereign era. Some make this claim 
because they see a previously unlimited sovereignty now delimited by law.186 I have 
argued that the relation of sovereignty to law always already involves an exposure 
across a world of delimited singular-plural sovereignties. I have also argued through 
Fitzpatrick, Wood, and Bobbitt, that the nation-state persists. The claim that a
186 Neil MacCormick for instance claims that we are observing the end of the sovereign state given the 
legal limitations on sovereign states imposed by the European Union and its laws (MacCormick, 1999, 
Ch. 8). This account is based, as Loughlin has argued, on opposing a previously unlimited sovereign to 
a ‘now’ legally delimited sovereign state in the European Union. I will not pursue a critique of 
MacCormick’s position as a similar problematic is dealt with previously in my treatment of the 
impossibility of monistic sovereignty in the ‘postcolonial’ context of Australia (See treatment of Mabo 
(No 2) in Chapter One, and discussion of the sovereign/legal ‘relation of exception’ in Chapter Three). 
For a useful account and critique of MacCormick, see Loughlin, 2003, 75-6.
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particular sovereignty has become ‘worldwide’ -  that a certain finitude has been made 
infinite -  has been extensively discussed and undermined in this Chapter. The task 
now is to consolidate my conclusion that it is the ‘infinite-finitude’ of imperial 
sovereignty that reveals the character of ‘sovereignty as ‘Nothing’.
4.4 Sovereignty as ‘Nothing’
In the preceding discussion I have consistently made the point that imperial 
sovereignty with no outside -  an overarching sovereignty that supersedes a system of 
nation-states is impossible. I have characterised this impossibility of a fully 
globalised sovereign power -  the impossibility of ‘worldwide’ authority -  through 
what I have termed the infinite-flnitude of sovereignty. The infinite-finitude of 
sovereignty connotes the singular-plural spacing of ‘sovereign’ distributions in the 
‘world’ (the multiple presences of sovereignty explained through Nancy). This is 
reinforced by the explanation of ‘world’ which I also drew from Nancy. The ‘world’ 
as the place of existence discloses the singular-plural exposure of beings. The ‘world’ 
is the trace of the exposure and transgression of ‘limits’ which separate beings and 
sovereign distributions. Imperial sovereignty as an ‘open frontier’ and limitless rule 
is an impossibility precisely because of the multiple delimitations that mark and resist 
the ‘smooth’, ‘open’, borderless ‘world’ asserted by those who claim that a totalising 
global sovereignty has emerged. This plural spacing of the ‘world’, as I asserted at 
the outset of this Chapter, “is itself the empty place o f sovereignty” because it reveals 
the persistence of sovereign finitude and delimitation which is always already an 
exposure across ‘limits’ (Nancy, 2000c, 137, original emphasis). The character of 
sovereignty as both delimited and also transgressing such limits is the condition of its
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im-possibility. The im-possibility of imperial sovereignty is its quality of being 
delimited and illimitable, finite and infinite. This im-possibility of sovereignty is 
disclosed, I have argued, through a variety of instances of its in-finitude. Throughout 
this thesis, then, I have made the point that the finitude of sovereignty is marked by an 
infinite exposure across limits. The infinite-finitude of sovereignty, the im-possibility 
of its presence, gives content to Bataille’s call which Nancy repeats:
“Sovereignty is NOTHING”: Which is to say that sovereignty is the sovereign 
exposure to an excess (to a transcendence) that does not present itself and does 
not let itself be appropriated (or simulated), that does not even give itself -  but 
rather to which being is abandoned. The excess ... is not... . (Nancy, 1991, 
18, original emphasis)
Sovereignty has no equivalence. Sovereignty is always already a relation. It is in­
division, and an exposure across limits. In claiming that the in-finitude of sovereignty 
has the character of sovereignty as ‘Nothing’, I am not claiming that it is a condition 
that has been attained. The in-finite sovereignty which I have identified in the 
‘postcoloniaT context of Australia, the habeas corpus cases in relation to Guantanamo 
Bay, or the present instantiation of imperial sovereignty discussed in this Chapter is 
not an instance of the attainment, finally, of ‘sovereignty as Nothing’. ‘Sovereignty 
as Nothing’, its character as in-finite sovereignty, remains an im-possibility which can 
be explained through Derrida. According to Derrida “[a]n event or an invention is 
possible only as im-possible” (Derrida, 2003b, 35). The im-possible never appears or 
announces itself as such (ibid). This is what it means to say ‘sovereignty is Nothing’. 
‘Sovereignty as Nothing’ cannot take place as a singular event. A singular 
sovereignty undercuts itself at the instant of its ‘eventness’. The ‘event’ is always
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singular-plural. This rather abstract account needs to be considered in the context of 
my opening concerns and it is to these that I will now return.
The opening concern of this thesis was, first, to undermine a ‘monistic’ 
conception of sovereignty that I identified in the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context. 
There we observed that sovereignty was rendered ‘finite’, singular, in order to 
disavow its imperial excesses and thus inaugurate a ‘postcolonial’ law and society. At 
stake was the possibility of re-presenting the ‘political community’ of the Australian 
‘nation’ as a ‘post-racist’, ‘postcolonial’ society. However, finite sovereignty also 
had to be capable of infinite reach -  that is, it needed to be an ‘event’ capable of being 
retained in order to ground present and future law and society. The conflicting 
tendencies of in-finite sovereignty, at once limited and without limit, is a tension that 
is sustained because a ‘political community’, such as ‘one nation’ and its law, is 
contingent on retaining and disavowing colonial sovereignty. The second concern of 
this thesis, then, was to demonstrate that the in-finite character of sovereignty was 
impelled by the formation, preservation and re-presentation of a ‘political 
community’. I argued that law withdraws in the face of imperial excesses of past or 
present colonialisms which claim to ground or sustain the political community of 
‘nation’, ‘people’, democracy and so on. This withdrawal takes place in the face of 
the sovereign decision on the ‘political’.187 The ‘illimitable’ sovereign decision, I 
argued, is in fact delimited by its juridical significance and purchase. The sovereign 
‘event’ takes place through law’s unceasing (re)positioning of sovereignty/law. The 
sovereign decision thus looses what is proclaimed to be its pure facticity, its character
187 Recall the non-justiciability of the ‘act of state’ in Mabo (Chapter One); the insistence of one law, 
one jurisdiction in Australia in the context of rejecting the noraiative potential of Aboriginal law (Yorta 
Yorta (2002) discussed in Chapter Two; and the discussion of Schmitt, Agamben, and Nancy in 
relation to the person ‘abandoned’ in the camp in Chapter Three.
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as an ‘excess’. The decision on the ‘political’, or put another way, law’s attempt to 
sustain its deference to sovereignty in the name of the political, is an im-possible 
‘event’. The im-possible event of sovereignty, I argued, is ‘singular-plural’. It is 
neither fully contained by a ‘limit’, nor absolutely unconditioned by the relations to 
which it is exposed.
I will now draw my enquiry to a close by examining what my account of in­
finite sovereignty contributes to the concerns with which I opened. Does the concept 
of an im-possible, in-finite sovereignty, sovereignty as ‘Nothing’, offer insights for 
resisting imperial instantiations of sovereignty? I will address this question by 
returning to the empirical contexts examined in this thesis: the ‘postcolonial’ context 
of Australia and the neo-imperial sovereign excess and its relation to ‘jurisdiction’ in 
the context of indefinite detention in Guantanamo Bay. It is among these textured 
contingencies of imperial sovereignty that we must consider the implications of 
‘sovereignty as Nothing’.
4.4.1 ‘Postcolonial9 Sovereignty as ‘Nothing9
“We, the peoples of Australia, of many origins as we are, make a commitment 
to go on together in a spirit of reconciliation”. This is the opening sentence of the
Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation (Council for Aboriginal
• • • 188  Reconciliation, 2000 -  see Appendix I for full text). The Declaration is premised
1881 have returned to consider the Australian ‘postcolonial’ context through this Declaration as it 
brings together a number of themes that were addressed in Chapters One and Two such as the 
problematic of in-finite sovereignty and the insistence of One ‘law of the land’ and One political 
community of the Australian ‘nation’. I will address these themes in the course of the discussion that 
follows.
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on a presumed and insistent ‘commonality’. Reconciliation is supposed to be the 
basis for a ‘postcolonial’ future -  a work of remembering, forgiving and forgetting, a 
promise ‘towards’ which the former ‘colonies’ will journey. But a singular ‘We’ is 
the first word, the ground, of this future. It is followed, in the text, by the recognition 
of a plurality of ‘peoples’ with ‘many origins’ but then returned, subordinated, to a 
‘being together’, a ‘spirit’ no less, of reconciliation. What holds this plurality of 
peoples with their ‘many origins’ together? It is, unsurprisingly, a concept of 
sovereignty in its original imperial terms: “We recognise this land and its waters were 
settled as colonies without treaty or consent” (ibid). This is an admission, a 
confession, but importantly a preservation of a sovereign assertion which is at once 
finite (an event that took place ‘back then’), and infinite (it can never be parted from 
or addressed). The Declaration repeats the colonial assertion of sovereignty in the 
‘original terms’ of a ‘settlement’ of land and waters “without treaty or consent”
1 O Q
(ibid). Thus the colonial appropriation of land is recognised but elevated beyond 
question (infinite). The lack of treaty or consent must not get in the way of redeeming 
the past for the sake of a future, and thus inaugurating a new law and society. The 
colonial sovereign event is lightly marked as an abomination, but one that ultimately 
cannot be wholly left behind. The imperial assertion of sovereignty cannot be 
exceeded, after all, what could exceed this, what could overwhelm it?
The Declaration was the end-product of a process commenced by the Council fo r Aboriginal 
Reconciliation Act 1991 (Cth). The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation sought to consult widely 
among ‘all’ Australians and set out a strategy for promoting reconciliation. The Council spent a decade 
in community consultation. In this same period, the production of a postcolonial society and juridical 
order through the recognition of native title, for the most part, failed to deliver land, self-determination 
or wider recognition to indigenous communities. The process of recognition of indigenous peoples’ 
antecedent property rights, as I indicated in Chapter Two, confirmed the appropriation of indigenous 
land by the state and the consequent extinguishment of native title, rather than result in the land being 
returned to its original owners. By the end of the 1990s, and with the evident failure of native title as a 
vehicle for restorative justice, reconciliation gained momentum as one of the strategies for producing a 
‘postcolonial’ society. The Declaration, as we will see, provides a succinct encapsulation of the 
problem of in-finite sovereignty and its relationship to ‘political community’.
189 Recall that settlement should have been reserved for uninhabited territories. See discussion of Mabo 
(No 2) in Chapter One, section 1.1.1.
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The solution turns out to be yet another imposition of a juridical order with a 
superior law. The basis for recognising the previously excluded is a new inscription 
of an absolute, unavowable Law: “Reaffirming the human rights of all Australians, we 
respect and recognise continuing customary laws, beliefs and traditions” (ibid). The 
colonial assertion of sovereignty is crystallised in the unity of a ‘nation’ of ‘peoples’ 
with ‘many origins’ (ibid). But plural ‘cultures’ are only recognised providing they 
conform to the overarching law of the “human rights of all Australians” (ibid). This is 
where reconciliation must be assessed in the context of the ‘extinguishment 
machinery’ of native title. As we observed in Chapter Two, any ‘traditional or 
‘customary’ norm that conflicts with ‘Australian law’ must give way to the latter.190 
Where there is no Aboriginal law, there can be no native title. In Fejo the High Court 
of Australia insisted that ‘traditional law and custom’ cannot be treated as a parallel 
law making system. To do so would be to “deny the acquisition of sovereignty” 
{Fejo, (1998), para. 44).
As the Declaration reiterates, Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders may 
have ‘self determination’, but it has to be “within the life of the nation” (ibid). The 
‘postcolonial’ nation vows to go on, into a future, as a movement ‘towards’ 
reconciliation. But this must be One ‘nation’ which abides by One law. There are, 
then, at least three moments of the ‘postcolonial’ condition where a ‘singularity’ is 
asserted in the Declaration. The first is the event of the colonial assertion of 
sovereignty. The second is the terms of its alteration which re-inscribes One law, 
Australian law, which is based on the common law of England which the colonial
190 See the discussion of Fejo (1998) in Chapter Two.
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settlers brought with them. The third is the insistence of One community in the form 
of the ‘nation’. I want to argue that all three ‘postcolonial’ moments appeal to a 
singularity which can be resisted through the notion of sovereignty as ‘Nothing’.
Sovereignty as ‘Nothing’ resists a singular sovereign event. Moreover, the 
im-possible character of sovereignty as ‘Nothing’ offers a means of resisting its re­
imposition. If sovereignty as ‘Nothing’ is regarded as a singular-plural spacing, an 
exposure and sharing out across a ‘limit’ which thus fails to contain and insulate the 
sovereign event as such, then the colonial sovereign moment is disrupted through its 
own being or existence. A singular sovereignty undercuts itself. The sovereign event 
as a plural spacing, an exposure across a limit, is an ‘empty place’. This is why the 
original imposition has to be repeated again and again. The foundation never 
succeeds in permanently establishing the colony, law, people, or ‘nation’. In another 
register, the plurality of law and community (of the colonised, the marginal), refuses 
to be effaced regardless of the Absolute terms in which One sovereignty, One nation 
and One law are re-iterated.191 In the ‘postcolonial’ context of Australia, the colonial 
sovereign event, either as the foundation of the common law or the ever pervasive 
ground repeated in the aspirational Declaration of reconciliation, is asserted as 
singular and substantial. But such an event is an im-possibility. Sovereignty as 
‘Nothing’ discloses, to the extent that it is an im-possibility, the contours of a failure 
which is in fact the event of resistance. This resistance opens within the sovereign 
event to the extent that sovereign finitude is always exceeded.
191 For an excellent example of how Aboriginal law would continue to allocate entitlement regardless 
o f what the Australian common law says about extinguishment of native title, see the discussion of 
extinguishment by the Aboriginal lawyer, Noel Pearson, 1997, 150-162.
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Colonial sovereignty cannot be contained in the past nor prevail in the present 
without the question of its legitimacy disrupting it again and again. As we observed 
in Mabo (No 2) and in the Declaration, the colonial assertion of sovereignty, the still 
abhorrent settling of an inhabited territory, must be repeated at a ‘postcolonial’ time 
when it needs to be forgotten. At the very instance of a confession, a quest for 
forgiveness, there is a re-inscription of the violence. ‘PostcoloniaV sovereignty fails 
precisely because it cannot leave the colonial behind, ‘once-and-for-all Note the 
‘postcolonial’ dilemmas captured in this phrase. Sovereignty cannot be ‘once’ in 
time (finite), it cannot be for ‘all’ time (infinite), and it is not an adequate foundation 
‘for all’ communities, either coloniser or colonised. The persistence of these elements 
haunts ‘postcolonial’ sovereignty. ‘Postcolonial’ sovereignty fails to escape the past, 
it cannot be legitimate in the present, nor can it be the basis for the new ‘We’ of the 
future. The notion of in-finitude I have elaborated in this thesis thus explains the 
structure of ‘postcolonial’ sovereignty. But what are the implications of this for 
‘postcolonial’ societies, and in particular for indigenous communities who seek to 
overcome the limits of the coloniser’s in-finite sovereignty? I want to address that 
question, tentatively, by commenting on the implications of the in-finitude of 
sovereignty for the aspiration of self-determination.192
1921 do not intend this reference to self-determination in this summation to be regarded as an 
exhaustive treatment of ‘self determination’. Indeed, there is a lengthy discussion that might be had on 
whether ‘self determination’ will avoid the pitfalls of singular sovereignty or a community based on 
some essence. Such a discussion can be informed by my analysis which de-positions monistic 
sovereignty and gives an account o f law at the limits o f the ‘political’. However, I have not attempted 
to undertake that discussion in this thesis as my principal concern has been to de-position imperial 
sovereignty. For discussion o f indigenous self-determination see: Pearson, 1993, 14-17; Nettheim, 
1993, 234-35; and for a more nuanced corrective, Watson, 2003.
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My account of ‘postcolonial’ sovereignty as ‘Nothing’ - treating sovereignty 
as singular-plural, a sharing across limits - has several implications for emancipatory 
projects which seek ‘self determination’. As Derrida recently pointed out:
One cannot combat, head on, all sovereignty in general, without threatening at 
the same time, beyond the nation-state figure of sovereignty, the classical 
principles of freedom and self-determination. (Derrida, 2003b, 49; original 
emphasis)
Derrida offers this caution having considered the current fragility of nation-state 
sovereignty (ibid, 44-48). The concept of sovereignty as “indivisible” and 
“unsharable” is now precarious because of the inroads made by “universal human 
rights” (ibid, 45). I will return below to consider how an indivisible, exceptional, 
sovereign power in current ‘world’ conflicts, such as the ‘war on terror’, is also being 
pushed towards the character of sovereignty as ‘Nothing’. Persisting with the 
‘postcolonial’ context of Australia for the time being, it is possible to observe 
Derrida’s claims borne out. The movement towards a ‘postcolonial’ law and society 
in Australia can at least partly be explained by the inroads made into the nation-state 
by international human rights norms. For instance, the principal reason the High 
Court in Mabo departed from previous authority in order to recognise indigenous 
peoples’ antecedent property rights was that a new era of respect for human rights 
demanded a move away from an age ‘frozen in racial discrimination’ (See Mabo, 41- 
2). Indeed, this was the key moment that heralded the ‘postcolonial’ aspirations of the 
decision in Mabo. It is offered as the reasons why previous authority could not stand. 
International norms had evolved and Australia had to change along with them, or so 
the story goes. The International Covenant o f Civil and Political Rights 1966 
(ICCPR) had pushed a number of signatory states to pass laws which guaranteed civil
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and political freedoms. The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RDA) was passed 
to implement aspects of that international treaty in Australia. The RDA was central in 
defeating the Queensland Government’s attempt to frustrate Eddie Mabo’s application 
for the recognition of native title rights by passing legislation to retrospectively 
extinguish any native title in the Murray Islands. The legislation was struck down by 
the High Court as it was judged to be racially discriminatory (see Mabo v Queensland 
(No 1) (1988)). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Western 
Sahara (1975) also played a crucial role in invalidating the application of the doctrine 
of ‘settlement’ to inhabited territories. The doctrine of settlement was usually 
reserved for uninhabited territories, unless the natives were judged to be ‘too low in 
the scale of social organisation’. The ICJ decision at least served to emphasise the 
need to adjust the ‘consequences’ of ‘settlement’ (the recognition of native title rights) 
even though the actual acquisition of sovereignty was left ‘non-justiciable’ or beyond 
the purview of municipal courts.193
The impact of international human rights norms and institutions on municipal 
law and sovereign authority is thus significant. In these developments we observe 
that the sovereign nation-state is at once ‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’ (Derrida, 
2003b, 49). It is ‘conditional’ to the extent that it is susceptible to the externally 
determined norms of the international community. At the same time, as Derrida 
pointed out, sovereignty is ‘unconditional’ and ‘indivisible’ (ibid, 49). Although this 
aspect of sovereignty must always be considered along with the ‘sharing’, the in­
finitude, and thus the im-possibility of sovereignty, the ‘unconditional’ aspect of 
sovereignty can be a “bulwark” against domination, it can stand against:
193 See discussion of the Mabo in Chapter One.
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certain ideological religious, or capitalist, indeed linguistic, hegemonies, 
which, under the cover of liberalism or universalism, would still represent, in a 
world that would be little more than a market, a rationalisation in the service 
of particular interests, (ibid)
‘Self determination’, inevitably, challenges and relies on this unconditionality of 
sovereignty. The call for indigenous self-determination refuses the illegitimate 
usurpation of territory and variously seeks independence, self-government, power- 
sharing, redistribution of wealth, and a plurality of laws. To that extent self- 
determination challenges the ‘unconditionality’ of a settler colony’s sovereignty. 
That is, there is always a call for justice and legitimacy - put another way, a call of 
and for another law, which sits alongside the sovereign plenitude asserted by the 
coloniser.
But what would it mean for colonial authority to be undone, ‘ once-and-for-
alV? If this was done in the name of de-colonisation or ‘postcolonial’ self-
determination, would the sovereignty which is the means and the end of this
emancipation be any less problematic? Indeed, my analysis suggests that all
sovereignty is im-possible. If self-determination is expressed through the notion of
sovereignty, it would be no less problematic, no less im-possible or in-finite. But this
speculation is not particularly relevant since indigenous communities within settler
colonies are consistently refused sovereign independence (recall Coe (No 1) (1979)
and Coe (No 2) (1993)).194 What is significant is that the in-finitude of sovereignty
which I have described should inform claims to self-determination. What my
elaboration of in-finite sovereignty has to offer the ‘postcolonial’ enterprise of
194 For an account of the protracted negotiations on the UN sponsored process to arrive at a Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous people, see Washington, 1998. A detailed treatment of this 
process is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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resisting colonial impositions is this: ‘postcolonial’ sovereignty is an im-possibility. 
This im-possibility is the event of a community which resists colonisation. The fact 
that sovereignty cannot be ‘finite’ or ‘infinite’ and thus a fully elaborated totalisation 
is the event of more-than-one law, more-than-one community. The possibility of 
these pluralities is the event of ‘postcolonial’ law and society. These are the modest 
implications of my thinking on sovereignty as far as it concerns the ‘postcolonial’ 
context.
4.4.2 Sovereign Exception as ‘Nothing’
In this Chapter I have principally focused on de-positioning imperial 
sovereignty by critiquing a contemporary and influential account of it (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000). In considering what it would mean for sovereignty to be ‘Nothing’ in 
the context of ‘worldwide’ sovereign authority, I drew on Nancy to argue that the 
‘becoming worldwide’ of sovereignty implies “sovereignty without sovereignty” 
(Nancy, 2000c, 134, 136-140; see section 4.1.2 above). If the notion of a ‘world’ 
without domination indicates a singular-plural gathering, then this ‘gathering’ must be 
liberated from ‘sovereignty’ as the essential organising principle of a ‘world order’. 
For Nancy, this calls for sovereignty as ‘Nothing’. Sovereignty as ‘Nothing’ involves 
focusing on the singular-plural spacing of being, a spacing that is not reduced to the 
“concentration of interiority” required by the re-presentation of political community 
through sovereignty (Nancy, 2000b, 36; see section 4.2.1 above). I developed this 
analysis of sovereignty as ‘Nothing’ by comparing Nancy and Hardt and Negri’s 
approach to ‘empire/Empire’ (see section 4.2.1 above). The principal difference 
between Nancy’s and Hardt and Negri’s approach to ‘worldwide authority’ is this:
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Nancy calls for a ‘world’ (singular-plural spacing) not determined by a distribution of 
sovereignties given content by an ‘essence’ (of ‘people’, ‘nation’, societies which 
respect ‘human rights’ contrasted with ‘outlaw’, ‘barbarian’ states etc). Hardt and 
Negri on the other hand announce the disappearance of the ‘limits’ by which modem 
sovereignty has been articulated. They assert the emergence of a ‘new’ juridical 
configuration of sovereignty called ‘Empire’. Empire is the new mode of sovereign 
hegemony which is characterised by an ‘open’, smooth, world without limits. I 
responded to the collection of claims accompanying their account by arguing that 
‘worldwide authority’ is in fact characterised by the in-finitude of sovereignty. 
Through the notion of in-finitude I drew attention to the persistence of ‘limits’, but 
more fundamentally, to the exposure and transgression of a ‘limit’ which thus fails to 
‘contain’ or delimit sovereignty. The in-finitude of sovereignty implies the ‘empty 
place of power’, the im-possible sovereign event, and thus sovereignty as ‘Nothing’. I 
will close this Chapter by returning to the issue of hegemonic, imperial sovereignty as 
it was considered through the instance of indefinite detention of persons in 
Guantanamo Bay. I will do so through a recent account of international law that 
squarely and commendably refuses to separate the exceptional sovereign decision on 
‘war’ from the juridical mediation or legal legitimisation of such actions. It is the im­
possible separation of the sovereign exception from law that gives some content to the 
claim that sovereignty is ‘Nothing’.
According to a recent commentary on international law, the hegemony of 
‘Great powers’ has long been more than a political fact -  it is embodied in 
international legal norms and institutions (Simpson, 2004, Ch. 3). Thus the archetypal 
monistic conception of sovereignty, the singularity of the (imperial) ‘international
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citizen’ whose sovereignty is more equal that others, turns out to be heavily mediated 
by law. The political exigencies of Great powers turns out to be legalised (ibid, Chs. 
4-7). International hegemony of certain sovereigns is a ‘legalised hegemony’ (ibid, 
68). That much may be obvious, though hardly acknowledged by international 
lawyers. Hence Simpson’s intervention is significant. Simpson argues that although 
the international legal order is based on the notion of ‘sovereign equality’ (each state 
is formerly equal to any other) and ‘existential sovereignty’ (each state has autonomy 
within its borders), ‘Great powers’ have been granted a form of ‘legalised hegemony’, 
a prerogative, based on the international constitutional recognition of their ability to 
collectively act in their own interests against ‘outlaw’ states (ibid, 67-76).195 After a 
detailed and persuasive treatment of the international norms and instruments which 
sustain his claim, he concludes his account of the relationship between ‘Great powers’ 
and ‘outlaw states’ with reference to the detention of persons in Guantanamo Bay. He 
claims that:
The US detention of Taliban personnel and the labelling of these individuals 
as ‘illegal combatants’ purports to place them outside the full protection of the 
law (i.e. the law of the Geneva Conventions as it applies to POWs) while their 
place of detention can be viewed as a metaphor for the treatment of outlaws 
generally. Guantanamo Bay is a place outside the law: an extra-territorial, 
extra-constitutional locale where the rules of domestic law and international 
law are suspended and yet where the suspects or detainees ... are closely
1951 have omitted reference to the international instruments and cases by which Simpson validates his 
claims as these are beyond the scope o f this thesis. Note that Simpson distinguishes ‘legalised 
hegemony’ from ‘superpower dominance’ because of the collective character of this hegemony 
(Simpson, 2004, 74).
Though I draw on Simpson here in order to sharpen the focus on international sovereignty, I 
dealt with the in-finitude of sovereignty in the ‘international order’ in a detailed way in Chapter One. 
There I claimed that the separation between international/nation is an im-possibility that can be 
expressed through the notion of the ‘parergon' , a frame that is indeterminately inside and outside what 
is contained ‘within’ it. The limit between international/nation sustains this indeterminacy.
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monitored and controlled. Like the outlaw states from which they hail, outlaw 
personnel are both outside the law and at the same time entangled in its terrors 
and violence, (ibid, 325)
Two qualifications must immediately be added to this statement. First, Simpson did 
not have the benefit of reading the U.S Supreme Court decisions in Rasul (2004) or 
Hamdi (2004) before his book went to print.196 In those cases the Supreme Court held 
that U.S Federal Courts have jurisdiction over the ‘custodians’ of persons being 
detained. Due to this assertion of the governmental role of the courts, the detainees 
are no longer utterly ‘outside’ the law.197 Second, the metaphor between ‘outlaw’ 
detainees and the ‘outlaw states’ from which they hail fails because of the number of 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay who are citizens of states allied with the U.S (Australia, 
Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia to name a few). The detainees may well be entangled 
in the terrors and violence of ‘Great powers’, but for the likes of Rasul (a UK citzen) 
or David Hicks (an Australian citizen), it cannot be claimed they are caught up in the 
terrors of outlaw states from which they hail.
What is useful for my purposes in Simpson’s analysis is the extent to which 
Guantanamo Bay serves as a signifier of ‘extra-legal’ space. But Simpson has a 
difficult time maintaining the delimitation of the ‘extra-legal’. Simpson places the 
detainee ‘inside’ (criminalised personnel of ‘outlaw states) and ‘outside’ law (the 
extra-legal conditions in which the detainee is held). The ‘extra-legal’, the ‘outlaw 
state’, turns out to be more like an international variety of ‘criminal’ who has 
transgressed the norms determined by the ‘Great powers’. The territory of 
Guantanamo Bay and persons detained there are not ‘outlaws’ in the sense of being
196 It should be noted that the early position in Rasul (2002) which placed Guantanamo Bay beyond the 
sovereign territory of the U.S was countered by the majority view in Gherebi (2003).
197 See my lengthy account of these cases in Chapter Three.
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‘outside’ one regime of law and encompassed in the separate, ‘exceptional’ law of the 
sovereign. Simpson claims that the ‘outlaw state’ is in fact subject to a “separate legal 
regime” (ibid, 313). Analogous to “common criminals”, these states are subject to 
“surveillance and occasional disciplinary violence” (ibid, 313-14). For Simpson the 
sovereign exception is an instance of the extra-legal, or the ‘outlaws’ are brought 
‘within’ through special ‘criminal’ measures. My thesis offers a corrective to these 
sovereign delimitations which I have characterised as im-possible. The discourse that 
criminalises the ‘outlaw’ state and its ‘personnel’ only serves to legalise hegemony. 
Combating the ‘criminal’, the ‘outlaw’, the ‘enemy’ -  these are means of validating 
an excessive power which will continue to transgress a ‘limit’ that must and cannot 
contain it.
The sovereign exception in the ‘war on terror’ -  what Simpson would term the 
prerogative of ‘Great powers’ in international law to disrespect the sovereign equality 
of the ‘outlaw state’ and wage war against it -  is in fact the ‘event’ of ‘Great powers’ 
faced with the lack o f sovereignty, the absence of a sovereign against whom war can 
be waged. The ‘criminalisation’ of the ‘outlaw state’ is a “projection” (Derrida, 
2003b, 47). As Derrida put it:
The United States and its allies, as well as the international institutions that 
depend largely on them for their daily operations (the Security Council, if not 
the entire UN), no longer face an identifiable enemy in the form of a “state” 
territory with whom they would wage what would still be called a “war”, even 
if it’s a war on international terrorism, (ibid, 46)
The sovereign exception, viewed in the light of international law, is an exposure 
across a limit of sovereign subjectivity. Sovereignty is not contained within the
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boundaries of ‘equal’, ‘plural’ sovereigns determined and recognised by international 
law. The sovereign exception in the war on terror is im-possible. A collection of 
sovereigns wage a war against a cipher. Moreover, the sovereignty of ‘Great powers’ 
is in-finite to the extent that it is neither an overarching ‘world’ sovereignty (Empire) 
nor is it contained within nation-state boundaries (finite) implied in the notion of an 
international system of sovereigns. Sovereignty always transgresses its limits - it is 
in-finite. The in-finitude of sovereignty is the condition of sovereignty as ‘Nothing’. 
This is not a condition that has been accomplished, but rather, an opportunity which 
may offer the interstitial point of resistance to sovereign excesses. As Derrida has put 
it, all states are rogues (Derrida, 2003b, 47). The sovereign nation-state need not be 
allowed the ‘substantiality’ or ‘presence’ that decisionism or internationalisms 
assume.
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Conclusion
The opening concern of this thesis was to provide an account of the relation 
between colonial sovereignty and law. Drawing from the telling instance of 
Australian law’s attempt to recognise the antecedent rights of indigenous people, we 
observed that the law characterises sovereignty as ‘finite’ in order to disavow imperial 
racist excesses and thus inaugurate a ‘postcolonial’ law and society. At stake in such 
an enterprise is the possibility of re-presenting the juridical order and ‘political 
community’ as ‘post-racist’ or ‘postcolonial’. However, imperial sovereignty, we 
observed, must also be capable of infinite reach. That is, sovereignty needs to be an 
‘event’ capable of being retained in order to ground present and future law and 
society. Imperial sovereignty and its racist negations thus continue to haunt the 
‘postcolonial’ juridical order and polity. I argued that the contradictory lineaments of 
in-finite sovereignty are sustained in the name of a purportedly singular, unified 
‘political community’ such as the nation-state.
The second concern of this thesis, then, was to demonstrate that the 
contradictory lineaments of sovereignty as finite and infinite are sustained with 
reference to ‘political community’. For instance, law withdraws in the face of 
imperial excesses of past or present colonialisms on the basis that (imperial) 
sovereignty purportedly grounds, symbolises or sustains the political community of 
‘nation’, ‘people’, and democracy. The re-positioning of imperial sovereignty is 
contingent on maintaining the stability of the ‘nation’. The sovereign ‘event’ takes 
place through law’s unceasing ‘positioning’ of sovereignty/law with reference to the 
stability or security of the political as ‘nation’, community of human rights,
266
democracy and so on. Sovereignty thus loses its unicity, its purportedly pure facticity 
in the process of its juridico-political instantiation. Law’s inscription of the ‘position’ 
of sovereignty with reference to the ‘political’ means that the facticity or ‘presence’ of 
sovereignty is an im-possible ‘event’. Sovereignty is neither fully contained within a 
‘limit’, of ‘nation’ for instance, nor absolutely unconditioned by its relation with a 
nation’s law. Moreover, the enquiry was not confined to the in-finitude of 
sovereignty in relation to national juridical orders. The discussion dealt with the 
possible criticism, via Hardt and Negri, that sustained concern with ‘postcolonial’ 
sovereignty and its position in a national juridical order, or the neo-imperial 
extraversions of a state such as the U.S, is no longer a pressing concern in a new 
imperial age marked by the emergence of a new form of ‘global’ sovereignty called 
‘Empire’.
Throughout the discussion the critique of finitude derived from Jean-Luc 
Nancy was central for the purposes of studying imperial sovereignty. The key 
insight, one that facilitated the treatment of imperial sovereignty in the ‘postcolonial’ 
context and in the wider discussion of ‘worldwide’ sovereign authority, was the 
importance of the notion of ‘finitude’ for examining the position, limit and relation 
between sovereignty and law. At the outset, when setting out Nancy’s thought, I 
identified the importance of devising the conceptual apparatus to imagine what it 
would mean to move sovereignty to a ‘non-place’. By the end of the discussion in 
Chapter Four, I had developed a set of insights that offered some basis for imagining 
what it would mean for sovereignty to be moved to a ‘non-place’ -  for sovereignty to 
be ‘Nothing’. Sovereignty as ‘Nothing’, to repeat, is not a condition that has been 
accomplished, but rather, it is an opportunity to exploit the ‘weakness’ of the infinite
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exposure of sovereignty across limits. It is the singular-plural spacing of all being 
that should inform the thought of community, the concept of the ‘subject’, and the 
juridico-political approaches to her emancipation. Before setting out some of these 
broader implications of the thesis, it is convenient to identify its key insights by 
recounting the argument advanced in each Chapter.
Chapter One identified the finite and infinite character of sovereignty in 
Australian ‘postcolonial’ law. It considered cases which purport to separate colonial 
law from its imperial origins. The problematic was posed in terms informed by the 
thought of Jean-Luc Nancy. Nancy has consistently argued that a ‘limit’ that 
separates absolutely is impossible. Drawing on this insight I argued that there can be 
no absolute ground from which law can originate or depart. The event of 
‘postcolonial’ law and community arises from the failure of such a ground. The 
question of ‘postcolonial’ justice must thus endlessly grapple with the persistence of 
imperial sovereignty that is the in-finite ground of law. But this persistence of the 
colonial in the ‘postcolonial’ condition of law and society is an opportunity that 
enables a resistance to the unitary, ‘pure fact’ of sovereignty. The ‘substantiality’ that 
might be attributed to sovereignty, one that would instantiate yet another closure, can 
be disabled by exposing the necessary relation by which sovereignty is constituted 
and re-constituted. The monistic character of sovereignty is de-positioned when it is 
demonstrated that it is im-possible, but yet necessary, to separate ‘postcolonial’ 
sovereignty from its erstwhile imperial form. This ambivalence marks a failure of 
imperial sovereignty.
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Chapter Two extended the critique of in-finite sovereignty by considering how 
conceptions of monistic sovereignty are maintained through the insistence of a unitary 
‘political community’ in the form of the nation-state with one law. The political and 
juridical concomitant of monistic sovereignty is the refusal of plurality (of law and 
community). I examined recent ‘native title’ cases from Australia which have insisted 
on subjecting the ‘postcoloniality’ of Australian law and society to unitary 
instantiations of ‘political community’. ‘One law of the land’ is wrought through the 
insistence on an essential ground for indigenous law and community, such as 
‘traditional law and custom’. To make this argument I drew on Nancy’s interrogation 
of the notion of ‘jurisdiction’. ‘Jurisdiction’ manifests the co-presence of sovereignty, 
law and the political. Jurisdiction, or ‘juris-fiction’ as Nancy put it (Nancy, 2003b, 
157), expresses the performativity of the judicial decision when marking out the 
space, territory and ambit of sovereignty/law. When this territorialisation of law is 
articulated with reference to a delimited political community, the effect is also to 
delimit what is otherwise regarded as beyond limit -  the (il)limitable power of 
sovereignty.
Chapter Three more specifically considered the ‘limit’ between sovereignty 
and law through the notion of jurisdiction. The habeas corpus cases in relation to the 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay disclosed, yet again, that the in-finitude of sovereignty 
is instantiated in and through law. The Supreme Court of the United States recently 
acceded to the governmental concern of controlling officials who detain prisoners in 
Guantanamo Bay (Rasul (2004)). But this did not clearly address the abject condition 
of the detainee as such. The ‘camp’, though seemingly ‘outside’ the juridical order, is 
actually central to the neo-imperial project. The ‘camp’ marks the infinite opening
269
out of sovereignty, its illimitable power, but also reveals the de-positioning of 
sovereignty and law. The mark of the sovereign ‘ban’ must be brought to bear on the 
(racialised) body of the detainee. It is this abandonment, this sacrifice, which 
produces the event of imperial sovereignty. The life of the being abandoned in the 
‘camp’ thus exposes the sovereign and discloses the limit of the juridical order and 
political community. Law’s delimitation of jurisdiction and adjustment of ‘due 
process’ to facilitate the exigencies of a sovereign at war offers little redress to the 
‘abandoned’ being. It is not a monistic sovereign, then, that renders this abandoned 
life beyond the mediation of civil law. ‘Abandonment’, wrought by sovereign power 
and law, marks the limit between sovereignty and law. What this analysis exposes is 
that the decision on friend/enemy cannot be attributed solely to a decisionist 
sovereign, but rather to the judicial treatment of the complex notion of jurisdiction.
The argument consistently developed throughout the thesis was that 
sovereignty is finite and infinite. Chapter Four thus dealt with the question of whether 
sovereignty has surpassed being delimited within a finite territory and has so 
thoroughly encompassed the ‘world’ that it is now a finitude that has become infinite 
-  an ‘Empire’ without limit. I emphasised that ‘imperial sovereignty’ or ‘empire’ 
must be understood as the infinite plurality of finitudes, what I termed infinite- 
finitude. I refuted the claim by Hardt and Negri that an infinite sovereignty had 
emerged. I pointed out that for Nancy the plural spacing of the world “is itself the 
empty place of sovereignty” (Nancy, 2000c, 137). By comparing Nancy’s account of 
authority becoming ‘worldwide’ with Hardt and Negri’s account of ‘Empire’, I 
explored what it means for sovereignty to be ‘Nothing’, for sovereignty to occupy a 
‘non-place’ (Nancy, 2000c, 137). Sovereignty as ‘Nothing’ involves conceiving of
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community as the spacing and exposure of singular beings, rather than the ‘unified’ 
entity that is symbolised through sovereignty.
A question that arises out of the enquiry, one that I wish to close with, and one 
that has been amply expressed through Nancy, and also Derrida (2003b), is whether 
community needs sovereignty. Will the call to seek an ‘empty place of sovereignty’ 
also mean that ideas of the political, self-determination, democracy, community, 
fraternity are discredited? Like sovereignty, each of these is in need of eradication 
and preservation, and I see no way out of this conundrum. What I suggest, and this is 
not entirely novel, is that ‘we’ cannot but live with this irresolution. What has been 
suggested in the discussion is that politics and juridico-political thinking must be 
informed by the critique of finitude (of sovereignty, community etc.). Some 
approaches to living with the paradox of sovereignty which must be ‘Nothing’ but 
also a non-place can be drawn from this enquiry. There can be no self-determination 
without sovereignty -  but this must not be a sovereignty of ‘brilliance’ and ‘finishing’ 
(Nancy, 2000c, 140). The limit, ‘we’ must understand, can never be closed 
absolutely. The ‘empty place of sovereignty’ must be a place, but what place -  and 
what should be the measure of belonging to it?
Nancy’s approach to the spacing of ‘empire’ offers some insights. The 
‘spacing of empire’ is a problem which arises out of the impossibility of delineating a 
source of ‘sense’ -  transcendent or immanent -  from which authority can be derived 
(Nancy, 1997, 5-6). Authority should not come from inside or outside a particular 
‘political space’ such as ‘Occidental culture’ because the latter’s presence is no 
longer, as if it ever was, self-evident. Authority is plural, contested and contingent.
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The finitude of being which is also always ‘being-in-common’ must be informed by a 
thinking of ‘world’ as ‘being toward’ (ibid, 8) -  and ‘being toward’ other senses of 
‘world’. This is partly the answer also to the disturbing return of religion as a source 
of sense/authority in the post cold war era. Binary oppositions of occident/orient or 
the oppositions in-between monotheistic religions cannot be sustained. Community 
must not be re-grounded on such essences. For the time being, it seems preferable to 
live with-in sovereignties which can be de-positioned and divided (by law) than to 
embrace utopian eschatologies which eschew law in the hope that we will not need it 
tomorrow.
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Appendix I
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (2000), Final Report o f the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation to the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Parliament.
Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation:
We, the peoples of Australia, of many origins as we are, make a commitment to 
go on together in a spirit of reconciliation.
We value the unique status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as the 
original owners and custodians of lands and waters.
We recognise this land and its waters were settled as colonies without treaty or 
consent.
Reaffirming the human rights of all Australians, we respect and recognise 
continuing customary laws, beliefs and traditions.
Through understanding the spiritual relationship between the land and its first 
peoples, we share our future and live in harmony.
Our nation must have the courage to own the truth, to heal the wounds of its past 
so that we can move on together at peace with ourselves.
Reconciliation must live in the hearts and minds of all Australians. Many steps 
have been taken, many steps remain as we learn our shared histories.
As we walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologises and expresses 
its sorrow and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so the other part accepts 
the apologies and forgives.
We desire a future where all Australians enjoy their rights, accept their 
responsibilities, and have the opportunity to achieve their full potential.
And so, we pledge ourselves to stop injustice, overcome disadvantage, and respect 
that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have the right to self- 
determination within the life of the nation.
Our hope is for a united Australia that respects this land of ours; values the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage; and provides justice and equity for 
all.
274
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Giorgio Agamben (1998), Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans.
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Giorgio Agamben (2004), State o f Exception. Trans, by Kevin Attell. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press).
Benedict Anderson (1991), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and 
Spread o f Nationalism (London: Verso).
KLirsten Anker (2004), “Law in the Present Tense: Tradition and Cultural Continuity 
in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria” vol: 28 Melbourne 
University Law Review 1-27.
Hannah Arendt (1958), The Origins o f Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
and Co.).
Hannah Arendt (1973), On Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
Aristotle (1981), The Politics. Trans. T.J. Saunders. (Middlesex: Penguin Books).
Stanley Aronowitz and Heather Gautney (eds.) (2003), Implicating Empire: 
Globalisation and Resistance in the 21st Century World Order (New York: Basic 
Books).
Bill Ashcroft (2001), Post-Colonial Transformation (London: Routledge).
Georges Bataille (1993), The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy,
Volume III, Sovereignty. Trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books).
Richard Bartlett (1983) “Aboriginal Land Claims at Common Law” Vol: 15 
University o f Western Australia Law Review 293-346.
Richard Bartlett (1993) “Mabo: Another Triumph of the Common Law” Vol: 15 
Sydney Law Review 178-185.
Zygmunt Bauman (2002), “Reconnaissance Wars of the Planetary Frontierland” Vol: 
19(4) Theory, Culture, Society 81-90.
Jens Bartelson (1995), A Genealogy o f Sovereignty. (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 1995).
Walter Benjamin (1968), “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in Walter Benjamin, 
Illuminations (London: Pimlico), pp. 245-255.
Harold Bennett (1930), “Sacer Esto” Vol: lxi, Transactions o f the American 
Philological Association 5-18.
275
Jean Bodin (1992) On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from The Six Books of the 
Commonwealth. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
John Borrows (2002), Recovering Canada: The Resurgence o f Indigenous Law 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
Peter Bratsis (2003), “Over, Under, Sideways, Down: Globalisation, Spatial 
Metaphors and the Question of State Power” in Stanley Aronowitz and Heather 
Gautney (eds.) (2003), Implicating Empire: Globalisation and Resistance in the 21st 
Century World Order (New York: Basic Books).
Judith Butler (1997) The Psychic Life o f Power: Theories o f Subjection (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press).
Judith Butler (2004), Precarious Life: The Powers o f Mourning and Violence. 
(London: Verso).
Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk (1992) The End o f Sovereignty ?: The Politics o f a 
Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.).
Emma Campbell (2003), “Introduction” to Jean-Luc Nancy, “Our World: An 
Interview” Vol: 8(2) Angelaki 43-54.
Alex C. Castles (1982), An Australian Legal History (Sydney: The Law Book 
Company).
Emilios Christodoulidis (2001) “Law’s Immemorial” in Emilios Christodoulidis and 
Scott Veitch (eds) Lethe’s Law: Justice, Law and Ethics in Reconciliation (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing). 207-227.
Emilios Christodoulidis (2002), “Paradoxes of Sovereignty and Representation” 
[2002] Journal of South African Law 108.
James Crawford (1979) The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press).
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (2000), Final Report o f the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation to the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Parliament, 
December 2000, http ://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLres/car/2000/l 6/. last 
visited, 05/05/2004.
Steven Curry (2004) Indigenous Sovereignty and the Democratic Project. (London: 
Ashgate).
Fred Dallmayr (2002) “Lessons of September 11”, Vol: 19(4) Theory, Culture,
Society, 137-146.
Jacques Derrida (1978), The Truth in Painting. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press).
276
Jacques Derrida (1986), “Declarations of Independence” 15 New Political Science I.
Jacques Derrida (1997), The Politics o f Friendship. G. Collins (trans.) (London: 
Verso)
Jacques Derrida (2002), “Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority””, in 
Jacques Derrida, Acts o f Religion. Trans. Mary Quaintance, Ed. Gil Anidjar (London: 
Routledge). pp. 230-298.
Jacques Derrida (2003a), Without Alibi. Trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press).
Jacques Derrida (2003b), “The ‘World’ of the Enlightenment to Come (Exception, 
Calculation, Sovereignty” Vol: 33 Research in Phenomenology 9 -  52.
Jacques Derrida (2004), Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press)
Michael Detmold (1995), "Law and Difference: Reflections on Mabo's case", Vol: 17 
Sydney Law Review 159.
Ignaas Devisch (2002), “Being mondaine: Jean-Luc Nancy’s Enumerations of the 
World” Vol: 6(4) Cultural Values 385-394.
Francesca Dominello (2003), “Becoming the Highest Court” Vol: 12 Griffith Law 
Review 263-287.
Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh (2002), “Just So: The Law Which Governs 
Australia is Australian Law”, Vol: 13(3) Law and Critique 289.
Peter Fitzpatrick (2001a) Modernism and the Grounds o f Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
Peter Fitzpatrick (2001b), “Bare Sovereignty: Homo Sacer and the Insistence of Law” 
Vol: 5:2 <http://muse.jhu.edU/joumals/theory_and_event/v005/5.2fitzpatrick.html>
Peter Fitzpatrick (2002), ‘“No Higher duty’: Mabo and the Failure of Legal 
Foundation” Vol: 13 Law and Critique 233.
Peter Fitzpatrick (2003a) “‘Gods Would be Needed ...”: American Empire and the 
Rule of International Law” 16 Leiden Journal o f International Law 429.
Peter Fitzpatrick, (2004a) ““We know what it is when you do not ask us”: The 
Unchallengeable Nation”, (forthcoming, Law. Text. Culture)
Peter Fitzpatrick (2004b) “Juris-fiction: Literature and the Law of the Law”, 
(forthcoming, ARIEL: A Review o f International English Literature).
277
Michel Foucault (1977), “Preface to Transgression”, in Michel Foucault, Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. Trans. Donald Bouchard 
and Sherry Simon. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press), pp. 29-52.
Michel Foucault ([1978] 1991), “Govemmentality” in Graham Burchell etal (eds.), 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Govemmentality (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf).
Ch. 4.
Michel Foucault (1980), “Truth and Power” in C. Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 by Michael Foucault. (New York, 
Pantheon).
Michel Foucault (1984), The History o f Sexuality, Vol. I, in Paul Rabinow (ed) The 
Foucault Reader. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books).
Michel Foucault (1997), “Truth and Juridical Forms”, in James Faubion (Ed.) Power: 
Essential Works o f Foucault 1954-1984, Vol. III. Trans. Robert Hurley etal. (New 
York: New Press), pp. 1-90.
Michel Foucault (2003), “Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de 
France: 1975-1976. Trans. David Macey (New York: Picador).
Michel Foucault and Maurice Blanchot (1987), Foucault/Blanchot. Trans. Brian 
Massumi and Jeffrey Mehlman (New York: Zone Books).
W. Warde Fowler (1920), Roman Essays and Interpretations (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press).
Ken Gelder and Jane M. Jacobs (1998), Uncanny Australia: Sacredness and Identity 
in a Postcolonial Nation. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press)
Ernest Gellner (1983), Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell).
Colin Gordon (1997), “Introduction” to James Faubion (Ed.) Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984, Vol. Ill (New York: New Press).
Derek Gregory (2004), The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing).
Jurgen Habermas (1999) The Inclusion o f the Other: Studies in Political Theory. 
(Cambridge: Polity Press).
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press).
H.L.A Hart (1997), The Concept o f Law. 2nd Ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Seymour Hersh (2004a) “The Gray Zone” The New Yorker (24th May, 2004).
278
Seymour Hersh (2004b), “Rumsfeld’s Dirty War on Terror” The Guardian -  G2, 13th 
September, 2004 pp. 2-4.
Barbara Hocking (1993), “Aboriginal Law Does Now Run in Australia: Reflections 
on the Mabo case: from Cooper v Stuart through Milirrpum to Mabo” Vol: 15 Sydney 
Law Review 187-205.
Ian Hunter (1994), “Native Title: Acts of State and the Rule of Law” in Murray Goot 
and Time Rowse (eds.) Make a Better Offer: The Politics o f Mabo (Sydney: Pluto 
Press). 97-110.
Nasser Hussain (2003) The Jurisprudence o f Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of 
Law (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press).
Michael Ignatieff (2003a), "The Burden", New York Times Magazine, January 5.
Michael Ignatieff (2003b), Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Afgahnistan. (Toronto: Penguin).
Ian James (2002), “The Persistence of the Subject: Jean-Luc Nancy” (2002) Vol: 25 
Paragraph 125-141.
Immanuel Kant (1951), The Critique o f Judgement (New York: Hafner).
Immanuel Kant (1970), Kant’s Political Writings (The Metaphysics and Morals). 
Trans. H.B. Nisbet. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Michael Keating (2001) Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post- 
Sovereignty Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Will Kymlicka (1989), Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press).
Will Kymlicka (1995), Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority 
Rights. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy (1997), Retreating the Political 
(London: Routledge).
Neil Lazarus (2001), Nationalism and Cultural Practice in the Postcolonial World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Neil Lazarus (2004), The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial and Literary Studies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Claude Lefort (1988), Democracy and Political Theory. Trans. David Macey. (Polity 
Press: Oxford).
279
Jeffrey S. Librett (1997), “Translator’s Forward: Between Nihilism and Myth: Value, 
Aesthetics, and Politics in The Sense of the World” (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), vii-xxvi.
Martin Loughlin (2003), “Ten Tenets of Sovereignty” in Neil Walker (ed.) 
Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart Publishing), pp. 55-86.
Neil MacCormick (1999) Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the 
European Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Patrick Macklem (2001), Indigenous Difference and the Constitution o f Canada. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
P. G. McHugh (1991), “The Lawyers Concept of Sovereignty, the Treaty of Waitangi, 
and a Legal History of New Zealand”, in W. Renwick, ed. (1991), Sovereignty and 
Indigenous Rights: The Treaty o f Waitangi in International Context. (Wellington: 
Victoria University Press).
Kent McNeil (1989), Common Law Aboriginal Title. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press).
Stewart Motha (1998) “Mabo (No 2): The Epistemic Limits of the Recognition of 
‘Difference’” Vol: 7(1) Griffith Law Review 79-96.
Stewart Motha (2002), “The Sovereign Event in a Nation’s Law” 13 Law and 
Critique 311 - 336.
Stewart Motha (forthcoming, 2005) “‘PostcoloniaF Sovereignty and the Event of 
Plurality”, forthcoming, Acta Sociologica.
Chantal Mouffe (1999) (ed.), The Challenge o f Carl Schmitt (London: Verso).
Jean-Luc Nancy (1991), The Inoperative Community. Trans. P. Connor. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press).
Jean-Luc Nancy (1993a), The Experience o f Freedom. Trans. B McDonald. (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press).
Jean-Luc Nancy (1993b), “Abandoned Being” in Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth To 
Presence. Trans. Brian Holmes. (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 36-47.
Jean-Luc Nancy (1993c), “The Jurisdiction of the Hegelian Monarch” in Jean-Luc 
Nancy, The Birth To Presence. (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 110-142.
Jean-Luc Nancy (1997), The Sense o f the World. Trans. Jeffrey Librett (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press).
280
Jean-Luc Nancy (2000a), Being Singular Plural. Trans. R.D. Richardson and A.E. 
O’Byme. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press).
Jean-Luc Nancy (2000b), “Of Being Singular Plural” in Jean-Luc Nancy, Being 
Singular Plural. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press).
Jean-Luc Nancy (2000c), “War, Right, Sovereignty - Techne”, in Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Being Singular Plural. (Stanford University Press: Stanford, California), pp. 101-143.
Jean-Luc Nancy (2000d), “Eulogy for the Melee”, in Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular 
Plural, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press). 145-158.
Jean-Luc Nancy (2003a), A Finite Thinking. Trans. Simon Sparks (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press).
Jean-Luc Nancy (2003b) “Lasus judicii” in Jean-Luc Nancy (2003a), A Finite 
Thinking. Trans. Simon Sparks (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press) 152- 
171.
Jean-Luc Nancy (2003c) “Changing of the World” in Jean-Luc Nancy, A Finite 
Thinking. Trans. Simon Sparks (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press) 300- 
307.
Jean-Luc Nancy (2003d), “The Confronted Community”. Trans. Amanda Macdonald. 
Vol:6(l) Postcolonial Studies 23-34.
Jean-Luc Nancy (2003e), “Deconstruction of Monotheism”. Trans. Amanda 
Macdonald. Vol:6(l) Postcolonial Studies 37-46.
Jean-Luc Nancy (2003f), “The War of Monotheism”. Trans. Amanda Macdonald. 
Vol:6(l) Postcolonial Studies 51-53.
David Neal (1991), The Rule o f Law in a PenalColony: Law and Power in Early New 
South Wales (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Garth Nettheim (1993), “The Consent of the Natives: Mabo and Indigenous Political 
Rights” Vol: 15 Sydney Law Review 223-46.
Andrew Norris (2000), “Carl Schmitt’s Political Metaphysics: On the Secularization 
of the “the Outermost Sphere”” Vol: 4:1 Theory and Event www....
Andrew Norris (2003), “The Exemplary Exception: Philosophical and Political 
Decisions in Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer” 119 Radical Philosophy 6.
Paul Patton (1995), “Poststructuralism and the Mabo Debate: Difference, Society and 
Justice”, in Margaret Wilson and Anna Yeatman (eds.) Justice & Identity: Antipodean 
Practices (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1995). pp. 153-71.
281
Paul Patton (1997), “Justice and Difference: The Mabo Case” in Paul Patton and 
Diane Austin-Broos (eds.) Transformations in Australian Society (Sydney: Research 
Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of Sydney), pp. 83-98.
Noel Pearson (1993), “Reconciliation: To Be Or Not To Be -  Nationhood, Self- 
Determination or Self Government” 61 Aboriginal Law Bulletin 14-17.
Noel Pearson (1997), “The Concept of Native Title at Common Law” in Galarrwuy 
Yunupingu (ed.) Our Land is Our Life: Land Rights -  Past, Present and Future 
(Brisbane: University of Queensland Press).
Elizabeth Povinelli (2002), The Cunning o f Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the 
Making o f Australian Multiculturalism (Durham: Duke University Press).
President of the United States (2002) National Security Strategy o f the United States 
o f America. (White House, Washington).
William Rasch (2004) Sovereignty and its Discontents: On the Primacy o f Conflict 
and the Structure o f the Political. (London: Birkbeck Law Press)
Edward Said (1995), “East Isn’t East”, Times Literary Supplement 4792 (3rd February, 
1995), 5.
Saskia Sassen (2002), “Governance Hotspots: Challenges We Must Confront in the 
Post- September 11 World”, Vol: 19(4) Theory, Culture, Society!33-244.
Carl Schmitt, ([1922] 1985), Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept o f 
Sovereignty. Trans. George Schwab. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).
Carl Schmitt ([1932] 1996), The Concept o f the Political. Trans. George Schwab. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Patricia Seed (1995), Ceremonies o f Possession in Europe’s Conquest o f the New 
World, 1492-1640, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Gerry Simpson (1993), “Mabo, International Law, Terra Nullius and the Stories of 
Settlement: An Unresolved Jurisprudence” Vol: 19 Melbourne University Law Review 
195-210.
Gerry Simpson (2004) Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the 
International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Benedicti de Spinoza (2000), Ethics. Trans, with an Introduction by G.H.R.
Parkinson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
James L. Strachan-Davidson (1912), Problems o f the Roman Criminal Law. Vol: 1 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press).
282
Gunther Teubner (1997) “Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society” in 
Gunther Teubner (ed) Global Law Without the State (Aldershot: Dartmouth), pp. 3- 
28.
John Urry (2002), “The Global Complexities of September 11th”, Vol: 19(4) Theory, 
Culture, Society, 57-70.
Emer de Vattel (1916), The Law o f Nations or Principles o f Natural Law. Trans. 
Charles G. Fenwick (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Institution).
Jeremy Webber (1995), "The Jurisprudence of Regret: The Search for Standards of 
Justice in Mabo", Vol:17 Sydney Law Review 5.
Neil Walker (ed.) (2003) Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart Publishing).
R.B.J. Walker (1993), Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Joe L. Washington (1998), “United Nations Human Rights Apparatus for the 
Protection of Indigenous People”, Vol: 2 Mediterranean Journal o f Human Rights 17- 
47.
Irene Watson (2003), “Buried Alive” Vol: 13 Law and Critique 253-69.
Slavoj Zizek (1999), The Ticklish subject: The Absent Centre o f Political Ontology. 
(London: Verso).
283
TABLE OF CASES
A v Secretary o f State for the Home Department (Court of Appeal, October 2002). 
Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara [Western Sahara Case] [1975] I.C.J.R. 12 
Ahrens v Clark 335 U.S 188 (1948).
Air Canada v Secretary o f State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394 at 438.
The Attorney-General v Brown (1847) 1 Legge 312.
Braden v 3(fh Judicial Circuit Court o f Ky 410 U.S 484, 495 (1973).
Bonjon’s Case (1841), Judge Willis, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Papers 
Relative to the Aborigines, Australian Colonies, Enclosure 3, in No. 41, pp. 148-155.
Cherokee Nation v Georgia (1831) 30 U.S (5 Pet.) 1.
Coe v The Commonwealth (No 1) (1979) 53 ALJR 403.
Coe v The Commonwealth (No 2) (1993) 68 ALJR 110.
Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 AC 286.
Cuban American Bar Association v Christopher 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995). 
Coalition o f Clergy v Bush 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Eisentrager v Forrestal 11A Fed. Rep, 2nd S. 961 (1948).
Falen Gherebi v Bush (2003a) (United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, 13th May, 2003).
Falen Gherebi v George Walker Bush and Donald H. Rumsfeld (2003b)(United States 
Courts of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, California, December 18th, 2003).
Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96 at 128.
Hamdi v Rumsfeld (2002)(United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, No. 
02-6895, 12 July, 2002).
Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 U.S (2004).
Johnson v Eisentrager 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Johnson v M ’Intosh (1823) 21 U.S (8 Wheat.) 543.
284
Khaled A.F. Al Odah v United States o f America (United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 02-5251, March 11, 2003).
Mabo v Queensland (No 1) (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186.
Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 F.L.R 141.
New South Wales v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Case) (1975) 
135CLR 337.
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 US 1 (1942) 31.
R v Van derPeet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
Ralpho v Bell 569 F. 2d 607 (DC Cir. 1977).
Rasul v Bush 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C 2002).
Rasul v Bush 542 U.S _  (2004).
Reference Re Language Rights Under s. 23 o f the Manitoba Act, 1870 and s. 133 of 
Constitution Act, 1867 (Manitoba Language Reference), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at 749.
Rumsfeld v Padilla 542 U.S (2004).
Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1.
Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (1998) 1606 FCA.
Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [2002] HCA 58.
Zadvydas v Davis, 533 U.S 678 (2001).
285
